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Abstract
Motivated by recent monetary expansion in the United States in the aftermath of the
2007-8 financial crisis, we use a New Keynesian three-country Center-Periphery model
to define a game between policymakers in emerging economies linked to some large
industrial economy via the exchange rate. We derive welfare-based payoffs to study
the policy implications of monetary expansion in the US. We highlight cases in which
policy coordination between emerging economies may improve their welfare. We identify
cases in which countries may prefer to manipulate the exchange rate and resist currency
appreciation.
We then propose a framework based on results from a Global Vector Autoregressive
Model. This approach allows us to treat the emerging economies according to the
observed data. We use US, Chinese and Brazilian data on consumption, output and
money supply between 1994 and 2014. We perform counterfactual analysis allowing to
determine the welfare outcomes of joint monetary expansions: in the US and China, in
the US and Brazil, and in all three countries.
Our results are relevant for the ongoing discussion on the benefits of policy coor-
dination and the spillover effects of monetary policy of a large industrial country on
emerging economies and suggest that this framework can be used as a tool to coordinate
countries on welfare-superior outcomes relative to Nash equilibrium.
In the third essay we consider an N-country two-good Cobb-Douglas model with
country specific preferences and arbitrary endowments. This allows us to look at the
interactions between asymmetric countries. We provide a general existence result which
we then apply to our specific endowment economy, and provide conditions on the prim-
itives of the model that ensure the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We
show that Nash equilibria with prohibitive tariffs cannot arise.
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Introduction
This thesis is a collection of three essays about strategic interactions between policy-
makers in interdependent economies and is divided in two parts. Part one consists of
two essays describing the effects of expansionary monetary policy of an advanced econ-
omy on the welfare of emerging economies that are its trading partners, while Part two
consists of an essay about international trade in the presence of tariffs.
Existing literature typically analyzes the optimal monetary policy and monetary
policy transmission mechanism between countries either in a small open economy (see
Gali and Monacelli (2005)) or a two-country framework but without allowing the other
country to be active (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Tille
(2001). Among existing examples of strategic interactions in the context of monetary
policy is Canzoneri and Henderson (1992); however, their model is not appropriate for
welfare analysis. Among multi-county models analysing the effect of various shocks on
other countries are papers using a GVAR model (Pesaran and di Mauro (2013), Dees
et al. (2007)); however, these papers do not perform the welfare analysis of such shocks
and do not explicitly allow countries to behave strategically.
Given this gap in the literature, we aim to provide a framework that allows for a
welfare analysis in which policymakers behave strategically in complex situations similar
to those taking place recently in the global economy. We overcome the complexity by
imposing game-theoretic structure in which we restrict the strategy space in a way
that allows us to look at the welfare outcomes of interactions between the emerging
economies.
The main innovation is in applying the game-theoretic approach that facilitates
the analysis of interactions between more than two economies and their welfare con-
sequences in various scenarios in which the emerging economies are allowed to react
strategically. We explore welfare measures using two alternative approaches. In Chap-
ter 1 we use the building blocks of a New Keynesian model developed in Corsetti et al.
(2000). In Chapter 2 we make use of real world data and apply a Global Vector Autore-
1
gressive model. Both Chapters 1 and 2 have been motivated by the recent discussions
between policymakers, especially in Brazil and the US, in the aftermath of the financial
crisis of 2007-08 and the recent non-conventional monetary policy of the US, namely
three rounds of quantitative easing (see for example Rousseff (2012), Bernanke (2013)).
The ongoing debate about potential gains from coordination of international policies
(see for example Ostry and Ghosh (2013), Obstfeld (2011)) or the lack thereof has
motivated us to investigate this problem in the context of the policy of the emerging
economies in response to monetary expansion in a large advanced economy.
One of the main contributions in Chapter 1 is defining the sufficient conditions in
terms of elasticity of substitution parameters and relative size for which the resulting
Nash equilibria are not optimal, when each country has only two strategies. In such
cases, the so called Prisoner’s Dilemma, we identify rationale for policy coordination and
suggest that our framework can be used by an institution to coordinate the economies
towards welfare-superior outcomes. Our sufficient conditions tell us that in the presence
of large asymmetries between the emerging economies countries would not gain from
policy coordination.
Since the starting motivation arose from real economic events we further extend the
study using macro-level data in order to see if the empirical predictions are consistent
with the theory in Chapter 1. Therefore the approach in Chapters 1 and 2 are strongly
connected and the design of the welfare measure in Chapter 2 follows from Chapter
1. In both the theoretical and empirical approaches we analyze different scenarios and
generate policy recommendations. As a result of the empirical analysis, we conclude
that there is no need for policy coordination between Brazil and China. In each case
the resulting Nash equilibrium is welfare superior to the available alternatives - there
is no Prisoner’s Dilemma. Chapter 2 uncovers further interesting finding: both the
welfare consequences of the expansionary monetary policy in the US, as well policy
recommendations for the emerging economies, vary over time. We think that the main
reason for this change might reflect the way the monetary policy transmission has been
affected in connection with the unconventional monetary policy of quantitative easing
in the US.
Part two is joint work with Professor Subir Chattopadhyay. In this chapter, similarly
to Chapters 1 and 2, we are interested in strategic interactions between policymakers in
more than two economies, and work with a model that allows us to potentially analyze
the role of asymmetries between countries. Although this was our initial motivation,
we have identified a gap in the existing literature, namely very limited results about
2
the conditions that ensure the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a model
like ours. Therefore we investigate the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in an N-country two-good Cobb-Douglas model with country specific preferences and
arbitrary endowments. This existence result forms an essential basis for more in depth
analysis of the outcomes of strategic interactions between policymakers in the presence
of size and preference asymmetries. We provide conditions on the primitives of the
model that ensure the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition we
show that Nash equilibria with prohibitive tariffs cannot arise when these conditions
are satisfied. We believe that having established those results is an important step in
the analysis of the outcomes of tariff wars, both for theoretical as well as numerical
approaches.
3
Chapter 1
Strategic interactions in emerging
economies and their welfare
consequences: A theoretical
approach
1.1 Introduction
Spillovers from domestic policies have been recognized for a long time in the macroe-
conomic literature. In the context of recent US expansionary monetary policy in the
aftermath of the 2007-8 financial crisis (see Figure 1.1) policymakers in many, both in-
dustrial as well as emerging economies are aware of the existence of such spillovers (see
Powell (2013), Sanchez (2013)). Although recognition interconnectedness is widespread,
there is no consensus about the effect of such expansionary monetary policy on other
countries. Often there are contradicting opinions between policymakers. On the one
hand, the Governor of the Fed Powell (2013) and Fed’s Chairman Bernanke (2013) con-
sider the US expansionary monetary policy to be ”enrich-thy-neighbor”. On the other
hand, the President of Brazil claims that such policy has a harmful effect on emerging
economies and contributes to deepening of the recession (Rousseff, 2012).
These recent discussions concentrate around the role and influence of policies origi-
nating in a large industrial country such as the US on the world economy, and emerging
economies in particular. However, little attention has been devoted to how this effect
depends on the behaviour of individual countries (U.S. Department (of the Treasury,
2011)). This is an important strategic aspect which we want to highlight and show how
4
Figure 1.1: US Money supply M1 between 2006 and 2013, Quarterly, Seasonally Ad-
justed, Change from year ago, Billions of Dollars, Source: FRED of St. Louis (2014)
countries’ welfare depends on individual actions of emerging economies. Not only do
the reactions of these countries, i.e. policy decisions in response to monetary expansion
in the US matter for their welfare, but also other factors such as their relative size
and elasticity of substitution between goods. In this sense it becomes apparent that
the same policy of the US may affect each country differently, what can be attributed
to the existing asymmetries between countries. Moreover, due to these asymmetries,
some of the emerging economies may play an important role in transmitting or even
generating spillovers to other emerging economies. For example, Mattoo et al. (2012)
have shown the impact of Chinese real exchange appreciation on boosting exports in
other countries with which China competes on third markets.
With these discussions in mind, we will look at the behaviour of a large emerg-
ing economy such as China, generating spillovers to another smaller country1, such as
Brazil, that is potentially negatively affected by Chinese and US spillovers. Both coun-
tries responded to US monetary expansion with an increase in money supply (see Figure
1.2), yet the changes in their exchange rate vis-a-vis US were not the same. Complaints
by Brazil’s President may imply that Brazil, in allowing its currency to appreciate
(see Figure 1.3), had a different experience than China, who resisted appreciation and
1in terms of size of trade, see Table 2.6.
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initially maintained a fixed exchange rate with the US.
With the help of a game-theoretic framework we would like to understand and
explain these actions and their implications on welfare of these emerging economies.
We would also like to see whether alternative actions could yield welfare improvement
for either or both of the countries. Using the concept of Nash equilibrium will allow us
to determine the optimal response of each country.
Despite many approaches to the analysis of transmission of shocks abroad, and their
influence on interconnected economies, the theoretical literature has mainly focused on
two countries. Due to the important role of the strategic aspect of interactions and their
influence on countries’ welfare we choose to work with more than a two-country model.
Among few existing three-country models is Corsetti et al. (2000). However they do
not design a game, nor look at Nash equilibria. Another is Canzoneri and Henderson
(1992), who however do not have the ingredients of a New Keynesian model, and they
focus on coalition formation. Since countries can respond to the policy of the Center,
we find it vital to include strategic interactions between policymakers in the model. We
use the Corsetti et al. (2000) model and make use of their building blocks to construct a
non-cooperative game2, which in turn allows us to answer the questions of interest in a
structured way. Such game-theoretic analysis has been long called for in the literature,
for example by Corsetti and Pesenti (1997), who recognized that it is of interest to
analyze the interactions of policymakers using game theory3.
The study of strategic interactions between policy makers in interdependent economies
using monetary policy as their instrument through a game-theoretic approach is not
a new topic in the literature. This research has been pioneered by Hamada (1985).
International monetary interdependence using game theory was further analyzed by
Canzoneri and Henderson (1992). However, at that time microeconomic foundations of
macroeconomic models were not available and thus welfare analysis using these mod-
els was not possible. The development of the New Keynesian models with nominal
rigidities and monopolistic competition allows us to analyze the welfare effects of mon-
etary policy. This chapter aims to analyze such consequences from a strategic game-
2We construct a game motivated by Corsetti et al. (2000) who wrote: ”Yet, the next crucial step
in the analysis will consist of adopting a game-theoretical approach, so as to focus more directly on
strategic interactions and non-cooperative equilibria across countries. The structure of international
spillovers and the micro-foundations of the mechanism of policy transmission discussed in this paper
are meant to provide the building blocks for a development of the analysis in such direction.” [p. 239,
Corsetti et al. (2000)]
3”(...) we leave to further contributions the detailed game-theoretic analysis of international strate-
gic interactions (...)” [p.26, Corsetti and Pesenti (1997)]
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theoretic perspective using a welfare-based approach. Among existing games between
two countries are papers by Benigno (2002), who compares competitive with monopo-
listic allocations, and Benigno and Benigno (2008), who look at cooperation between
policymakers. However, these papers look at continuous optimal policy and its imple-
mentation in a two-country framework. Such analysis becomes extremely difficult as
soon as we extend the model to three countries. This is why we will only look at discrete
choices in the strategy space of policymakers in the Periphery who can choose between
keeping their money supply fixed or fixing their exchange rate. In the strategies in
which the Periphery countries are assumed to keep their exchange rate fixed relative
to the Center, the monetary policy rule is an ’exchange-rate rule’. In such case the
country’s money supply has to be determined passively, by whatever is necessary to
keep the exchange rate fixed. In the cases in which the Periphery countries allow their
currencies to fluctuate, the monetary policy can be conducted using money supply or
via following an interest-rate rule. Since the exchange rate can easily be expressed as
a function of money supply in this model we choose to conduct monetary policy via
the money-supply rule. Alternatively, policymakers could use interest-rate rule, which
we believe will qualitatively yield similar results. However, due to the fact that the
interest-rate rules involve various forms of feedback of the interest rate on inflation,
output, etc., the results of the analysis are likely to be sensitive to the feedback param-
eters and to the choice of feedback variables. Even though we use this simplification,
i.e. a discrete strategy space, the model still remains complicated since we allow for dif-
ferent elasticities of substitution between goods produced at home and between goods
produced abroad. This approach has been introduced by Tille (2001), who looked at
the effect of a monetary shock in an open economy, an extension to standard analysis
assuming equal elasticities like in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). Our results are in terms
of relative size of within- and between-country substitutabilities and relative size of
countries, which allows us to investigate the role of asymmetries in welfare changes.
Our main contribution is the construction of a game-theoretic framework for the
analysis of strategic interactions, shedding light on recent monetary policy develop-
ments in the United States and their effect on emerging economies, such as Brazil and
China. Our framework is constructed based on payoffs derived from the building blocks
of the Corsetti et al. (2000) model. In the context of recent discussions about gains
from coordination and how to achieve them, we show that our framework can be used
to identify the existence of such gains and possibly used as a tool for supranational
authorities to coordinate countries on welfare-improving outcomes. We identify situa-
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Figure 1.2: Brazil and China Money supply M1 between 2008 and 2013, Quarterly, Not
Seasonally Adjusted, Change from year ago, Source: FRED (IMF) of St. Louis (2014)
tions in which self-oriented policy may lead countries to get stuck in an equilibrium with
lower payoffs, the so called Prisoner’s Dilemma, and show when such inferior equilibria
will not arise. Need for coordination has recently received more attention, especially
after the Great Moderation, due to the amplification mechanism and spillovers from
uncoordinated responses of policymakers in different countries, see Taylor (2013). We
believe that our findings can be used to explain why self-oriented policies may not be
optimal from the point of view of global welfare, and justify coordination4, which has
been discussed in the literature for a long period of time with little support (Oudiz and
Sachs (1984), Taylor (1985), Taylor (1993), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), Rogoff (1985),
and Carraro and Giavazzi (1988)).
Rather than providing a mechanism allowing countries not to end up in Pareto-
inefficient outcomes, we aim to provide a tool for policymakers and possibly for a
neutral assessor, that would help in explaining the benefits of coordinated actions.
”Coordination in this sense, does not require policymakers to act against their national
interests, but rather to recognize that alternative policy packages - when pursued by all
parties - can allow each to improve national welfare” (Ostry and Ghosh (2013), p. 5-7).
Although the equilibrium with coordination improves welfare of both countries, because
4Typically what is meant by ’coordination’ in this literature is in terms of game theory considered as
’cooperation’. We will follow the literature and point out at a later stage when the term ’coordination’
is used more formally.
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Figure 1.3: Exchange Rates of the Brazilian Real (secondary-right axis) and Chinese
Yuan (primary-left axis) to the US Dollar between 2008 and 2014, Source: Banco
Central do Brasil and Bank of China (via DataStream)
of the incentive to deviate, it is not a stable outcome. This is why without commitment
or international sanctions, coordination is so difficult to achieve. A possible solution to
that commitment problem is to allow for the possibility of side payments between all
countries, which would require a change in the design of the current game.
Our main result is to show that in the absence of large size asymmetries emerging
economies can benefit from coordination. This allows one to understand the common
view in the ongoing debate that coordination may not always be desirable. We suggest
two possible explanations why China resisted appreciation. In one of them we show
that as a large emerging economy it has a dominant strategy to peg, and in the other
we justify it with the presence of uncertainty about the model, a situation in which a
peg yields always positive payoffs. We show that the US recommendation for emerging
economies to allow their currencies to appreciate is optimal, only if these emerging
economies are small and under a particular assumption on the substitutability between
goods. The reasons why Brazil allowed its currency to appreciate are harder to explain.
Maybe Brazil would have preferred to peg, which is an optimal strategy under certain
circumstances, but the size of its monetary expansion was not large enough? After all
Brazil has a flexible exchange rate and it might not be in its interest to manipulate it.
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Perhaps Brazil hoped that China would do the same and then the welfare effect of US
monetary expansion would not be so negative as Brazil experienced it. With the help
of our model we are able to explain why Brazil had reasons to complain, and justify it
with the possible spillovers generated by the policy of China.
In the next section we recall the model from Corsetti et al. (2000), and show how we
derive the payoffs to construct a game between policymakers. In Section 1.3 we present
our results. In Section 1.4 we conclude.
1.2 The Model
The building blocks of the model are adopted from Corsetti et al. (2000). The model is
a three-country version of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001),
allowing for differences in substitutability between goods produced in different coun-
tries. Each country specializes in production of one set of goods. Producers operate in
monopolistically competitive markets producing a continuum of brands and face down-
ward sloping demand curves. The source of nominal rigidities is preset prices, that
cannot be adjusted after the shocks occur in the short run. All producers must keep
their prices unchanged and can adjust them in the following period, in which the long
run equilibrium is reached. The only adjustment that takes place in the short run is
increase in production (employment). The labour market is not modelled explicitly in
this model.
Households are defined over a continuum of unit mass with the respective popula-
tion’s shares of the Periphery, denoted by γP ∈ [0, 1] and the Center γC ∈ [0, 1] in the
world economy. The share of country A in the Periphery’s populations is denoted by
γA, where γA ∈ [0, 1], therefore the size of country A is simply γAγP . Similarly the size
of country B is (1−γA)γP , since its share in the population of the Periphery is (1−γA)
(See Figure 1.4).
The representative household in country j, where j = A, B, C, at time t (as in
Corsetti et al. (2000), p. 221) derives utility from consumption, money balances and
disutility from work effort:
U jt =
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
lnCjt+s + χln
(
M jt+s
P jt+s
)
− κ
2
(Y jt+s)
2
]
(1.1)
where κ and χ are positive constants and β is the discount rate between 0 and 1.
Household wants to maximize utility, subject to the budget constraint of the form:
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Figure 1.4: Population size in each country
EjtB
j
t+1
P jt
+
M jt
P jt
+ Cjt = (1 + it)
EjtB
j
t
P jt
+
M jt−1
P jt
+
SRjt
P jt
− T
j
t
P jt
(1.2)
where Ej is the nominal exchange rate, defined as country j’s currency per unit of
Center currency (i.e. EC = 1), it is the nominal yield on the bond Bt in terms of the
Center’s currency; SRj is agent’s sales revenue in nominal terms, and T j is a lump sum
tax denominated in country j’s currency. Each unit of household’s labor, Lt produces
one unit of output Yt, so the production function is given by Yt = Lt (which linearized
around the symmetric steady-state can be expressed as yt = lt).
The consumption of a representative household from country j in this model consists
of goods produced in the Periphery and the Center:
Cj =
[
γ
1
ρ
P
(
CjP
) ρ−1
ρ + (1− γP )
1
ρ
(
CjC
) ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
(1.3)
where ρ is the elasticity of substitution between the types of goods produced in the
Center and the Periphery, and CjP is a function of goods produced in country A and
country B defined as:
CjP =
[
γ
1
ψ
A
(
CjA
)ψ−1
ψ + (1− γA)
1
ψ
(
CjB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
(1.4)
where ψ the elasticity of substitution between the types of goods produced in country
A and B. In each country there is a continuum of varieties, and the consumption
subindexes are given by the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions:
CjA =
[
(γAγP )
− 1
θ
∫ γAγP
0
(CjA(z))
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(1.5)
11
CjB =
[
((1− γA)γP )− 1θ
∫ γP
γAγP
(CjB(z))
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(1.6)
CjC =
[
(1− γP )− 1θ
∫ 1
γP
(CjC(z))
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(1.7)
where θ is the the elasticity of substitution between the types of goods within one
country (and θ > 1).
Corsetti et al. (2000) assume that each country specializes in production of one
type of good, which corresponds to the following restriction: ρ ≤ ψ ≤ θ. We relax this
parameter restriction to identify cases in which the expansionary monetary policy of the
Center can be beggar-thy-neighbour for the Periphery countries, as well as a situation
of Prisoner’s Dilemma when both Periphery countries keep their exchange rates fixed.
From intertemporal optimization we obtain the following first order conditions:
• the Euler equation, which informs us about the way consumers smooth consump-
tion over time:
Cjt+1
Cjt
= β(1 + it+1)
PCt
PCt+1
(1.8)
where PCt is the price of goods in the currency of the Center, i.e. P
C
t =
P jt
Ejt
.
• money demand equation, which embodies the uncovered interest parity condition,
and shows that households are indifferent between consuming a unit of consump-
tion at date t, or using the funds for real money balances, and converting them
back to consumption in period t+ 1:
M jt
P jt
= χCjt
(1 + it+1)E
j
t+1
(1 + it+1)E
j
t+1 − Ejt
(1.9)
• and pricing rule in flexible price equilibrium, in which producers set the price as
a markup on marginal cost, which comes form an equilibrium condition in which
marginal cost of producing an extra unit equals marginal revenue generated by
it:
P jj,t
P jt
=
θκ
θ − 1C
j
t Y
j
t (1.10)
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where P jj,t is the price of good produced and consumed in country j, and P
j
t is the
price level in country j.
The price indices derived from expenditure minimization problems are as follows:
P iA =
[
1
γAγP
∫ γAγP
0
(
P iA(z)
)(1−θ)
dz
] 1
1−θ
(1.11)
P iB =
[
1
(1− γA)γP
∫ γP
γAγP
(
P iB(z)
)(1−θ)
dz
] 1
1−θ
(1.12)
P iC =
[
1
(1− γP )
∫ 1
γP
(
P iC(z)
)(1−θ)
dz
] 1
1−θ
(1.13)
P iP =
[
γA
(
P iA
)(1−ψ)
+ (1− γA)
(
P iB
)(1−ψ)] 11−ψ
(1.14)
and
P i =
[
γP
(
P iP
)(1−ρ)
+ (1− γP )
(
P iC
)(1−ρ)] 11−ρ
(1.15)
In the presence of monopolistic competition producers set prices above marginal
cost. The markup ( θ
θ−1) reflects the market power of producers and this results in
output below competitive level. The market power of firms decreases as θ gets larger.
The current account balance equals the accumulation of net claims on abroad and
income from sold units of output and payoff from riskless bonds denominated in the
currency of the Center, minus households consumption:
Ejt
P jt
(Bjt+1 −Bjt ) = it
EjtB
j
t
P jt
+
SRjt
P jt
− Cjt (1.16)
and the net supply of bonds is zero in equilibrium:
0 = γAγPB
A + (1− γA)γPBB + (1− γP )BC (1.17)
The seigniorage revenue is repayed to consumers in form of a lump sum transfer, so
the government’s budget constraint is of the form:
M jt −M jt−1 = −P jt T jt (1.18)
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1.2.1 Solution
The model focuses on the impact of small monetary shocks and is solved for log-
deviations from an initial symmetric equilibrium. We follow same log-linearization
method as Corsetti et al. (2000), i.e. x ≈ X−X0
X0
. For the linearized model and solution
see details in Corsetti et al. (2000) and in Appendix 1.8.
1.2.2 Macroeconomic properties of the model
The effect of unanticipated, permanent monetary expansion in one country on the rest
of the world (ROW) has been analyzed in the related literature, such as Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1995) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001). These seminal models have been further
extended by Tille (2001), who emphasized the role of the differences between the within-
and between-country elasticities of substitution. The main difference between these ap-
proaches are the assumptions about the relative elasticities of substitution parameters.
In Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), in a two-country model, because the within-country
and between-country elasticity of substitution are set equal to each other, monetary
expansion in one country improves the welfare of both countries. A positive welfare
change after the shock in their model is a result of the adjustment of inefficiently low
output stemming from monopolistic competition, in the presence of nominal rigidities.
If prices were flexible, producers could adjust prices instead of output. Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001) in their model allow the within- and between-country substitutability
to vary, however they fix the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in dif-
ferent countries to one. Fixing between-country elasticity of substitution in this way,
switches off the effect coming from the so called Marshall-Lerner-Robinson (MLR) con-
dition. The MLR condition informs us about the effect on the trade balance of a change
in relative prices. If the sum of import and export elasticities (here between-country
elasticity5) is greater than one, currency devaluation will improve the trade balance of
that country where the shock has originated. As long as the between-country elasticity
of substitution is different from one, consumption smoothing will take place via ad-
justment in the current account. This effect is absent in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001),
whereas it is at the heart of Tille’s (2001) paper and this chapter.
In this model the transmission mechanism is basically the same as in Tille (2001),
with some exceptions, one being the consequence of allowing for more than two coun-
tries, and as a consequence introducing an additional intra-Periphery elasticity of sub-
5see Tille (2001), p. 443 for proof.
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stitution, and the other being a consequence of countries’ strategic interactions, i.e. the
fact that we allow a country to react to monetary expansion, by changing its money
supply. At this stage we describe the general mechanism at work in this model, treating
the world as two countries (these would correspond to the strategy of an active Center
and a passive Periphery) and refrain from describing the effect of monetary shock in
the presence of strategic interaction, leaving them for the results section of this paper.
In an economy with monopolistic competition output is sub-optimally low. A small
monetary shock raises employment and output, and in the presence of aggregate de-
mand externality and nominal rigidity improves worldwide welfare. The distribution
of welfare depends in turn on the degree of substitutability of goods between countries
relative to the within-country substitutability (see equations (1.137) and (1.145)). To
be more precise, the elasticity of substitution informs us at which rate exports to differ-
ent countries are transformed into consumption in that country. It may happen, that
welfare is decreased in some countries, which may happen even in the country where
the shock originated - the so called beggar-thyself effect.
As an effect of monetary expansion in one country, call it home, its agents want to
consume more of home and foreign goods due to increased wealth. Increased demand
for foreign goods creates higher demand for foreign currency and therefore depreciation
of home currency. The nominal exchange rate in the home country depreciates (see
equations (1.130) and (1.138)) and causes a change in relative prices, in particular, the
real price of home goods decreases. Depreciation generates consumption-switching to-
wards home goods in the short run, the so called expenditure switching or consumption
effect. Depending on the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in different
countries this consumption switch increases, if elasticity of substitution is greater than
one, or decreases sales revenue at home, if elasticity is smaller than one.
Relative output and employment at home increase in the short run (see equations
(1.133) and (1.140)), and if the sales revenue increases, home agents can save part of
their income in form of current account surplus (equations (1.131) and (1.142)), to
smooth consumption over time.
This is a situation in which the so called MLR condition holds, meaning that goods
produced at home and abroad are strong substitutes, and depreciation generates a
(trade) current account surplus. Since in the short run home nominal prices are fixed
we can observe terms of trade worsening in the home country6. Current account surplus
6The opposite happens, if the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is less than
unit elastic. The consumption at home decreases in the short term, country has a trade deficit and
lends abroad to allow for higher consumption abroad.
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at home implies for the foreign country, that in order to pay his debt in the long run,
it has to increase production relative to home country. This in turn means that home
country production in the long term will be necessary lower, causing an increase in
relative price of home output. Terms of trade effect in the long term is reversed, and
relative price of home output increases. This is the so called terms of trade improvement,
which allows agents to afford more imports for given level of exports. As long as the
goods from abroad have smaller elasticity of substitution than goods produced at home,
extra consumption is too small to offset the additional effort, and welfare at home can
be decreased. If the within- and between-country substitutability are the same, an
increase in welfare from increased consumption is offset by the increase of disutility of
work effort from increased production, and the change in utility in both countries is the
same.
Increased demand in the presence of inability to adjust prices can be met by in-
creased output allowing for higher consumption. Increased consumption increases wel-
fare, but increased output means increased disutility from work effort. If the cost of
effort is more than offset by larger consumption, the overall welfare in the country
where the monetary expansion takes place increases. This happens if the between-
country substitutability of goods (relative consumption of foreign goods increases) is
smaller than the within-country substitutability (absolute consumption of home goods
increases).
To sum up, the key mechanism relies on what happens to the home country’s stock
of net foreign assets. If there is a current account surplus, this stock goes up . Home
agents are then wealthier than before, and this higher wealth raises their demand for
leisure (if leisure is a ‘normal’ good). Equivalently, it lowers labour supply and hence
lowers home output. A monetary expansion, if it affects the trade balance, has a
permanent effect on output and the terms of trade, even though price rigidities are
only temporary. This is because it has permanent effect on net foreign assets: they
inhibit ‘hysteresis’, or ‘unit root’ behaviour.
1.2.3 Game setup
We analyze the effect of a positive, permanent, exogenous monetary shock originating
in the big industrial economy (called the Center) on the emerging economies (called the
Periphery), given that the policymakers in the Periphery have two available strategies.
We assume that the Center remains passive. We consider the following sequence of
events:
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1. Exogenous permanent monetary shock in the Center, m¯C > 0,
2. Simultaneous decision about money supply by policymakers in country A and B.
We consider a game between policymakers in country A and B with a discrete
set of strategies for the Periphery countries form a strategy space S = {0, m¯C}7. In
order to construct a game in normal form with strategies that have convenient real life
interpretation we choose to allow policymakers to decide between two strategies. In
principle, it would be possible to use a continuous strategy space, but we decide for a
discrete set for two reasons. One of them is the analytical convenience that a binary
choice of strategies implies, the other is the fact that in the current policy debate the
binary choice corresponds to the inherent decision that the emerging economies are
facing, namely whether to keep their exchange fixed or to keep their money supply
fixed. On the one hand, keeping the money supply fixed is motivated by the desire to
resist the inflationary pressures that arise in a country operating under fixed exchange
regime after monetary expansion in the Center. Resisting inflation can be achieved by
exiting the fixed exchange rate regime and allowing the currency to appreciate. On the
other hand, keeping the exchange rate fixed is motivated by the desire to prevent the
loss in competitiveness in the Periphery country/ies after monetary expansion in the
Center. Maintaining a fixed exchange, a strategy called PEG, in the model can achieved
only by an increase in money supply of the same size in the Periphery country as in the
Center. Currency appreciation in the Periphery countries, a strategy called APP, can
be achieved by keeping their money supply at unchanged level. Given that on average
the inflationary pressures are higher in emerging economies than in advanced economies
we do not consider a strategy in which abandoning fixed exchange by increasing money
supply more than in the Center would result in currency depreciation in the Periphery
countries.
To sum up each policymaker in country A and B maximizes the utility of a repre-
sentative agent in their own country by making one of two available choices about her
money supply m¯i, and decides whether to leave it at unchanged level or permanently
increase it. The strategies of the policymaker in country i = A,B result in either of
these two outcomes:
1. Fixed exchange rate vis-a-vis the Center, i.e. ei = 0 (see equation (1.138) in
7This somehow narrower and discrete strategy space enables us to overcome technical difficulties
that arise as soon as we allow for a richer strategy space, which leads to achieving the same goal as
in this game. For details about the alternative strategy space and its implications for the results see
Remark 1.5.1 in Appendix 1.5.
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Appendix 1.8), call it PEG, which is achieved by increasing the money supply
by the same amount as the Center, i.e mi = m¯C ; or
2. Currency appreciation in country i, i.e. ei < 0 (see equation (1.138) in Appendix
1.8), call it APP, which is achieved by not changing the level of money supply
i.e. mi = 0.
Policymakers take the strategy of the other country as given. Price setters do not
form any expectations about the game, and do not expect money supply to change once
the prices have been set. We could possibly explain this behaviour by assuming that, at
the moment prices were set, the policymakers were not welfare maximizers but simple
money supply targeters. After the prices have been set, there are unexpected changes
in government in all countries, and welfare-maximizing policymakers are elected. We
treat such events as having very low probability of occurrence such that the price
setters were not expecting that. Policymakers maximize over available choices from the
strategy space by comparing potential payoffs. Payoff construction is presented in the
next section.
1.2.4 Payoffs
By comparing the payoffs from available strategies we find Nash equilibria, and give
policy recommendations based on realized changes in utilities from available actions,
depending on the characteristics of the economies, with particular focus on the role
of asymmetries between countries. The payoffs express the changes in the utility of
a representative agent after the shock, and reflect changes in short- and long-term
consumption and output.
We can distinguish between three periods that play an important role in the dy-
namics of the game, namely t = 0, t = 1, and t ≥ 2. In t = 0 each economy in an
initial symmetric steady-state. This period serves as a reference and the variables of the
model are log-linearized around their initial steady-state values at t = 0. In time t = 1
a permanent expansionary monetary shock takes place in the Center country. We refer
to the events taking place at time t = 1 as short-run. Each country in the Periphery
may or may not respond with a permanent monetary expansion of the same size as
in the Center. Because of the presence of one-period price rigidity the producers can
meet changes in demand after the shock by adjusting production/output at time t = 1.
In the short-run, after the shock, variables can deviate from their initial equilibrium
values from time t = 0. At t = 2, which we call the long-run, the economy comes back
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to the flexible-price equilibrium (with new permanently higher than in t = 0 money
supply in the Center, and potentially higher/or the same money supply in the Periphery
countries). Beyond t = 2 the economy stays in the long-run equilibrium. For notational
convenience we use variables without bar to denote the log-linearized variables (around
the symmetric steady-state) in the short-run (x), and variables with a bar to denote
the log-linearized variables in the long-run (x¯).
The payoffs are derived using the building blocks of the Corsetti et al. (2000) model.
Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) we focus only on the real components of the utility
function (URt ), assuming that the parameter χ→ 0:
URt = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
lnCjt+s −
κ
2
(Y jt+s)
2
]
(1.19)
Since the new steady state is reached after one period (prices are fixed for one period
only) we can rewrite (1.19) as the sum of the short term effect (denoted by C and Y )
together with the discounted sum of long term effects (denoted by C¯ and Y¯ ):
URt =
[
lnCj(x)− κ
2
(Y j)2
]
+
β
1− β
[
lnC¯j − κ
2
(Y¯ j)2
]
(1.20)
We will proceed using a log-linear approximation of a variable X, where X = {C, Y }
in the utility function around its (initial) steady state X0:
X = elogX ≈ elogX0 + elogX0(logX − logX0) (1.21)
X ≈ X0 +X0(logX − logX0) (1.22)
X −X0
X0
≈ (logX − logX0) ≡ x (1.23)
Consider the utility function and its value at the (initial) steady state (where we
omit indexes for simplicity):
URt =
[
logC − κ
2
Y 2
]
+
β
1− β
[
logC¯ − κ
2
Y¯ 2
]
(1.24)
UR0 =
[
logC0 − κ
2
Y 20
]
+
β
1− β
[
logC¯0 − κ
2
Y¯0
2
]
(1.25)
and subtracting equation (1.25) from (1.24) yields:
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uj ≈ URt − UR0 = c−
κ
2
(Y 2 − Y 20 ) +
β
1− β
[
c¯− κ
2
(Y¯ 2 − Y 20 )
]
(1.26)
Now we can log-linearize the nonlinear terms around their initial steady state value:
Y 2 = e2logX ≈ Y 20 + 2Y 20 (logY − logY0) (1.27)
Y 2 − Y 20 ≈ 2Y 20 (logY − logY0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡y
(1.28)
Based on that equation (1.26) can be rewritten as:
uj ≈ URt − UR0 ≈ c− κY 20 y +
β
1− β
[
c¯− κY 20 y¯
]
(1.29)
Then we substitute the value of the initial steady state:
Y0 =
√
θ − 1
θκ
and thus
Y 20 =
θ − 1
θκ
we can express the approximation around the symmetric, flexible-price equilibrium:
uj = cj − κθ − 1
θκ
yj +
β
1− β
[
c¯j − κθ − 1
θκ
y¯j
]
= cj − θ − 1
θ
yj +
β
1− β
[
c¯j − θ − 1
θ
y¯j
]
(1.30)
The net present value is the sum of short term value and the discounted sum of the
long term value, so:
xnpv = x+
β
1− β x¯ (1.31)
and the changes in the utility of a representative agent relative to symmetric equi-
librium, following a monetary shock, will represent player’s payoff of the form:
uj = cjnpv −
θ − 1
θ
yjnpv (1.32)
As in Corsetti et al. (2000) we can express relative utilities in the following form
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(after substitution for cj and yj as functions of m¯i, see expressions in Appendix 1.8):
• Center-Periphery
uP − uC = ρ− θ
ρθ
(
1 + ρ
1 + β + ρ(1− β)
)
(m¯P − m¯C) (1.33)
• Intra-Periphery
uA − uB = ψ − θ
ψθ
(
1 + ψ
1 + β + ψ(1− β)
)
(m¯A − m¯B) (1.34)
Using equations (1.33) and (1.34), and using the fact that the change in the world
utility after a positive monetary shock is:
uw =
1
θ
m¯w (1.35)
and applying the following definitions:
xP ≡ γAxA + (1− γA)xB (1.36)
xw ≡ γPxP + (1− γP )xC (1.37)
we can derive individual payoffs.
The overall change in the utilities after the shock for country A and B can be
written in terms of countries’ money supply choices, and the underlying parameters of
the model:
• Payoff of country A:
uA =
1
θ
[[γPγA + (1− γP )γAΠ(ρ) + (1− γA)Π(ψ)]m¯A
+[γP (1− γA) + (1− γP )(1− γA)Π(ρ)− (1− γA)Π(ψ)]m¯B
+ [(1− γP )(1− Π(ρ))]m¯C ] (1.38)
• Payoff of country B:
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uB =
1
θ
[[γPγA + (1− γP )γAΠ(ρ)− γAΠ(ψ)]m¯A
+[γP (1− γA) + (1− γP )(1− γA)Π(ρ) + γAΠ(ψ)]m¯B
+ [(1− γP )(1− Π(ρ))]m¯C ] (1.39)
where Π(x) =
(
x−θ
x
) (
1+x
1+β+x(1−β)
)
, where x = ρ, ψ .
In Lemma 1 we specify the properties of Π(x), which will be helpful in the results
section.
Lemma 1. Let Π(x) =
(
x−θ
x
) (
1+x
1+β+x(1−β)
)
. Assume that θ > 1. Then Π(x) is a
strictly increasing function in x ∈ R \ {0}, and Π(x) has the following properties: 1.
Π(x) = 0 if x = θ, 2. Π(x) < 0 if 0 < x < θ, 3. Π(x) > 0 if x > θ, 4. The Solutions
to Π(x) = 1 are:
x =
β + θ −√β2 + 6βθ + θ2
2β
and x =
β + θ +
√
β2 + 6βθ + θ2
2β
5. Π(x) > 1 if x >
β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
.
Proof : See Appendix 1.7.1.
Remark 1. It follows from the definition of monotonicity that Π(ψ) > Π(ρ) if ψ >
ρ > 0, or alternatively Π(ψ) < Π(ρ) if 0 < ψ < ρ, in which case Π(ψ) = Π(ρ) if and
only if ψ = ρ > 0.
Π(x) can only be greater than 1, if x is sufficiently larger than θ (see Figure 1.6 in the
Appendix). Numerical examples show that this happens, if the difference between x and
θ is greater than 2. In most cases this is not an issue, because, since the within-country
substitutability is greater than the one between countries usually Π(x) < 0.
Strategy specific payoffs
In this section we present payoffs specific to our game, in which each country in the
Periphery, in response to monetary expansion in the Center can either adjust money
supply to keep its exchange rate unchanged vis-a-vis the Center mi = m¯C > 0, a
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strategy called PEG, or to allow its currency to appreciate by leaving the money supply
at unchanged level mi = 0, a strategy called APP, where i = A,B. We include the
payoffs of the Center to see the effect of different reactions of the Periphery countries
to the shock on the welfare of country C.
Definition 1. Payoff for country i is denoted by uiX,Y , where X = APP or X = PEG
is the strategy of country A, and Y = APP or Y = PEG is the strategy of country B.
The function uiX,Y is defined as:
uiX,Y : S ⊂ R8 → R
where the domain S of uiX,Y is defined as
S := (1,∞) × (0,∞) × (0,∞) × (0, 1) × [0, 1] × [0, 1] × [0, 1] × (−∞,+∞), with
θ ∈ (1,∞), ψ ∈ (0,∞), ρ ∈ (0,∞), β ∈ (0, 1), γA ∈ [0, 1], γB ∈ [0, 1], γP ∈ [0, 1], m¯C ∈
(−∞,+∞). The function uiX,Y measures a change in the utility of a representative
agent in country i after the shock, relative to initial equilibrium.
In Table 1.1 we present a game between country A and B in normal form, with
strategy specific payoffs defined below:
Table 1.1: Payoff matrix
uBPEG,PEG u
B
PEG,APP
uAPEG,PEG u
A
PEG,APP
uBAPP,PEG u
B
APP,APP
uAAPP,PEG u
A
APP,APP
PEG APP
PEG
APP
Country B
C
ou
n
tr
y
A
• Strategy PEG PEG - Both Periphery countries maintain the exchange rate at
unchanged level, i.e. m¯A = m¯B = m¯C :
uAPEG,PEG =
1
θ
m¯C (1.40)
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uBPEG,PEG =
1
θ
m¯C (1.41)
uCPEG,PEG =
1
θ
m¯C (1.42)
Payoffs of countries A and B, as well as of the Center are always positive in this
strategy. Equal increase in money supply in all countries must increase welfare in
all of them, because of short run increase in aggregate demand, raising output and
removing some of the inefficiency caused by the existence of monopoly. In such
case there is no exchange rate nor terms of trade effect neither in the Periphery
countries nor in the Center. This is due to proportionate increase in money supply.
• Strategy APP APP - Both Periphery countries allow their currency to appreciate
relative to the Center, maintaining their money supply at unchanged level, i.e.
m¯A = m¯B = 0 :
uAAPP,APP =
1
θ
(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)m¯C (1.43)
uBAPP,APP =
1
θ
(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)m¯C (1.44)
uCAPP,APP =
1
θ
[1− γP + γPΠ(ρ)]m¯C (1.45)
If both Periphery countries allow their currencies to appreciate, after monetary
expansion in the Center, the change in their utility will be positive, if Π(ρ) <
1, and negative, if Π(ρ) > 1. The sign of the welfare change depends on the
substitutability between home and foreign goods (see Lemma 1). Intuitively,
after monetary expansion in the Center, Periphery experiences terms of trade
improvement which makes home goods more expensive. Demand shifts away form
Periphery goods and sales revenue from exports decreases. If ρ is sufficiently high
(so that Π(ρ) > 1) despite of appreciation of their currency agents in the Periphery
cannot afford increase in imports form the Center because their sales revenue has
decreased. The net effect of these changes may be negative and therefore, in
cases described above, monetary expansion in the Center may reduce welfare in
the Periphery countries.
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• Strategy PEG APP - Country A maintains the exchange rate at unchanged level,
and country B allows for currency appreciation vis-a-vis the Center by leaving the
money supply at unchanged level, i.e. m¯A = m¯C , m¯B = 0 :
uAPEG,APP =
1
θ
[1− Π(ρ) + γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ) + γP (Π(ρ)− 1))]m¯C (1.46)
uBPEG,APP =
1
θ
[1 + γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ) + γP (Π(ρ)− 1))]m¯C (1.47)
uCPEG,APP =
1
θ
[1 + γP (1− γA)(Π(ρ)− 1)]m¯C (1.48)
In case one country in the Periphery maintains money supply unchanged and
the other increases it to match monetary expansion in the Center, whether their
welfare will be improved or deteriorated, depends on their size and relative sub-
stitutability between home and foreign goods. We provide details on the changes
in welfare of the Periphery countries in Proposition 1.
• Strategy APP PEG - Country A maintains the money supply and country B
the exchange rate at unchanged level, i.e. m¯A = 0, and m¯B = m¯C , :
uAAPP,PEG =
1
θ
[1+Π(ψ)−γAΠ(ψ)+(1−γA)Π(ρ)+γP (γA−1+Π(ρ)−γAΠ(ρ))]m¯C
(1.49)
uBAPP,PEG = −
1
θ
[Π(ρ)− 1 + γA(Π(ψ)−Π(ρ)) + γP (γA − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)]m¯C (1.50)
uCAPP,PEG = −
1
θ
[1− γAγP (1− Π(ρ))]m¯C (1.51)
In case one country in the Periphery maintains money supply at unchanged and
the other increases it to match monetary expansion in the center, whether their
welfare will be improved or deteriorated, depends on their size and relative sub-
stitutability between home and foreign goods. We provide details on the changes
in welfare of the Periphery countries in Proposition 1.
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where Π(x) =
(
x−θ
x
) (
1+x
1+β+x(1−β)
)
, with x = ρ, ψ.
We conclude this section by an observation in Remark 2, that both the strategic
aspect of countries’ interactions, as well as asymmetries in size and elasticity of substi-
tution between goods, matter for their welfare, as expressed in form of derived payoffs.
Remark 2. (Strategic aspect and role of asymmetries) Countries’ payoffs depend on:
1. the actions taken by their trading partners,
2. their relative size,
3. relative substitutability between goods.
1.3 Results
In this section we provide results in terms of the parameters of the model, namely the
relative size of countries (γi) and substitutability of goods between and within coun-
tries (θ, ρ, and ψ). This particular approach allows us to deal with asymmetries in
country size, and their implications on countries’ welfare, and suggest some potential
explanations for the behaviour of Brazil and China. We first look at the result of indi-
vidual decisions of countries in the Periphery after monetary expansion in the Center,
and present an array of possible welfare consequences of their reactions with particular
emphasis on investigating when gains from coordination may arise.
We show what dominant strategies, and under which conditions, can arise as a re-
sult of countries interactions. We then look at the possibility of collectively suboptimal
outcomes resulting from individually rational strategies, the so called Prisoner’s Dilem-
mas. We show that, if the Prisoner’s Dilemma occurs, coordination can result in higher
payoffs, i.e. there are gains from coordination. We then show cases when we do not have
to worry about welfare inferior equilibria. We further investigate numbers of equilibria
and possibility of coordination failure. We show that multiplicity of equilibria is not an
issue and therefore coordination failure will not arise.
Because of computational complexity of this model (i.e. number of parameters), we
restrict our analysis to looking at extreme and intermediate cases, such as the limits of
country size, and relative substitutability between- and within-countries. This approach
allows us to develop an intuition about the results and highlight the role of asymmetries
in size. If specific parameter values describing the economies of interest are available,
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these can be used to compute the exact welfare changes and to find Nash equilibria.
We support our findings with illustrative numerical examples.
It is important to point out that the approach taken in this chapter, namely provid-
ing conditions on the elasticity parameters of the model when the size of the country
goes to zero implies that the analysis is conducted close to the points of discontinuity.
This limitation can potentially be overcome by adopting the approach of De Paoli
(2009) or Sutherland (2005).
De Paoli (2009) introduces the following parameters: home consumers’ preferences
for domestic goods v, and the degree of country’s openness λ. Because the analysed
model is a three-county model we modify the parameters in the following way. Let
vP denote the household’s j preference for goods produced in the Periphery (and (1−
vA) the preference of a household in the Periphery for goods produced in country B).
Households’ preferences for Periphery and non-Periphery goods depend then on the
relative size of the Periphery γP , and the degree of openness λ, such that (1 − vP ) =
(1− γP )λ and vP = γPλ (and for the countries in the Periphery (1− vA) = (1− γA)λ
and vA = γAλ).
Using De Paoli (2009) approach the modified consumption equations become:
Cj(x) =
[
v
1
ρ
P
(
CjP (x)
) ρ−1
ρ + (1− vP )
1
ρ
(
CjC(x)
) ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
(1.52)
and
CjP (x) =
[
v
1
ψ
A
(
CjA(x)
)ψ−1
ψ + (1− vA)
1
ψ
(
CjB(x)
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
(1.53)
Then, if we assume that the size of country A or the Periphery as a whole goes to
0, i.e. γA → 0 or γP → 0, then the preference for home and foreign goods will depend
solely on the degree of openness of the country: vA = 1− λ, and vP = 1− λ.
Similarly the price indices will become:
P iP =
[
vA(P
i
A)
(1−ψ) + (1− vA)(P iB)(1−ψ)
] 1
1−ψ (1.54)
and
P i =
[
vP (P
i
P )
(1−ρ) + (1− vP )(P iC)(1−ρ)
] 1
1−ρ (1.55)
Since the consumption and price sub-indices will remain the same as in the model
without the parameter of home consumers’ preferences for domestic goods v, and the
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degree of country’s openness parameter λ (equations 1.5-1.7, and 1.11-1.13), we con-
clude that introducing these parameters is not going to address the concern that some
of the price indices may go to zero and production may go to infinity if we consider the
limit of the country size to be zero. This is also the case in the analysis done by De
Paoli (2009).
1.3.1 Enrich or Beggar-thy-neighbour?
How does monetary expansion in an industrial economy affect emerging economies?
Based on the discussions between policymakers in industrial and emerging economies
(Rousseff, 2012) this question does not seem to have a clear answer. In this section we
show, how our framework is useful in answering this question, depending on the relative
country size and substitutability of goods produced in different countries, and actions
taken by individual countries in the Periphery. We show, that in terms of welfare,
increase in money supply in the Center may or may not be beggar-thy-neighbour.
In the following two Propositions we look at what changes in welfare can countries
in the Periphery expect from taking specific actions (APP or PEG). We focus here
mainly on the outcome in terms of welfare changes, and to be more specific, whether
the reaction to a shock in the Center results in welfare improvement, i.e. positive change
in welfare relative to pre-shock equilibrium; or deterioration of welfare.
In Proposition 1, we show when the Periphery countries can expect their welfare
to be lower, than before the shock (ui < 0), conditional on the actions of the other
country.
Definition 2. Policy in the Center is said to be beggar-thy-neighbour for country i, if
ui < 0, for i = A,B.
Proposition 1. Monetary expansion in the Center is beggar-thy-neighbour for the
Periphery countries in the following cases:
• for both Periphery countries in case of APP, APP, if ρ > β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
, i.e. ρ
sufficiently larger than θ,
• for country A, if the Periphery is large, i.e. γP → 1, and:
– APP,PEG, if ψ >
β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
, i.e. ψ sufficiently larger than θ, and
country A is very small, i.e. γA → 0,
– PEG,APP, if Π(ψ) < γA
γA−1 ,
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• for country B, if the Periphery is large, i.e. γP → 1, and:
– APP,PEG, if Π(ψ) < γA−1
γA
,
– PEG,APP, if ψ >
β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
, i.e. ψ sufficiently larger than θ,
• for country A, if the Periphery is small, i.e. γP → 0, and:
– APP,PEG, if country A is very small, i.e. γA → 0, and ψ > β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
,
i.e. ψ sufficiently larger than θ, or if country A is very large, i.e. γA → 1,
and ρ >
β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
, i.e. ρ sufficiently larger than θ,
– PEG,APP, if country A is very small, i.e. γA → 0, and Π(ψ)−Π(ρ) < −1,
• for country B, if the Periphery is small, i.e. γP → 0, and:
– APP,PEG, if country A is very large, i.e. γA → 1, and Π(ψ)− Π(ρ) < −1,
– PEG,APP, if country A is very large, i.e. γA → 1, and ψ > β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
,
i.e. ψ sufficiently larger than θ, or if country A is very small, i.e. γA → 0,
and ρ >
β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
, i.e. ρ sufficiently larger than θ.
Proof : See Appendix 1.7.6.
Proposition 1, except for the strategy APP APP, relies on big asymmetries in coun-
try size, and often requires the within-country substitutability of goods to be smaller
than between-country substitutability. This specific condition has been ruled out by
Corsetti et al. (2000), who assume that each country specializes in production of single
type of good, and therefore goods produced at home should be more substitutable than
goods produced in different countries. If we made the same assumption, i.e. assume
that ρ ≤ ψ ≤ θ, we could conclude that beggar-thy-neighbour effect of expansionary
monetary in the Center is likely to occur in very few cases.
Proposition 1, may help us to understand the worries expressed by Brazil’s Presi-
dent (Rousseff, 2012) about possible harm generated by the US expansionary monetary
policy on Brazilian economy. Our model allows for analyzing a scenario, which is con-
sistent with what actually happened in Brazil after a policy of quantitative easing (QE)
in the US. According to Barroso et al. (2013), QE brought about currency appreciation,
accompanied by an increase in consumption and imports, and fall in industrial produc-
tion in Brazil. This model predicts such a scenario accompanied by decrease in welfare
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Table 1.2: Trade weights 2009
USA Brazil China Sum
USA - 0.11 0.89 1
Brazil 0.50 - 0.50 1
China 0.88 0.12 - 1
in the emerging economy, if either the substitutability of goods produced in different
countries is greater than the within-country substitutability, i.e. when ρ > θ in APP
APP, independently of the size of the emerging economy; or in case of PEG APP for
country B in case goods produced in the Periphery countries are more substitutable
than those produced at home, i.e. when ψ > θ, when country B is relatively small. If
we look at the trade flows between Brazil and US relative to other emerging economies,
such as China, indeed Brazil is a relatively small country8. Its trade is almost equally
split between US and China. But trade flows from and to Brazil, from US and China
are only 10% of these countries trade flows. Most of the US trade comes from China
(around 90%), and most of the Chinese trade from the US (around 90%). We can sum-
marize this observation in a Table 1.2, where we treat China, Brazil and US as a whole
world, similarly as in our three-country model. This methodology is adapted from the
way weight matrices are constructed for Global Vector Autoregressive Models.
The mechanism at work, which can be described with the help of our model, and is
consistent with Barroso et al. (2013) is the following. After monetary expansion in the
Center/US (and alternatively also in country A), the world demand shifts away from
goods produced in country B (Brazil) and therefore reduces its sales revenue from ex-
ports. Because of terms of trade improvement in country B (Brazil), its agents want to
substitute away from relatively more expensive (but more substitutable) foreign goods
and consume more (less substitutable) home goods. The higher ρ or ψ the stronger
the desire to substitute consumption of foreign goods for home goods (consumption
switching). Although currency appreciation allows country B (Brazil) to afford more
imports for given level of income, because of the decrease in sales revenue from exports,
B (Brazil) cannot afford enough goods from abroad. This relative decrease in con-
8in terms of shares of import and export between countries relative to total net trade. In construc-
tion of a weight matrix expressing relative trade flows between US, Brazil and China, we have used
the OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and End-use category (OECD, 2009), to show
that Brazil is relatively small in terms of trade flows for China and US, but both China and US are
important trade partners for Brazil, see Table 1.2.
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sumption, together with decrease in sales revenue, and increase in the long run output
necessary to repay debt (current account deficit) in the long run, can result in decreased
welfare.
We can illustrate this case by constructing a numerical example in which country B
(Brazil) is very small, γB = 0.1×0.4 = 0.04, countries of the Periphery are smaller than
the Center (US), γP = 0.4, the within- and between-country elasticities of substitution
are equal θ = ρ = 2, and the within-Periphery elasticity of substitution is smaller than
within-country elasticity θ < ψ = 4, with equal change in money supply in the Center
(US) and country A (China) m¯C = m¯A = 0.5, and the discount factor β = 0.99. In
such an economy the resulting payoffs for country A and B are: uAPEG,APP = 0.27 and
uBPEG,APP = −0.04 (full payoff matrix can be found in the Appendix 1.6). If country
A (China) allowed its currency to appreciate, country B (Brazil) would be better off
relative to the case in which country A (China) keeps its exchange rate fixed, which is
consistent with the recommendations given in the U.S. Treasury Report to Congress on
International Economic and Exchange rate Policies of the Treasury (2011), and Mattoo
et al. (2012). If both emerging economies managed to keep the exchange rate fixed,
both would increase their welfare. Clearly, the payoff of country B (Brazil) depends on
the action taken by country A (China), an observation that we made in Remark 2. The
strategic aspect in the spillover mechanism of policies originating in the Center cannot
be underestimated.
Interestingly, even though we treat monetary expansion in the Center as an exoge-
nous shock, the model predicts that it may happen, that such policy can yield lower
payoff for the Center than in the symmetric equilibrium. We call such a situation
beggar-thyself and we define conditions in which such situation may arise.
Definition 3. Policy in the Center is said to be beggar-thyself, if uC < 0.
Lemma 2. Monetary expansion in the Center is beggar-thyself, in case of:
• APP,APP, if Π(ρ) < γP−1
γP
,
• APP,PEG, if Π(ρ) < γP γA−1
γP γA
,
• and PEG,APP, if Π(ρ) < γP (1−γA)−1
γP (1−γA) .
Proof : See Appendix 1.7.3.
Beggar-thyself outcomes for the Center may arise in every strategy except for when
all countries simultaneously increase money supply. Such policy will never harm any of
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the countries in this model, because effectively their agents become agents of a closed
economy in which monetary expansion in the presence of fixed prices brings the level
of production closer to its competitive level and therefore improves welfare. In each
of the remaining strategies the beggar-thyself condition depends on the relative size of
the country where monetary supply increases. The right hand side in each condition is
negative. For Π(ρ) to be less than the right hand side, using Lemma 1, the elasticity
of substitution between goods produced in different countries (ρ) has to be sufficiently
smaller than within-country elasticity (θ). Intuitively, beggar-thyself can happen, if
the worldwide impact of the monetary shock is negligible (relatively large γP ), i.e. the
Center and the country that decides to increase its money supply as well are small,
and the benefit from monetary expansion is smaller than the negative terms of trade
externality, which happens, when goods produced internationally are worse substitutes
than those produced domestically (i.e. ρ < θ).
To complete the analysis, we are now going to examine when does the policy in the
Center improve welfare in the Periphery countries. For this, we will start by defining
what we mean by an enrich-thy-neighbour policy.
Definition 4. Policy in the Center is said to be enrich-thy-neighbour for country i, if
ui > 0, for where i = A,B.
Proposition 2. (Enrich-thy-neighbour) Monetary expansion in the Center is always
enrich-thy-neighbour for all countries in the Periphery in case of PEG PEG. This is
independent of country size and elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods. It can be enrich-thy-neighbour for the Periphery countries in other strategies, if
the conditions in Proposition 1 do not hold.
Proof : See Appendix 1.7.7.
This result is consistent with Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) who show that monetary
expansion abroad can be ”prosper-thy-neighbor” for admissible monetary shocks,
and with the view of Bernanke (2013) and Powell (2013) that US policy generated
positive spillovers to the rest of the world.
Since, depending on the characteristics of the economy, the same actions of the
Periphery countries can lead to opposite (in terms of sign) welfare outcomes, it is im-
portant for countries to know what are the values of the parameters describing the
economy, before they decide to react to monetary expansion in the Center. Using
Propositions 1 and Proposition 2 we can state a Corollary 1 highlighting the role of
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uncertainty in potential explanation of the behaviour of China and Brazil, who both in-
creased money supply (a strategy which in our model leads to maintaining the exchange
rate at unchanged level) after the first round of QE in the US (see Figure 1.2).
Corollary 1. (Uncertainty) Countries in the Periphery may prefer to intervene and
resist currency appreciation to keep their exchange rate fixed, if unsure about the
parameters of the model.
Proof : See Appendix 1.7.2.
If there is uncertainty about the parameters of the model (related to “uncertainty
about the state of the economy” Ostry and Ghosh (2013), or Frankel (1988)), countries
may prefer to stick to a strategy resulting in welfare improvement independently of
the values of the parameters. This may explain why Periphery countries may prefer to
keep their exchange rate fixed. In Proposition 1 and 2 we show, that pegging always
results in welfare improvement, as opposed to appreciation, which depends on the elas-
ticity of substitution between goods produced at home and abroad. As a consequence,
if countries are uncertain about the underlying size and substitutability parameters,
countries may prefer to choose to resist currency appreciation, as it was initially the
case of China.
1.3.2 Dominant strategies
In this section we focus our attention on dominant strategies, that is strategies that
yield a higher payoff for the player, for any feasible action of the other player. Finding
conditions in which particular dominant strategies arise is a crucial step in finding out,
whether individually rational actions may lead to collectively suboptimal outcomes, i.e.
so called Prisoner’s Dilemma situations.
One of the consequence of the construction of the strategy set in our game is that
dominant strategies will always exist9. In the following section we will only look at sit-
uations resulting in symmetric dominant strategies, that is such that Nash equilibrium
for both players is either APP APP or PEG PEG. However, depending on the values of
elasticity parameters and relative size of countries, dominant strategy for each player
may differ, and Nash equilibria such as APP PEG or PEG APP are possible. Before we
move on to investigate when countries will have same dominant strategies let us define
the concept first.
9However, it can be shown that dominant strategies may not exist, if we allow for a reacher strategy
space, which we do not consider for technical reasons. For details see Remark 1.5.1 in Appendix 1.2.3.
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Definition 5. Dominant strategy for player i is her best response to any strategy of the
other player, i.e. a strategy which always yields higher payoff for player i, regardless of
strategy of the other player(s).
Currency appreciation in both countries - APP APP
We first look at the possibility of one potential dominant strategy which is for both
countries to prefer to allow their currency to appreciate, no matter what the other
country chooses to do.
Proposition 3. (Dominant strategy to appreciate) Countries in the Periphery have a
dominant strategy to appreciate, if the following conditions hold:
• for Country A:
γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ) + γP [Π(ψ)− 1])− Π(ψ) > 0 (1.56)
• for Country B:
γA[Π(ψ)− Π(ρ)] + (γA − 1)γP [Π(ρ)− 1] + Π(ρ) < 0 (1.57)
Proof : See Appendix 1.7.8.
To help us see when APP APP is a dominant strategy for both countries let us have
a look at these conditions for extreme and intermediate values of country size (See Table
1.5). If the Periphery is relatively large, these conditions clearly do not hold. Intuitively,
since the Center is the only country where money supply increases, the overall increase
in welfare generated in such case will be negligible and the Periphery countries would as
well prefer to increase their money supply to generate larger increase in world welfare.
Since the payoffs of country A and B are decreasing in size of the Periphery, both
countries may prefer to allow their currency to appreciate, if the size of the Periphery is
sufficiently small. Additionally, the following assumption on elasticities of substitution
has to hold: ρ < ψ < θ. Notice, that in the presence of this elasticity condition, if a
country is very small, it is better off allowing its currency to appreciate. This might
be the case of Brazil (see Table 1.2, in which we show that Brazil is a relatively small
country for US and China) who’s exchange rate vis-a-vis the US appreciated (see Figure
1.3).
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We present a numerical example in Table 1.3 and describe it together with the condition
for Prisoner’s Dilemma in section 1.3.3.
US recommendation for emerging economies to allow their currency to appreciate
(see e.g. U.S. Department of the Treasury (2011), or Obstfeld (2011)) is plausible only if
we believe that these countries are sufficiently small and particular elasticity conditions
hold (see Table 1.5), an observation which we make in the following remark:
Remark 3. APP APP is a dominant strategy for both Periphery countries if ρ < ψ < θ,
and the Periphery as a whole is sufficiently small.
Fixed exchange rate in both countries - PEG PEG
The other possibility of dominant strategy we consider is for both countries to prefer
to keep their exchange rate vis-a-vis the Center fixed.
Proposition 4. (Dominant strategy to peg) Countries in the Periphery have a dominant
strategy to adjust their money supply, such that the exchange rate vis-a-vis the Center
will remain at unchanged level, if the following conditions hold:
• for Country A:
γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ) + γP [Π(ψ)− 1])− Π(ψ) < 0 (1.58)
• for Country B
γA[Π(ψ)− Π(ρ)] + (γA − 1)γP [Π(ρ)− 1] + Π(ρ) > 0 (1.59)
Proof : See Appendix 1.7.9.
We present a numerical example in Table 1.4.
Countries in the Periphery prefer to keep their exchange rate at unchanged level,
if the substitutability of goods produced between countries (ρ and ψ) is larger that
the within-country substitutability (θ). This result is consistent with Tille (2001),
who showed that country can be better off by increasing money supply relative to its
neighbour, only if the benefit from switching consumption is larger than the increased
disutility from work effort at home.
Conditions relating the size of the substitutability parameters and relative size of
countries are derived in Appendix 1.7.9 and presented in Table 1.5.
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Remark 4. If one of the Periphery countries is sufficiently large and the Periphery is
sufficiently large as a whole, then its dominant strategy is to peg.
The observation in Remark 4 follows from Table 1.5, in case when γP → 1 and
γA → 0, then B’s dominant strategy is to peg.
Remark 4 in conjunction with the trade weight matrix may help us to explain why
China initially chose to maintain fixed exchange vis-a-vis the US.
1.3.3 Gains from coordination in cases of Prisoner’s Dilemma
When countries decide to take self-oriented actions they may end up in a Nash equilib-
rium that is Pareto inferior, and yield lower payoff for both players than from alternative
actions. In such, so called Prisoner’s Dilemma, type of situations there is a scope for
welfare improvement and gains from coordination (CG)10.
Definition 6. Gains from coordination for country i, denoted by CGi is the difference
in country i’s payoffs, given by
CGi = u
i
−NE − uiNE
where uiNE is the payoff of country i in Nash equilibrium, and u
i
−NE is the payoff from
a strategy yielding the highest payoff for both of the players, which they choose to play,
if they cooperate.
There exist many examples in the literature arguing that there are few gains from
coordination, like Ostry and Ghosh (2013), Buiter and Marston (1986), Frankel (1988),
or that it may even be counterproductive as argued by Rogoff (1985). Motivated by this
lack of consensus we show when gains from coordination between Periphery countries
may exist.
In our game, we look at two potential equilibria with Prisoner’s Dilemma11, namely
APP APP and PEG PEG. In order for Prisoner’s Dilemma to arise, both countries
have to have dominant strategies, and the payoff from the resulting non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium must be lower, than from taking alternative actions simultaneously.
10Whenever we use a word coordination, we actually mean cooperation. This abuse of language is
common to macroeconomists and policymakers. The only time we are formally meaning coordination,
as used in game theory, is in section 1.3.6.
11It can be shown that in this game other Nash equilibria, such as PEG APP and APP PEG, may
arise.
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Definition 7. Prisoner’s Dilemma is a situation in which both players have dominant
strategies, and the Nash equilibrium, resulting from agents acting non-cooperatively in
self interest, yields lower payoff for both, than if they could cooperate.
In the following sections we will look at sufficient conditions for Prisoner’s Dilemma
to arise and investigate in which situations this might happen in our model.
Currency appreciation in both countries - APP APP
Below we present sufficient conditions for Prisoner’s Dilemma with Nash equilibrium
APP APP - a situation in which both countries would be better off if they coordinated
and simultaneously increased money supply.
Proposition 5. (Prisoner’s Dilemma with appreciation) If the conditions in Proposi-
tion 3 hold simultaneously with:
γP [1− Π(ρ)] + Π(ρ) > 0 (1.60)
then we call such situation Prisoner’s Dilemma in which appreciation is a welfare inferior
equilibrium.
Proof : See Appendix 1.7.10.
Welfare can be improved if countries coordinate and coordination gains can be
computed using Definition 6.
What these conditions require in terms of relative substitutability between good
and size of countries can be seen in Table 1.5 in the limiting cases. Prisoner’s Dilemma
is less likely to happen if there are large asymmetries in size between the Periphery
countries.
These conditions do not appear to be very intuitive, therefore we present a numer-
ical example, outline the transmission mechanism at work, and its dependence on the
particular parameters in this example12. With help of this example we would also like
to show that there is scope for policy coordination.
To describe the transmission mechanism at work contributing to changes in coun-
tries’ welfare we will look at the example in Table 1.3 from a perceptive of player A.
To start with let us have a look at the overall effect of countries interactions in terms
of changes in the world welfare. Welfare changes depend on countries’ actions - whether
12In all our numerical examples the size of the shock is 0.5 units (other examples are Tille (2001),
p. 438, who analyzes a numerical example normalizing the monetary expansion to m¯ = 1).
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Table 1.3: Example of Prisoner’s Dilemma with Nash equilibrium APP APP. Parameter
values: θ = 3, ψ = 2, ρ = 2, β = 0.9, γP = 0.6, γA = 0.5, m¯
C = 0.5
0.17 0.20
0.17 0.08
0.08 0.11
0.20 0.11
PEG APP
PEG
APP
Country B
C
ou
n
tr
y
A
to keep their money supply at unchanged level or to increase it. As a consequence,
total world welfare change is different in different strategies and can be derived from
the general expression for uw:
uw =
1
θ
m¯w =
1
θ
[γP m¯
P +(1−γP )m¯C ] = 1
θ
{γP [γAm¯A+(1−γA)m¯B]+(1−γP )m¯C} (1.61)
In particular we have:
uwPEG,PEG =
1
θ
m¯C (1.62)
uwAPP,APP =
1
θ
[(1− γP )m¯C ] (1.63)
uwPEG,APP =
1
θ
[γPγAm¯
C + (1− γP )m¯C ] (1.64)
uwAPP,PEG =
1
θ
[γP (1− γA)m¯C + (1− γP )m¯C ] (1.65)
In this numerical example resulting changes in world welfare are: uwPEG,PEG = 0.17,
uwAPP,APP = 0.07, u
w
PEG,APP = 0.12, u
w
APP,PEG = 0.12.
The redistribution of world welfare generated in each strategy between countries
depends on the relative substitutability of goods, MLR conditions, as well as countries’
relative size.
Let us focus on the transmission mechanism first. For simplicity and transparency
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this example assumes same size of the Periphery countries13 and same within-Periphery
elasticity of substitution (so that looking at A’s choice will describe the decision faced
by B in the alternative strategy).
In PEG PEG all countries increase money supply by the same amount. As a result
world welfare increases proportionately and is redistributed equally among agents in
all countries. In fact, this strategy is equivalent to treating the whole world as closed
economy, and therefore an increase in money supply in the presence of monopolistic
competition and nominal rigidities unambiguously increases welfare pushing the pro-
ducers closer to perfectly competitive production level. Change in the world utility is
the largest in this case.
In APP APP monetary expansion takes place only in the Center. Because mone-
tary expansion takes place only in one, not too big country (γC = 1−γP = 0.4), and in
this strategy world utility is negatively related to the size of the Periphery, the overall
change in world utility is the smallest of all four strategies. Since money supply in both
Periphery countries stays at unchanged level, both countries A and B experience same
changes in consumption, output and therefore welfare. The currencies of the Periphery
countries appreciate relative to the Center. The size of the exchange rate adjustment
depends on the degree of substitutability between goods produced in the Periphery and
the Center (ρ). Because in the short run prices are fixed, an increase in money supply
allows to increase consumption in the Center. Agents in the Center want to consume
more of home and foreign goods, but because of exchange rate effect Center’s goods be-
come relatively cheaper for its agents, which generates consumption switching towards
home goods. Short and long run consumption in the Center increases relative to the
Periphery. World demand switches away from goods produced in the Periphery. In the
short run Periphery countries produce less relatively to the Center. Demand switch
reduces A’s and B’s market share of export, which causes fall in sales revenue from
export. The opposite happens in the Center, where because the MLR condition holds,
terms of trade worsening yields increase in sales revenue. Increase in sales revenue en-
ables C’s agents to save a share of its income that can be lend abroad for consumption
smoothing purposes. In the long run, in order to repay its debt, Periphery countries will
have to produce more. Long run production is therefore larger in the Periphery than
in the Center. Relative change in consumption and long term output depends on the
MLR condition. The relative change in welfare depends on the so called ’generalized
13asymmetry in size may lead to a different Nash equilibrium than APP APP (e.g. if A is very
small, then APP PEG would be the Nash equilibrium).
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MLR condition’ defined by Tille (2001), which says that monetary expansion can raise
country’s welfare only if ρ > θ > 1. Since in our example the opposite condition holds,
the Periphery as a whole experiences increase in welfare relative to the Center. This is
because an increase in consumption in the Center increases utility, but an increase in
production does not generate sufficient revenue and increases disutility from work effort.
In this example additionally Center’s utility change is negative (see Lemma 2), because
its relative size is not big enough. The adverse terms of trade in the Center does not
generate large enough consumption switch towards home goods, so that higher revenue
generated from producing more is not enough to compensate for the more expensive
imports, away from which C cannot substitute. On the other hand Periphery countries,
because of terms of trade improvement, can finance higher level of consumption for
given nominal income, and because of lower demand there is a decrease in the disutility
from work effort.
A’s payoff in Nash equilibrium is smaller than in PEG PEG, because with lower
between- ρ than within-country substitutability θ, APP APP is decreasing in size of the
Periphery (here γP = 0.6), and the overall welfare increase generated in this strategy is
the smallest. This is a case where coordination of both countries on choosing to increase
their money supply would be beneficial in terms of welfare not only for the Periphery
countries but also for the Center. Gains from coordination for the Periphery countries
can be computed using the formula in the Definition 6: 0.17− 0.11 = 0.06.
In PEG APP both Center and country A increase their money supply, which gen-
erates a change in the world utility smaller than in PEG PEG but larger than in APP
APP. Since country A takes different action than country B, this generates relative
changes in consumption, output and exchange rates in the Periphery. Country B’s
currency appreciates relative the Center, as a consequence Periphery’s currency appre-
ciates as well but by less than in APP APP. The size of the exchange rate adjustment
depends in this case on the MLR condition, i.e. the value elasticity of substitution
between the Periphery countries (here ψ > 1). In this case agents in country A and
C feel wealthier and increase consumption of both home and foreign goods. Consump-
tion in country A increases in both short and long term relative to country B, however
the overall consumption in the Periphery decreases relative to the Center. Exchange
rate effect creates consumption switching in country A and C towards home produced
goods, which in turn switches global demand away from goods produced in country B.
While A and C’s agents experience terms of trade worsening in the short term, agents
in country B experience the opposite and can afford more consumption for a given level
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of nominal income. But because of decrease in demand for B’s goods, its sales revenue
decreases and B’s agents borrow from abroad (from A and C) to smooth consumption.
Lending to B is possible because both A and C generate additional income that can be
saved from increased sales revenue due to ρ > 1 (MLR condition). Production increases
in the short term in A relative to B, but the opposite happens in the long run. A’s
agents feeling wealthier prefer to substitute consumption with leisure (they can do this
since they saved enough and expect repayment from abroad), while B’s agents have to
work more in the long run to repay their debt. Since now two countries expand money
supply their relative size is big enough not to generate beggar-thyself effect and the
change in welfare will be positive in all countries. However, similarly to the APP APP
case, countries where monetary expansion took place will experience relatively lower
welfare than their passive neighbours.
In PEG APP A’s payoff is lower than in APP APP because of two reasons. Firstly,
the overall welfare generated in this strategy is lower than in APP APP, secondly, A is
in this case experiencing the consequences of an externality generated by the so called
generalized ’MLR condition’, and falling on the country that decides to increase money
supply. Here country B benefits the most since its terms of trade improves in both
periods and the increase in disutility of work effort is not large enough to offset an
increase in utility from increased consumption.
In APP PEG both Center and country B increase their money supply, which
generates a change in the world utility smaller than in PEG PEG but larger than
in APP APP. In this case country B experiences what country A experienced in the
strategy PEG APP.
The analysed example in Table 1.3 is a case that Bernanke (2013) called ”enrich-
thy-neighbour”, however we can show that there are cases, in which the same policy
can generate an equilibrium with negative payoffs, where countries are stuck suffering
loss in their welfare. We construct such example using Proposition 1 and present it in
the Appendix 1.6. In such example the concerns by the Periphery countries that US
expansionary monetary policy can generate negative spillovers may be justified.
Fixed exchange rate in both countries - PEG PEG
Prisoner’s Dilemma with inferior Nash equilibrium PEG PEG happens, if both countries
have dominant strategies to keep their exchange rate at unchanged level vis-a-vis the
Center (see Proposition 4) and the payoffs are smaller than from allowing the currency
to appreciate in both Periphery countries.
41
Proposition 6. (Prisoner’s Dilemma with fixed exchange rate) If the conditions in
Proposition 4 hold simultaneously with:
γP [1− Π(ρ)] + Π(ρ) > 0 (1.66)
then we call such situation Prisoner’s Dilemma in which keeping exchange rate relative
the Center fixed is a welfare inferior equilibrium.
Proof : See Appendix 1.7.11.
Welfare can be improved if countries coordinate and coordination gains can be
computed using Definition 6.
What these conditions require in terms of relative substitutability between good
and size of countries can be seen in Table 1.5 in the limiting cases. Prisoner’s Dilemma
is less likely to happen if there are large asymmetries in size between the Periphery
countries.
Table 1.4: Example of Prisoner’s Dilemma with Nash equilibrium PEG PEG. Parameter
values: θ = 1.1, ψ = 6, ρ = 0.3, β = 0.9, γP = 0.1, γA = 0.5, m¯
C = 0.5
0.45 0.28
0.45 1.32
1.32 1.14
0.28 1.14
PEG APP
PEG
APP
Country B
C
ou
n
tr
y
A
In numerical example presented in Table 1.4 the Periphery is small as a whole and
countries within the Periphery are symmetric in size. Within-country substitutability
of goods are larger than between goods produced in the Center, but smaller than for
goods produces in the Periphery countries. MLR conditions hold only for the Periphery
countries, and not for the Center. Country A and B are stuck in Nash equilibrium with
lower payoffs than from appreciation. Despite yielding higher payoffs, appreciation
is not an equilibrium, because both countries have an incentive to deviate tempted by
higher payoffs from alternative action. Therefore the loss in utility is 1.14−0.45 = 0.67.
If countries had a chance to coordinate, they could achieve improvement in their utility.
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It appears that the results are sensitive to the choice of the point around which we
log-linearize, which is related to the presence of an approximation error. In particular
the Prisoner’s Dilemma not always occurs if the variables are approximated around an
alternative steady-state given the conditions on the parameters of the model specified
in Propositions 5 and 6.
This has been established by comparing the results from to steady-states:
• the symmetric steady-state given by C2 = Y 2 = θ−1
θκ
,
• and a hypothetical steady-state with a subsidy δ
δ−1 , given by C
2 = Y 2 = θ−1
θκ
δ
δ−1 ,
where δ can be smaller, equal or greater than θ. When δ = θ this case would
correspond to an economy with perfect competition.
To address this issue we wish to undertake the analysis in future research by using
higher order approximation developed in more recent literature, such as Benigno and
Woodford (2012).
1.3.4 Summary of conditions for dominant strategies and Pris-
oner’s Dilemma in the limits
In Table 1.5 we summarize conditions for dominant strategies and Prisoner’s Dilemma
in limiting cases resulting from Propositions 3, 4, 5, and 6 derived in the Appendix
1.7.8, 1.7.9, 1.7.10, and 1.7.11.
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1.3.5 No need for coordination
Since the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a very special case which happens in the absence of
large size asymmetries between countries, we would like to show as well, when counties
may be sure that it will not arise. In related literature Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)
looked at economies, where countries do not specialize in production of certain types
of goods. This assumption corresponds to condition on the parameters of our economy
of: θ = ψ = ρ, which means that goods produced at home and abroad are equally
substitutable. We can show, that in such a world with equal elasticities of substitution,
Prisoner’s Dilemma will never happen.
Lemma 3. (No need for coordination) If goods produced at home, abroad and within
the region are equally substitutable (θ = ρ = ψ), then PEG PEG is a unique Nash
equilibrium with positive payoffs and efficient Nash equilibrium. As a consequence
there is no need for cooperation.
Proof : See Appendix 1.7.4.
This result is independent of the size of the Periphery as a whole, and size of
individual country.
Table 1.6: Example of Nash equilibrium PEG PEG with no need for coordination θ = 3,
ψ = 3, ρ = 3, β = 0.9, γP = 0.3, γA = 0.8, m¯
C = 0.5
0.17 0.16
0.17 0.16
0.13 0.12
0.13 0.12
PEG APP
PEG
APP
Country B
C
ou
n
tr
y
A
In Table 1.6 we present a numerical example yielding possible payoffs in all strate-
gies, with Nash equilibrium PEG PEG. Important thing to notice in this example, is
that the payoffs of both Periphery countries, country A and country B, are the same.
In fact, we can show that payoffs of all countries are the same, for example in Nash
equilibrium: uA = 0.17, uB = 0.17, and uC = 0.17 (by Lemma 1, if Π(x) = 0 then
ui = uj). This case is the same as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) where monetary
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expansion increases welfare in all countries, and because the payoffs are in ’pre capita’
terms, every agent regardless of the country experiences proportional increase due to
the same elasticity of substitution within and between the countries.
Since countries’ payoffs form APP APP are decreasing in the size of the Periphery,
the smaller the Periphery, the less can the Periphery countries improve by choosing
PEG PEG. The gain from choosing PEG is greater for the larger Periphery country.
However, this particular example is not the only one in which the arising Nash
equilibrium is optimal. Other examples can be found, especially in the absence of size
asymmetries, which is when the conditions for Prisoner’s Dilemma in Proposition 5
and Proposition 6 do not hold, an observation which follows from Table 1.5, and which
we summarize in the following Remark 5. This result depends on the size asymmetry
rather than conditions on the elasticities of substitution.
Remark 5. (Role of asymmetries for need of coordination) Need for coordination is
not likely in cases when there are big size asymmetries between countries.
Because of large size asymmetries between Brazil and China (see Table 1.2) we may
conclude that it was not an example of Prisoner’s Dilemma, and therefore there is no
scope for gains from coordination.
So far the choice of size parameters for examples has been rather arbitrary. Following
the adopted relative size parameters as well as the functional form of the production
function (yt = lt) we can encounter a complication in establishing the relative size
of different countries. The production function implies that the relative size of the
countries could be measured by the population size, and this should be proportional to
the output, e.g. measured using GDP of the country.
To illustrate this complication we consider China and Brazil to be the Periphery
countries, and the United States to be the Center. We use the actual data of population
and GDP (as a measure of production) in the year 2013 from the World Bank. Table
1.7 presents the share of each country’s population and GDP in the world population
and world GDP, if we treat the world to be composed of three countries, as well as
the share of Brazil’s and China’s population and GDP in the Periphery population and
Periphery GDP.
While the share of China’s and Brazil’s population and GDP in the population and
GDP of the Periphery is not significantly different when we compare these two different
measures of relative size, the proportions of country’s size in the world population and
GDP vary significantly between those two measures. We conclude that a reasonable
value for the parameter γA could be between 0.8 − 0.9 in case of China. But the size
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Table 1.7: Relative size of countries in 2013. Data: World Bank
Population share (World) GDP share (World)
USA 72 % 24%
Brazil 11 % 6%
China 17 % 71%
Population share (Periphery) GDP share (Periphery)
Brazil 13 % 19 %
China 87 % 81 %
of the Periphery as a whole, depends on the measure we adopt. If we decide to use the
GDP data, the parameter γP could be around 0.3. A numerical example presented in
this section corresponds to the data, where the size of the Periphery, γP is equal to 0.3,
and the size of country A - China, represented with γA is equal to 0.3. If, however we
decide to use the population data, then γP could be around 0.7. China and Brazil are
only example countries, and this parametrization will of course vary with the choice of
countries.
1.3.6 Coordination failure
Coordination15 failure is a situation, in which there are multiple equilibria, and some of
them are preferred by one or more players. In such cases players would achieve mutual
gains from coordination, yet there are no individual incentives to do that. In our
case, potential equilibria with coordination failure would happen, when it is optimal
for both countries to maintain peg, if the other country does it, and to allow their
currency to appreciate when the other country does it (i.e. Nash equilibria APP APP
and PEG PEG - see example in Table 1.10 in the Appendix 1.6.3 where potential Nash
equilibria are in gray cells). The other potential multiple equilibria could arise when
each country plays the alternative strategy - different from the other country. The
resulting equilibria would then be: APP PEG and PEG APP (see Table 1.11 in the
Appendix 1.6.3). If coordination failure was possible no country should have a dominant
strategy, as opposed to Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Definition 8. Coordination failure is a situation with more than one pure strategy
Nash equilibrium, and some of the Nash equilibria are preferred by one or more players.
15here we refer to coordination as a formal game theory term.
47
It turns out that the consequence of the restricted strategy set, multiple equilibria
will never arise. The way that the strategy set, possibly resulting in coordination failure,
could be expanded is explained in Remark 1.5.1) in the Appendix 1.5. Therefore the
only role for external institutions to coordinate countries on equilibria with higher
welfare is in case of Prisoner’s Dilemma type of situations described before.
Lemma 4. (Coordination failure) Given the payoff structure of this game and available
strategies, coordination failure will never occur.
Proof : See Appendix 1.7.5.
We anticipate that, if we allow for a richer strategy space, coordination failure could
be possible (for details see Remark 1.5.1).
1.4 Conclusions
The analysis presented in this chapter has been motivated by the recent financial crisis
of 2007-08. It is intended as an in depth analysis of the welfare effects of monetary
policy decisions of big industrial economies on emerging economies. While there is
evidence that “when the U.S. sneezes, emerging markets catch a cold” (Mackowiak
(2007), p. 2513), the role of strategic interactions of emerging economies on their own
welfare and that of their trading partners has been understated. These interactions
among the emerging economies are therefore the focus of this study.
In this chapter we provide a game-theoretic framework to analyze the welfare effects
of monetary expansion in industrial economies on emerging markets. We highlight the
strategic aspect of interactions between emerging economies and the role of existing
asymmetries between countries (see Remark 2). We show when such expansionary
monetary policy may not be beggar-thy-neighbour, and when countries in the Periphery
actually benefit from it (see Proposition 2).
We show that US policy recommendation for emerging economies to allow their
currencies to appreciate is plausible only in special circumstances (see Proposition 3
and Remark 3).
We suggest a potential explanation as to why both Brazil and China increased their
money supply in response to US expansionary monetary policy (see Corollary 1 of
Propositions 1 and 2). While the size asymmetry between Brazil and China might help
explain why China initially kept its exchange rate fixed vis-a-vis the US (see Remark
4 and Proposition 6), it remains a challenge to explain why Brazil has not done it.
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Perhaps Brazil intended to limit the appreciation by increasing money supply, yet the
size of monetary adjustment was not enough to keep the exchange rate fixed.
We show when countries, as a result of self-oriented policy, may end up in an equi-
librium with lower welfare - so called Prisoner’s Dilemma (see Propositions 5 and 6).
We show that in such cases there is need for coordination between countries in the
Periphery. In such situations, our framework can be used by institutions to highlight
gains from coordination to individual countries, and advice policymakers to take ac-
tions toward improvement of global welfare. However, given the existing asymmetries
between the countries considered here, we believe that Prisoner’s Dilemma was not a
result of Brazil’s and China’s policy decisions (see Remark 5).
In the future, one may want to look at the nonlinear model, in which it would
be possible to work with continuous space of strategies to derive reaction functions
and to allow for non-equiproportionate increases in money supply. This extension
would further allow us to investigate the role of asymmetries in country choices, and
their implications for countries’ welfare. In particular it may help to explain Brazil’s
behaviour, which is difficult to explain using the model used here. Another interesting
direction for further research would be to test this theory empirically. What is difficult
in the context of a general equilibrium model, namely including more than two or three
countries, can be done empirically using Global Vector Autoregressive model. We look
at such analysis in the following chapter.
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1.5 Appendix: Remarks
1.5.1 Remark to section 1.2.3
In this remark we explain possible alternative strategies for country A and B. We also
point out technical difficulties that arise as a consequence of expanding the strategy set
by including these alternatives.
It is reasonable to assume that after monetary expansion in the Center, countries in
the Periphery may want to resist further inflationary pressures and wish to keep their
money supply unchanged. The strategy of pegging can be motivated by the desire of
avoiding currency appreciation in the Periphery, making it less competitive and leading
to lower export of the Periphery goods.
Treating APP as an anchor strategy, in which a country chooses to keep its money
supply at unchanged level, i.e. m¯i = 0 we can show that the exchange rate stability in
country i, can be achieved by adjusting money supply, such that the change corresponds
to the size of the shock in the Center, i.e. m¯i = m¯C , but not only in this way.
Using equation (1.138), which we repeat below for convenience, we can show what
alternative choices of m¯i allow countries to keep their exchange rate vis-a-vis the center
at unchanged level, depending on the strategy:
eA − eB = 1
ψ
1− β + ψ(1 + β)
1 + β + ψ(1− β)(m¯
A − m¯B)
• PEG APP corresponds to B’s choice of keeping money supply at unchanged level,
i.e. m¯B = 0, and A’s choice of keeping exchange rate at unchanged level, i.e.
eA = 0. Rearranging equation (1.138), we can show that the corresponding value
of A’s money supply should satisfy m¯A = −e
B
1
ψ
1−β+ψ(1+β)
1+β+ψ(1−β)
• APP PEG corresponds to A’s choice of keeping money supply at unchanged level,
i.e. m¯A = 0, and A’s choice of keeping exchange rate at unchanged level, i.e.
eB = 0. Rearranging equation (1.138), we can show that the corresponding value
of B’s money supply should satisfy m¯B = −e
A
1
ψ
1−β+ψ(1+β)
1+β+ψ(1−β)
Since by design of the game the result of APP PEG and PEG APP in country keep-
ing the money supply at unchanged level is appreciation of it’s exchange rate relative
to the Center, i.e. ei < 0, money supply in the country aiming to keep its exchange
rate fixed is positive, and in special case can match monetary expansion in the Center.
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Allowing m¯i to take values other than m¯C or 0 makes the analysis of payoffs in
different strategies much more complicated than the one we undertake. Recall the
expressions for payoffs of the Periphery countries:
uA =
1
θ
[αAAm¯
A + αABm¯
B + αACm¯
C ] (1.67)
uB =
1
θ
[αBAm¯
A + αBBm¯
B + αBCm¯
C ] (1.68)
where:
αAA = [[γPγA + (1 − γP )γAΠ(ρ) + (1 − γA)Π(ψ)], αAB = [γP (1 − γA) + (1 − γP )(1 −
γA)Π(ρ)− (1− γA)Π(ψ)], αAC = [(1− γP )(1−Π(ρ))], αBA = [[γPγA + (1− γP )γAΠ(ρ)−
γAΠ(ψ)], α
B
B = [γP (1−γA)+(1−γP )(1−γA)Π(ρ)+γAΠ(ψ)], αBC = [(1−γP )(1−Π(ρ))].
In order to compare payoffs in different strategies, it would now be necessary to
consider different values of m¯i as well as αji that vary with parameter values. In this
extended cases we encounter huge technical difficulty, which would require considering
much more cases that we are currently looking at. However, if we know the param-
eters characterizing economies, as well as their choices concerning money supply, our
framework is still suitable to compute the payoffs.
Our choice of discrete strategy set has consequences on the existence of dominant
strategies, and the existence of coordination failure.
51
1.6 Appendix: Additional Examples
1.6.1 Numerical example to section 1.3.1 - Beggar-thy-neighbour
Table 1.8: Example of asymmetries in size with negative payoff for the smaller country
in PEG APP. Parameter values: θ = 2, ψ = 4, ρ = 2, β = 0.9, γP = 0.4, γA = 0.9,
m¯C = 0.5
0.25 -0.04
0.25 0.27
0.44 0.15
0.13 0.15
PEG APP
PEG
APP
Country B
C
ou
n
tr
y
A
1.6.2 Numerical example to section 1.3.3 - Prisoner’s Dilemma
with negative payoffs in Nash equilibrium APP APP
Table 1.9: Example of Nash equilibrium APP APP with Prisoner’s Dilemma and neg-
ative payoffs. Parameter values: θ = 1.1, ψ = 0.2, ρ = 6, β = 0.9, γP = 0.1, γA = 0.5,
m¯C = 0.5
0.45 0.60
0.45 -0.67
-0.67 -0.52
0.60 -0.52
PEG APP
PEG
APP
Country B
C
ou
n
tr
y
A
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1.6.3 Payoff matrices for examples of coordination failure in
section 1.3.6
Table 1.10: Possible coordination failure in a game with two Nash equilibria: PEG
PEG and APP APP
uBPEG,PEG u
B
PEG,APP
uAPEG,PEG u
A
PEG,APP
uBAPP,PEG u
B
APP,APP
uAAPP,PEG u
A
APP,APP
PEG APP
PEG
APP
Country B
C
ou
n
tr
y
A
Table 1.11: Possible coordination failure in a game with two Nash equilibria: APP
PEG and PEG APP
uBPEG,PEG u
B
PEG,APP
uAPEG,PEG u
A
PEG,APP
uBAPP,PEG u
B
APP,APP
uAAPP,PEG u
A
APP,APP
PEG APP
PEG
APP
Country B
C
ou
n
tr
y
A
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1.7 Appendix: Proofs
1.7.1 Proof of Lemma 1 - Π
By looking at the graph of Π(x) =
(
x−θ
x
) (
1+x
1+β+x(1−β)
)
, we can see that Π(x) is strictly
increasing in x on the two intervals that conform the domain of the function. This can
also be seen in figures 1.6 and 1.7.
The values at Π(x) = 1 are shown at the intersection of the solid and the dashed
lines on the Figure 1.6. It is clear that since the root of Π(x) = 0 on the domain (0,∞)
lies at x = θ. For Π(x) to be greater than 1, then x needs to be sufficiently larger than
θ. Equivalently, for Π(x) < 1, then x requires to be sufficiently smaller than θ. Figure
1.5 shows the relationship between x and θ, while Figure 1.6 shows the graph of Π(x)
for fixed θ (here θ = 2).
Notice that function Π(x) has an asymptote at 1
(1−β) as it can be seen in Figure 1.7.
This can also be explicitly shown by taking the limit as x tends to infinity.
lim
x→∞
Π(x) = lim
x→∞
(
x− θ
x
)(
1 + x
1 + β + x(1− β)
)
= lim
x→∞
x2( 1
x
+ 1− θ
x2
− θ
x
)
x2( 1
x
+ β
x
+ 1− β)
=
0 + 1− 0 + 0
0 + 0 + 1− β =
1
1− β
Figure 1.5: Plot of function Π(x), for β =
0.99
Figure 1.6: Plot of Π(x) for fixed θ - solid
line, Π(x) = 1 - dashed line (β = 0.99)
1.7.2 Proof of Corollary 1 - Uncertainty
Here we show that countries’ payoffs in PEG PEG are always positive, independently
of relative country size and substitutability parameters.
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Figure 1.7: Function Π(x) (red line), its derivative ∂Π(x)
∂x
(blue line), and asymptote
x = 1
1−β > 1 (black line)
Proof. From (1.40) and (1.41) we can see that because we are only considering positive
monetary expansion in the Center, i.e. m¯C > 0, and θ > 0, uAPEG,PEG = u
B
PEG,PEG is
always positive.
Showing that other strategies may yield negative payoffs (see Proof of Proposition
1) completes the proof.
1.7.3 Proof of Lemma 2 - Beggar-thyself-C
In the following proof we show when monetary expansion in the Center can decrease
C’s utility depending on the action of the Periphery countries.
Proof. uCPEG,PEG < 0 ⇐⇒ 1θm¯C < 0 which never holds, because θ > 0, and m¯C > 0.
uCAPP,APP < 0 ⇐⇒ 1θ [1− γP + γPΠ(ρ)]m¯C < 0, given that θ > 0, and m¯C > 0 the
condition simplifies to 1− γP + γPΠ(ρ) < 0 ⇐⇒ Π(ρ) < γP−1γP .
uCAPP,PEG < 0 ⇐⇒ −1θ [1− γAγP (1−Π(ρ))]m¯C < 0, given that θ > 0, and m¯C > 0
the condition simplifies to 1− γAγP (1− Π(ρ)) < 0 ⇐⇒ Π(ρ) < γP γA−1γP γA .
uCPEG,APP < 0 ⇐⇒ 1θ [1 + γP (1 − γA)(Π(ρ) − 1)]m¯C < 0, given that θ > 0, and
m¯C > 0 the condition simplifies to 1+γP (1−γA)(Π(ρ)−1)] ⇐⇒ Π(ρ) < γP (1−γA)−1γP (1−γA) .
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1.7.4 Proof of Lemma 3 - No need for coordination
Proof. It is straightforward to show that given the payoffs with θ = ψ = ρ, both
countries have a dominant strategy to PEG, and that PEG PEG yields greater payoff
than APP APP:
• Country A has a dominant strategy to PEG because, from (1.69) and (1.73):
1
θ
m¯C > 1
θ
[1 + γP (γA − 1)]m¯C , 1 > [1 + γP (γA − 1)], 0 > γP (γA − 1), which is
always true since 0 < γA < 1, and 0 < γP < 1; and from (1.75) and (1.71):
1
θ
(1 − γAγP )m¯C > 1θ (1 − γP )m¯C , (1 − γAγP ) > (1 − γP ), γP > γAγP , which is
always true because 0 < γA < 1,
• Country B has a dominant strategy to PEG because, from (1.70) and (1.76):
1 > (1−γPγA), γPγA > 0 , and from (1.74) and (1.72): [(1+γP (γA−1)] > (1−γP ),
γPγA > 0, both conditions aer always true since 0 < γA < 1, and 0 < γP < 1,
• PEG PEG yields greater payoff than APP APP: from (1.69), (1.70), (1.71), and
(1.72) 1
θ
m¯C > 1
θ
(1 − γP )m¯C , which simplifies to 1 > 1 − γP , and further the
condition becomes 0 < γP , which is always true, since 0 < γP < 1.
Remark 6. For convenience, we provide here the limits of expressions from section
1.2.4 used in this Proof.
lim
ρ→ψ→θ
(uAPEG,PEG) =
1
θ
m¯C (1.69)
lim
ρ→ψ→θ
(uBPEG,PEG) =
1
θ
m¯C (1.70)
lim
ρ→ψ→θ
(uAAPP,APP ) =
1
θ
(1− γP )m¯C (1.71)
lim
ρ→ψ→θ
(uBAPP,APP ) =
1
θ
(1− γP )m¯C (1.72)
lim
ρ→ψ→θ
(uAAPP,PEG) =
1
θ
[1 + γP (γA − 1)]m¯C (1.73)
lim
ρ→ψ→θ
(uBAPP,PEG) =
1
θ
[1 + γP (γA − 1)]m¯C (1.74)
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lim
ρ→ψ→θ
(uAPEG,APP ) =
1
θ
[1− γAγP ]m¯C (1.75)
lim
ρ→ψ→θ
(uBPEG,APP ) =
1
θ
[1− γAγP ]m¯C (1.76)
1.7.5 Proof of Lemma 4 - Coordination failure
Proof. Coordination failure with two equilibria APP APP and PEG PEG arises, if the
following conditions hold simultaneously:
1. uAPEG,PEG > u
A
APP,PEG,
2. uAPEG,APP < u
A
APP,APP ,
3. uBPEG,PEG > u
B
PEG,APP ,
4. uBAPP,PEG < u
B
APP,APP ,
From 1. and using (1.40) and (1.49):
uAPEG,PEG − uAAPP,PEG =
1
θ
m¯C [Π(ψ) + γA(γP − Π(ψ) + Π(ρ)− γPΠ(ρ))] > 0
and from 2. and using (1.46) and (1.43):
uAPEG,APP − uAAPP,APP =
1
θ
m¯C [Π(ψ) + γA(γP − Π(ψ) + Π(ρ)− γPΠ(ρ))] < 0
which cannot hold simultaneously, therefore coordination failure with Nash equilib-
ria APP APP and PEG PEG will never arise.
Coordination failure with two equilibria APP PEG and PEG APP arises, if the
following conditions hold simultaneously:
1. uAPEG,PEG < u
A
APP,PEG,
2. uAPEG,APP > u
A
APP,APP ,
3. uBPEG,PEG < u
B
PEG,APP ,
4. uBAPP,PEG > u
B
APP,APP ,
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From 1. and using (1.40) and (1.49):
uAPEG,PEG − uAAPP,PEG =
1
θ
m¯C [Π(ψ) + γA(γP − Π(ψ) + Π(ρ)− γPΠ(ρ))] < 0
and from 2. and using (1.46) and (1.43):
uAPEG,APP − uAAPP,APP =
1
θ
m¯C [Π(ψ) + γA(γP − Π(ψ) + Π(ρ)− γPΠ(ρ))] > 0
which cannot hold simultaneously, therefore coordination failure with Nash equilib-
ria APP PEG and PEG APP will never arise.
1.7.6 Proof of Proposition 1 - Beggar-thy-neighbour
Proof. We want to check the following inequalities:
1. uAPEG,PEG < 0,
2. uBPEG,PEG < 0,
3. uAAPP,APP < 0,
4. uBAPP,APP < 0,
5. uAPEG,APP < 0,
6. uBPEG,APP < 0,
7. uAAPP,PEG < 0,
8. uBAPP,PEG < 0.
Conditions 1. and 2. never hold for positive monetary shock in the Center. From
(1.40) and (1.41): 1
θ
m¯C < 0 only, if there is negative monetary shock in the Center
m¯C < 0. Conditions 2. and 3. hold if Π(ρ) > 1, which by property 5 of Lemma 1
happens when ρ >
β+θ−
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
. From (1.43) and (1.44), and using the fact that
m¯C > 0, and 0 < γP < 1:
1
θ
(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)m¯C < 0, if Π(ρ) > 1.
Conditions 5.-8. are more complicated, so we look at extreme values of the country
size.
58
First assume large Periphery, i.e. γP → 1. From (1.49) we check when [(γA −
1)(Π(ψ)−1)] < 0, which for small country A simplifies to Π(ψ) > 1, which using Lemma
1 holds, if ψ <
β+θ−
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
. From (1.50) we check when 1
θ
m¯C [1+γA(Π(ψ)−1)] < 0,
which simplifies to Π(ψ) < γA−1
γA
, which holds for ψ sufficiently smaller than θ (which
is easier to fulfill as γA → 1. From (1.46) we check when 1θm¯C [γA + (1− γA)Π(ψ)] < 0,
which simplifies to Π(ψ) < −γA
1−γA , which holds for ψ sufficiently smaller than θ (which is
easier to fulfill as γA → 1. From (1.47) we check when −1θm¯C [γA(Π(ψ)− 1)] < 0, which
simplifies to Π(ψ) > 1, which using Lemma 1 holds, if ψ >
β+θ−
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
.
Now assume small Periphery, i.e. γP → 0. From (1.49) we want to check when
1
θ
m¯C [(1+(γA−1)Π(ψ)−γAΠ(ρ)] < 0, we can look at two extreme cases: small country A,
i.e γA → 0 or small country B γA → 1. If γA → 0, then the condition becomes Π(ψ) > 1,
which by Lemma 1 holds, if ψ >
β+θ−
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
. If γA → 1, then the condition becomes
Π(ρ) > 1, which by Lemma 1 holds, if ρ >
β+θ−
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
. From (1.50) we want to
check when 1
θ
m¯C [1 + γA(Π(ψ) − Π(ρ))] < 0, which does not hold for small country A,
and holds for large country A, if Π(ψ) − Π(ρ) < −1. From (1.46) we want to check
when 1
θ
m¯C [(1+(1−γA)Π(ψ)+(γA−1)Π(ρ)] < 0, which does not hold for large country
A, and holds for small country A, if Π(ψ)−Π(ρ) < −1. From (1.47) we want to check
when −1
θ
m¯C [γA(Π(ψ)−Π(ρ)) + Π(ρ)− 1] < 0. If γA → 1, then the condition becomes
Π(ψ) > 1, which by Lemma 1 holds, if ψ >
β+θ−
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
. If γA → 0, then the
condition becomes Π(ρ) > 1, which by Lemma 1 holds, if ρ >
β+θ−
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
.
Remark 7. For convenience, we provide here the limits of expressions from section
1.2.4 used in this Proof.
lim
γP→1
(uAAPP,PEG) =
1
θ
m¯C [(γA − 1)(Π(ψ)− 1)] (1.77)
lim
γP→1
(uBAPP,PEG) =
1
θ
m¯C [1 + γA(Π(ψ)− 1)] (1.78)
lim
γP→1
(uAPEG,APP ) =
1
θ
m¯C [γA + (1− γA)Π(ψ)] (1.79)
lim
γP→1
(uBPEG,APP ) = −
1
θ
m¯C [γA(Π(ψ)− 1)] (1.80)
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lim
γP→0
(uAAPP,PEG) =
1
θ
m¯C [(1 + (γA − 1)Π(ψ)− γAΠ(ρ)] (1.81)
lim
γP→0
(uBAPP,PEG) =
1
θ
m¯C [1 + γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ))] (1.82)
lim
γP→0
(uAPEG,APP ) =
1
θ
m¯C [(1 + (1− γA)Π(ψ) + (γA − 1)Π(ρ)] (1.83)
lim
γP→0
(uBPEG,APP ) = −
1
θ
m¯C [γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ)) + Π(ρ)− 1] (1.84)
1.7.7 Proof of Proposition 2 - Enrich-thy-neighbour
Proof. We want to check the following inequalities:
1. uAPEG,PEG > 0
2. uBPEG,PEG > 0
3. uAAPP,APP > 0
4. uBAPP,APP > 0
5. uAPEG,APP > 0
6. uBPEG,APP > 0
7. uAAPP,PEG > 0
8. uBAPP,PEG > 0
These are exactly the exact opposite to conditions in the previous proof 2, and this
follows by the same reasoning.
1.7.8 Proof of Proposition 3 - Dominant strategies to appre-
ciate
Proof. For country A and B to have a dominant strategy to appreciate, the following
inequalities have to hold simultaneously:
1. uAPEG,PEG < u
A
APP,PEG,
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2. uAPEG,APP < u
A
APP,APP ,
3. uBPEG,PEG < u
B
PEG,APP ,
4. uBAPP,PEG < u
B
APP,APP .
From 1. and 2. we get condition (1.56) for Country A, and from 3. and 4. we get
condition (1.57) for Country B.
Remark 8. To look at the role of asymmetries in country size for these results, we split
these cases into subcases, depending on the relative size of the countries, and consider
the limits of expressions used in the inequalities above.
”Symmetry” in size
First we consider the case, in which Periphery is half the size of the world economy and
each periphery country is half the size of the Periphery, i.e. γP = 0.5, and γA = 0.5.
1. 1
θ
m¯C < 1
θ
m¯C [(0.75− 0.5Π(ψ)− 0.25Π(ρ)]
2. 1
θ
m¯C [(0.75 + 0.5Π(ψ)− 0.25Π(ρ)] < 0.51
θ
m¯C [1− Π(ρ)]
3. 1
θ
m¯C < 1
θ
m¯C [(0.75− 0.5Π(ψ)− 0.25Π(ρ)]
4. 1
θ
m¯C [(0.75 + 0.5Π(ψ)− 0.25Π(ρ)] < 0.51
θ
m¯C [1− Π(ρ)]
Since inequality 1. and 3., and 2. and 4. are the same we actually need to look at
2 inequalities. From 1. 0.5Π(ψ) + 0.25Π(ρ) < 0.25, and from 2. 0.5Π(ψ) + 0.25Π(ρ) <
−0.25, which is a stronger condition than 1. If both Π(ψ) and Π(ρ) are sufficiently neg-
ative (i.e. x sufficiently smaller than θ), then this condition holds. Also this condition
might hold, if at least one Π is sufficiently negative, with the other being positive.
Large Periphery - small country A
Here we consider a case of large Periphery, i.e. γP → 1 and asymmetry in size between
the countries in the Periphery such that γA → 0.
1. 1
θ
m¯C < 1
θ
[1− Π(ψ)]m¯C
2. 1
θ
Π(ψ)m¯C < 0
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3. 1
θ
m¯C < 0
4. 1
θ
m¯C < 0
Conditions 3. and 4. are violated, since both θ and m¯C are larger than zero. There-
fore, APP APP is never a dominant strategy when the Periphery is large, and one of
the Periphery countries is very small.
Small Periphery - small country A
Here we consider a case of small Periphery, i.e. γP → 0 and asymmetry in size between
the countries in the Periphery such that γA → 0.
1. 1
θ
m¯C < 1
θ
[1− Π(ρ)]m¯C
2. 1
θ
[1 + Π(ψ)− Π(ρ)]m¯C < 1
θ
[1− Π(ρ)]m¯C
3. 1
θ
m¯C < 1
θ
[1− Π(ρ)]m¯C
4. 1
θ
m¯C < 1
θ
[1− Π(ρ)]m¯C
From 1., 3. and 4. Π(ρ) < 0, and from 2. Π(ψ) < 0. By Lemma 1 Π(x) < 0, if x <
θ. Therefore, if the Periphery is small relative to the Center, and the substitutability of
goods within the country is greater than between the countries, APP APP is a dominant
strategy for both large and small Periphery country.
Small country A
When country A is small, i.e. γA → 0 the conditions become:
1. 1
θ
m¯C < 1
θ
m¯C [1− Π(ψ)]
2. u1
θ
m¯C [(1 + Π(ψ) + γP (Π(ρ)− 1)− Π(ρ)] < 1θm¯C(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)
3. 1
θ
m¯C < 1
θ
m¯C(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)
4. 1
θ
m¯C < 1
θ
m¯C(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)
From 1. and 2. Π(ψ) < 0. From 3. and 3. γP
γP−1 < Π(ρ).
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Small Periphery
When Periphery as a whole is small, i.e. γP → 0 the conditions become:
1. 1
θ
m¯C < 1
θ
m¯C [(1 + (γA − 1)Π(ψ)− γAΠ(ρ)]
2. 1
θ
m¯C [(1 + (1− γA)Π(ψ) + (γA − 1)Π(ρ)] < 1θm¯C [1− Π(ρ)]
3. 1
θ
m¯C < −1
θ
m¯C [γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ)) + Π(ρ)− 1]
4. 1
θ
m¯C [1 + γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ))] < 1θm¯C [1− Π(ρ)]
From 1. and 2. γA
γA−1 <
Π(ψ)
Π(ρ)
. From 3. and 4. γA
γA−1 <
Π(ρ)
Π(ψ)
. For example, this is
true if Π(ψ) = Π(ρ).
1.7.9 Proof of Proposition 4 - Dominant strategies to peg
Proof. Country A and B will heave dominant strategy PEG PEG, if the following
inequalities hold simultaneously:
1. uAPEG,PEG > u
A
APP,PEG,
2. uAPEG,APP > u
A
APP,APP ,
3. uBPEG,PEG > u
B
PEG,APP ,
4. uBAPP,PEG > u
B
APP,APP .
From 1. and 2. we get condition (1.58) for Country A, and from 3. and 4. we get
condition (1.59) for country B.
Remark 9. To look at the role of asymmetries in country size for these results, we split
these cases into subcases, depending on the relative size of the countries, and consider
the limits of expressions used in the inequalities above.
”Symmetry” in size
First we consider the case, in which Periphery is half the size of the world economy and
each periphery country is half the size of the Periphery, i.e. γP = 0.5, and γA = 0.5.
1. 1
θ
m¯C > 1
θ
m¯C [(0.75− 0.5Π(ψ)− 0.25Π(ρ)]
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2. 1
θ
m¯C [(0.75 + 0.5Π(ψ)− 0.25Π(ρ)] > 0.51
θ
m¯C [1− Π(ρ)]
3. 1
θ
m¯C > 1
θ
m¯C [(0.75− 0.5Π(ψ)− 0.25Π(ρ)]
4. 1
θ
m¯C [(0.75 + 0.5Π(ψ)− 0.25Π(ρ)] > 0.51
θ
m¯C [1− Π(ρ)]
Since condition 1. and 3., and 2. and 4. are the same we actually need to look at two
conditions only. From 1. 0.5Π(ψ)+0.25Π(ρ) > 0.25, and from 2. 0.5Π(ψ)+0.25Π(ρ) >
−0.25. Since condition 1. is stronger than 2., countries will prefer to PEG, if both Π(ψ)
and Π(ρ) are sufficiently positive (i.e. x sufficiently larger than θ), or Π(ψ) sufficiently
larger than Π(ρ).
Large Periphery - small country A
Here we consider a case of large Periphery, i.e. γP → 1 and asymmetry in size between
the countries in the Periphery such that γA → 0.
1. 1
θ
m¯C > 1
θ
[1− Π(ψ)]m¯C
2. 1
θ
Π(ψ)m¯C > 0
3. 1
θ
m¯C > 0
4. 1
θ
m¯C > 0
From 1. and 2. Π(ψ) > 0, and 3. and 4. are always true. Therefore, if the
Periphery is large and countries in the Periphery are of different size, PEG PEG is a
dominant strategy when ψ > θ.
Small Periphery - small country A
Here we consider a case of small Periphery, i.e. γP → 0 and asymmetry in size between
the countries in the Periphery such that γA → 0.
1. 1
θ
m¯C > 1
θ
[1− Π(ρ)]m¯C
2. 1
θ
[1 + Π(ψ)− Π(ρ)]m¯C > 1
θ
[1− Π(ρ)]m¯C
3. 1
θ
m¯C > 1
θ
[1− Π(ρ)]m¯C
4. 1
θ
m¯C > 1
θ
[1− Π(ρ)]m¯C
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From 1., 3. and 4. Π(ρ) > 0, and from (2) Π(ψ) > 0. By Lemma 1 Π(x) > 0, if x >
θ. Therefore, if the Periphery is small relative to the Center, and the substitutability of
goods within the country is smaller than between the countries, PEG PEG is a dominant
strategy for both large and small Periphery country.
Small country A
When country A is small, i.e. γA → 0 the conditions become:
1. 1
θ
m¯C > 1
θ
m¯C [1− Π(ψ)]
2. 1
θ
m¯C [(1 + Π(ψ) + γP (Π(ρ)− 1)− Π(ρ)] > 1θm¯C(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)
3. 1
θ
m¯C > 1
θ
m¯C(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)
4. 1
θ
m¯C > 1
θ
m¯C(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)
From 1. and 2. Π(ψ) > 0. From 3. and 4. γP
γP−1 > Π(ρ).
Small Periphery
When Periphery as a whole is small, i.e. γP → 0 the conditions become:
1. 1
θ
m¯C > 1
θ
m¯C [(1 + (γA − 1)Π(ψ)− γAΠ(ρ)]
2. 1
θ
m¯C [(1 + (1− γA)Π(ψ) + (γA − 1)Π(ρ)] > 1θm¯C [1− Π(ρ)]
3. 1
θ
m¯C > −1
θ
m¯C [γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ)) + Π(ρ)− 1]
4. 1
θ
m¯C [1 + γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ))] > 1θm¯C [1− Π(ρ)]
From 1. and 2. γA
γA−1 >
Π(ψ)
Π(ρ)
. From 3. and 4. γA
γA−1 >
Π(ρ)
Π(ψ)
. For example, this is
true if Π(ψ) = Π(ρ).
1.7.10 Proof of Proposition 5 - Prisoner’s Dilemma with ap-
preciation
Proof. We want to check the following conditions:
1. uAPEG,PEG < u
A
APP,PEG,
2. uAPEG,APP < u
A
APP,APP ,
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3. uBPEG,PEG < u
B
PEG,APP ,
4. uBAPP,PEG < u
B
APP,APP ,
5. uAAPP,APP < u
A
PEG,PEG and u
B
APP,APP < u
B
PEG,PEG.
From 1. and 2. we get condition (1.56) for Country A, from 3. and 4. we get
condition (1.57) for Country B, and from 5. we get condition (1.60).
Conditions 1.-4. are the same as in Proof of Proposition 3. Since payoffs in country
payoffs in APP APP and PEG PEG are independent of relative size of A and B, only
relative size of the Periphery as a whole, and thus symmetric, condition 5. reduces to
uAAPP,APP < u
A
PEG,PEG.
Remark 10. We split these cases into subcases, depending on the relative size of the
countries to look at the role of asymmetries in size, as we did in the proof for dominant
strategies.
”Symmetry” in size
If the Periphery is half the size of the world economy and each periphery country is half
the size of the Periphery, i.e. γP = 0.5, and γA = 0.5, then condition 5. becomes:
0.5
1
θ
m¯C [1− Π(ρ)] < 1
θ
m¯C
which holds when Π(ρ) > −1, therefore Prisoner’s Dilemma is possible.
Large Periphery - small country A
Condition 5. becomes:
0 <
1
θ
m¯C
which always holds, but this is never a dominant strategy, therefore Prisoner’s
Dilemma is not possible.
Small Periphery - small country A
Condition 5. becomes:
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1θ
[1− Π(ρ)]m¯C < 1
θ
m¯C
which holds when Π(ρ) > 0, which by Lemma 1 holds, if ρ > θ.
Small country A
Condition 5. becomes:
1
θ
m¯C(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1) < 1
θ
m¯C
which holds when Π(ρ) < γP
γP−1 .
Small Periphery
Condition 5. becomes:
1
θ
m¯C [1− Π(ρ)] < 1
θ
m¯C
which holds when Π(ρ) > 0, which by Lemma 1 holds, if ρ > θ.
Summary of Prisoner’s Dilemma conditions is presented in Table 1.5.
1.7.11 Proof of Proposition 6 - Prisoner’s Dilemma with peg
Proof. For Prisoner’s Dilemma with Nash equilibrium PEG PEG to arise, the following
inequalities have to hold simultaneously:
1. uAPEG,PEG > u
A
APP,PEG,
2. uAPEG,APP > u
A
APP,APP ,
3. uBPEG,PEG > u
B
PEG,APP ,
4. uBAPP,PEG > u
B
APP,APP ,
5. uAAPP,APP > u
A
PEG,PEG and u
B
APP,APP > u
B
PEG,PEG.
From 1. and 2. we get condition (1.58), from 3. and 4. we get condition (1.59),
and from 5. we get condition (1.66). Conditions 1.-4. are the same as in Proof
of Proposition 3. Since payoffs in country payoffs in APP APP and PEG PEG are
independent of relative size of A and B, only relative size of the Periphery as a whole,
and thus symmetric, condition 5. reduces to uAAPP,APP < u
A
PEG,PEG.
67
Remark 11. We split these cases into subcases, depending on the relative size of the
countries, as we did in the proof for dominant strategies.
”Symmetry” in size
If the Periphery is half the size of the world economy and each periphery country is half
the size of the Periphery, i.e. γP = 0.5, and γA = 0.5, then condition 5. becomes:
0.5
1
θ
m¯C [1− Π(ρ)] > 1
θ
m¯C
which holds when Π(ρ) < −1.
Large Periphery - small country A
Condition 5. becomes:
0 >
1
θ
m¯C
which never holds.
Small Periphery - small country A
Condition 5. becomes:
1
θ
[1− Π(ρ)]m¯C > 1
θ
m¯C
which holds when Π(ρ) < 0, which by Lemma 1 holds, if ρ < θ.
Small country A
Condition 5. becomes:
1
θ
m¯C(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1) > 1
θ
m¯C
which holds when Π(ρ) > γP
γP−1 .
Small Periphery
Condition 5. becomes:
68
1θ
m¯C [1− Π(ρ)] > 1
θ
m¯C
which holds when Π(ρ) < 0, which by Lemma 1 holds, if ρ < θ.
Summary of Prisoner’s Dilemma conditions is presented in Table 1.5.
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1.8 Appendix: Log-linearized model
In a symmetric steady state, around which the model is linearized, the real interest rate
equals the discount rate:
β =
1
1 + i
.
In the initial steady state, both consumption and output are constant are equal:
C0 = Y0 =
√
θ − 1
θκ
Then we can use the log-linear approximation of a variable around it’s equilibrium
steady-state value:
x ≈ X −X0
X0
where the lowercase letter means the approximated value, X0 - steady state value,
and X - actual value of a variable. Variables with upperbars will denote long run
variables and without, short run ones.
And since bond holdings are assumed to be zero:
BA = BB = BP = BC = 0
the log linear approximation in this case will be defined as:
b¯j =
Bj
PC0 C0
All of the following expressions come from the Corsetti et.al. (1999) Corsetti et al.
(1999b). The following notation is used: x for the short run percentage deviations from
the initial steady state, and x¯ for the long run percentage deviations from the initial
steady state. More details of the model can be found in one of these: Corsetti et al.
(2000), Corsetti et al. (1999a) or Corsetti et al. (1999b).
xP ≡ γAxA + (1− γA)xB (1.85)
xw ≡ γPxP + (1− γP )xC (1.86)
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that solve for the country-specific variables we will use the following decompositions:
xC = xw − γP (xP − xC)
xP = xw + (1− γP )(xP − xC)
xA = xP + (1− γA)(xA − xB)
xB = xP − γA(xA − xB)
1.8.1 Long run
To derive the long rum solution we will start by log linearizing money demand and
pricing rule equations:
m¯j − p¯j = c¯j (1.87)
p¯jj − p¯j = c¯j + y¯j (1.88)
Then from price index equations we can write:
p¯jP = γAp¯
j
A + (1− γA)p¯jB (1.89)
and
p¯j = γP p¯
j
P + (1− γP )p¯jC (1.90)
The log linearized output demands are:
y¯A = −ψ(p¯AA − p¯AP ) + y¯P (1.91)
y¯B = −ψ(p¯BB − p¯BP ) + y¯P (1.92)
y¯P = −ρ(p¯CP − p¯C) + c¯w (1.93)
y¯C = −ρ(p¯CC − p¯C) + c¯w (1.94)
From sales revenue and current accounts (Equations are derived as in Obstfeld and
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Rogoff (1996) Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) by integrating over time the period budget
constraint of the individual, and imposing transversality condition. In this way the
present value of the lifetime constraint is obtained, which after imposing money-market
equilibrium reduces to C¯A = iB¯A +
P¯AA
P¯A
Y¯ A then notice that 1−β
β
= i and log linearize.)
0 =
1− β
β
b¯A − c¯A + p¯AA − p¯A + y¯A (1.95)
0 =
1− β
β
b¯B − c¯B + p¯BB − p¯B + y¯B (1.96)
0 =
1− β
β
b¯C − c¯C + p¯CC − p¯C + y¯C (1.97)
0 = γAγP b¯
A + γBγP b¯
B + γC b¯
C (1.98)
Center-Periphery
From pricing equation, output demand and current account equations we can write:
(p¯PP − p¯CC)− (p¯P − p¯C) = (c¯P − c¯C) + (y¯P − y¯C) (1.99)
(y¯P − y¯C) = −ρ(p¯CP − p¯CC) (1.100)
(c¯P − c¯C) = 1− β
β
b¯P
(1− γP ) + (y¯
P − y¯C) + (p¯CP − p¯CC) + (p¯P − p¯C) (1.101)
And when the law of one price holds:
p¯CP + e¯
P = p¯PP (1.102)
p¯C + e¯P = p¯P (1.103)
(p¯PP − p¯CC − e¯P ) = (c¯P − c¯C) + (y¯P − y¯C) (1.104)
(y¯P − y¯C) = −ρ(p¯PP − p¯CC − e¯P ) (1.105)
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(c¯P − c¯C) = 1− β
β
+ (p¯PP − p¯CC − e¯P ) + (y¯P − y¯C) (1.106)
And the long run solutions are:
(y¯P − y¯C) = −1
2
1− β
β
b¯P
(1− γP ) (1.107)
(c¯P − c¯C) = 1 + ρ
2ρ
1− β
β
b¯P
(1− γP ) (1.108)
(p¯PP − p¯CC − e¯P ) =
1
2ρ
1− β
β
b¯P
(1− γP ) (1.109)
Intra-Periphery
Intra-Periphery solutions are obtained as the Center-Periphery solutions.
(c¯A − c¯B) = 1 + ψ
2ψ
1− β
β
b¯A − b¯B
(1− γA) (1.110)
(p¯AA − p¯BB)− (e¯A − e¯B) =
1
2ψ
1− β
β
b¯A − b¯B
(1− γA) (1.111)
(y¯A − y¯B) = −1
2
1− β
β
b¯A − b¯B
(1− γA) (1.112)
1.8.2 Short run
In the short run prices are fixed at the following levels:
p¯AP = (1− γA)(eA − eB) (1.113)
p¯BP = −γA(eA − eB) (1.114)
p¯CP = γAe
A + (1− γA)eB = eP (1.115)
p¯A = γP (1− γA)(eA − eB) + (1− γP )eA = eA − γP eP (1.116)
73
p¯B = −γPγA(eA − eB) + (1− γP )eB = eB − γP eP (1.117)
p¯C = −γP eP (1.118)
c¯j − cj = βdi+ pC − p¯C (1.119)
m¯j − pj = cj + β
1− β (e
j − e¯j − βdi) (1.120)
cj − ck = c¯j − c¯k (1.121)
ej − ek = e¯j − e¯k (1.122)
Output demands:
yA = ψ(1− γA)(eA − eB) + yP (1.123)
yB = −ψγA(eA − eB) + yP (1.124)
yP = ρ(1− γP )eP + cw (1.125)
yC = −ργP eP + cw (1.126)
Sales revenue and current account equations:
b¯A + cA = −(eA − γP eP ) + yA (1.127)
b¯B + cB = −(eB − γP eP ) + yB (1.128)
b¯C + cC = γP e
P + yC (1.129)
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1.8.3 Center-Periphery
eP =
1
ρ
1− β + ρ(1 + β)
1 + β + ρ(1− β)(m¯
P − m¯C) (1.130)
b¯P
1− γP =
2β(ρ− 1)
1 + β + ρ(1− β)(m¯
P − m¯C) (1.131)
cP − cC = c¯P − c¯C = ρ− 1
ρ
(1− β)(1 + ρ)
1 + β + ρ(1− β)(m¯
P − m¯C) (1.132)
yP − yC = 1− β + ρ(1 + β)
1 + β + ρ(1− β)(m¯
P − m¯C) (1.133)
y¯P − y¯C = −1
2
1− β
β
b¯P
1− γP (1.134)
yPnpv − yCnpv =
1 + ρ
1 + β + ρ(1− β)(m¯
P − m¯C) (1.135)
cPnpv − cCnpv =
ρ− 1
ρ
1 + ρ
1 + β + ρ(1− β)(m¯
P − m¯C) (1.136)
uP − uC = ρ− θ
ρθ
(yPnpv − yCnpv) (1.137)
1.8.4 Intra-Periphery
eA − eB = 1
ψ
1− β + ψ(1 + β)
1 + β + ψ(1− β)(m¯
A − m¯B) (1.138)
cA − cB = c¯A − c¯B = ψ − 1
ψ
(1− β)(1 + ψ)
1 + β + ψ(1− β)(m¯
A − m¯B) (1.139)
yA − yB = 1− β + ψ(1 + β)
1 + β + ψ(1− β)(m¯
A − m¯B) (1.140)
y¯A − y¯B = −1
2
1− β
β
b¯A − b¯P
1− γA (1.141)
b¯A − b¯P
1− γA =
2β(ψ − 1)
1 + β + ψ(1− β)(m¯
A − m¯B) (1.142)
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yAnpv − yBnpv =
1 + ψ
1 + β + ψ(1− β)(m¯
A − m¯B) (1.143)
cAnpv − cBnpv =
ψ − 1
ψ
1 + ψ
1 + β + ψ(1− β)(m¯
A − m¯B) (1.144)
uA − uB = ψ − θ
ψθ
(yAnpv − yBnpv) (1.145)
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Chapter 2
Strategic interactions in emerging
economies and their welfare
consequences: An empirical
approach
2.1 Introduction
The debate between policymakers concerning the effects of the expansionary monetary
policy in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-08 on emerging economies remains
present on the international agenda. While policymakers in the US assert that such
policies are beneficial domestically as well as for the emerging economies (Powell, 2013;
Bernanke, 2013) other policymakers, like the President of Brazil, expressed their worries
about the negative impact of such policies on emerging economies (Rousseff (2012)).
Existing literature typically analyzes the optimal monetary policy and monetary
policy transmission mechanism between countries either in a small open economy (see
Gali and Monacelli (2005) or a two-country framework but without allowing the other
country to be active (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Tille
(2001)). Among existing examples of strategic interactions in the context of monetary
policy is Canzoneri and Henderson (1992), however their model is not appropriate for
welfare analysis because it lacks the micro-foundations that have later been introduced
in the New Keynesian models. Recently Pesaran et al. (2004) introduced a Global
Vector Autoregressive Model (GVAR) approach, that allows for the analysis of the
effects of policy shocks on other economies, regions and markets. Although there exist
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various applications of GVAR for counterfactual analysis (Pesaran and di Mauro (2013),
Dees et al. (2007)) no one has so far used it to evaluate the welfare effects of policy
spillovers between countries. Several studies have investigated the effects of quantitative
easing (QE) performed by various monetary policymakers, such as the Bank of England
(see Pesaran and Smith (2012), Kapetanios et al. (2012)), Bank of Japan (Hiroshi,
2010), and the Federal Reserve (Chen et al., 2012). However, the existing studies
do not address the role that the QE has on the welfare of the domestic and foreign
economies. Given this gap in the literature we provide a framework that allows for
a welfare analysis in which policymakers behave strategically in complex situations
similar to those taking place recently in the global economy. Our framework allows to
address the aforementioned debate between the policymakers.
We have addressed the issues related to the welfare consequences of expansionary
monetary policy of an advanced economy on its trading partners in Chapter 1 in which
we borrowed the Corsetti et al. (2000) three-country New Keynesian model to provide
a policy analysis of interactions between emerging economies in a strategic context.
In this chapter we investigate how our theoretical results correspond to the actual
economic developments in the world economy, especially in the period after the financial
crisis of 2007-08 and over the period of unconventional monetary policy of quantitative
easing (QE) of the Federal Reserve. We analyze different scenarios by allowing emerging
economies (EME) to respond to the monetary expansion in the US in different ways.
In our counterfactual scenarios the emerging economies behave strategically and can
either allow their currency to appreciate (we call it APP) or increase money supply - a
strategy which is equivalent to pegging in Chapter 1 (we call it PEG).
This chapter is original in the way we provide methodology to analyse welfare
changes in asymmetric economies using real world data. By establishing the link be-
tween the theory and the data we analyse the outcomes of strategic interactions between
Brazil and China after monetary expansion in the US in the period before and after
the financial crisis of 2007-08. Due to the fact that the post-crisis sample covers a very
short period of time, we analyze the welfare effects using recursive estimation, includ-
ing all available data up to the point of the crisis to isolate the effect on the pre-crisis
sample, and then expanding the sample by adding an additional year up to the time of
the most recent data available. In this way we compare a total of 8 samples as shown in
Table 2.8. We approach the welfare analysis in a dynamic way and track the evolution
of welfare effects and potential policy implications over time. We believe that the sev-
eral rounds of the US quantitative easing have implications on the policy in emerging
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economies and we show how the policy recommendations change in connection to these
events (summarized in the Table 2.8).
Motivated by the ongoing debate as well as the example presented by Obstfeld
(2011) we look at the welfare impact of monetary expansion in the US on China and
Brazil. Obstfeld (2011) describes a similar scenario to ours in which a large industrial
economy loosens its monetary policy, and analyses an impact of such policy on EME.
In his example appreciation today is seen as more costly (loss in one payoff unit) than
inflation tomorrow (loss in 0.9 payoff unit). When one country allows its currency to
appreciate it has to pay an appreciation cost (-1), and the country whose currency
does not appreciate has to pay the cost of inflation (-0.9) which is partially offset
by an effective nominal depreciation due to the other country’s appreciation relative
to the dollar (and measured by the extent of intra-EME trade parameter α > 0.1).
In his game the ad-hoc payoffs for the emerging economies are always negative (see
Figure 2.13 in Appendix 2.8.2) and the emerging economies are treated symmetrically.
Countries’ interactions in his game result in a Prisoner’s Dilemma1 (Obstfeld calls it
a coordination failure). In this case the Nash equilibrium in which both countries
continue to peg their currencies to that of the advanced economy results in lower payoff
(of (−1)) than if both would allow their currencies to appreciate (of −(1 − α)). Thus
Obstfeld’s policy recommendation for EME is to appreciate. We put his example into
a theoretical context in Chapter 1 and into an empirical one in this chapter.
We use an empirical approach, in particular a Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR)
model to derive payoffs using data from US, China and Brazil. Since GVAR performs
well in forecasts, we make use of the forecasted values of consumption and output as
well as generalized impulse response functions to construct payoffs in a non-cooperative
game between China and Brazil. The advantages of applying a GVAR is the ability
to relax unrealistic assumptions from the theory and ‘let the data speak for itself’.
We assess the welfare effects of individual country shocks on themselves and their
trading partners, and by using the linear combination of shocks, we assess the impact
of regional shocks (shock taking place simultaneously in more than one economy) on
the interdependent economies. The analysis of impulse response functions enables us to
evaluate the short- and long-term effects of shocks on consumption and output, which
are the main components in our welfare functions.
We construct a data set consisting of consumption, output, exchange rate and money
1Prisoner’s Dilemma is a situation in which both players have dominant strategies, and the Nash
equilibrium, resulting from agents acting non-cooperatively in self interest, yields lower payoff for both,
than if they could cooperate.
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supply (M1) variables for China, Brazil and the US. We believe to have achieved several
improvements relative to the analysis conducted in Chapter 1. Among them are the
ability to avoid the calibration of the elasticity of substitution and relative size param-
eters of the model. We construct country-specific payoffs using data that reflect the
existing asymmetries between countries. In performing this analysis we did not have
to assume the nature of nominal rigidities, which is considered a strong assumption in
most of the New Keynesian models.
We are motivated to address the following questions: Are the welfare consequences
quantitatively and qualitatively the same for both emerging economies as in Obstfeld
(2011) and in Chapter 12? Can we expect the empirical results to differ from these
predictions due to asymmetries between EME which are not modelled in Chapter 1,
such as, for example, different current account positions? What is the sign of the wel-
fare effect of the monetary expansion in the US in emerging economies? The theory in
Chapter 1 suggests that when both countries increase the money supply, this strategy
always results in positive payoffs, while according to Obstfeld (2011) all strategies result
in negative payoffs. Is Prisoner’s Dilemma a possible outcome of strategic interactions
between China and Brazil? If yes, would appreciation in both countries improve their
welfare relative to the Nash equilibrium as recommended by the U.S. Department of the
Treasury (2011) and Obstfeld (2011)? Or is there actually no benefit from policy coor-
dination because of the large asymmetries between them as suggested by the findings
in Chapter 1? Is the policy of the US beggar-thy-neighbour or enrich-thy-neighbour for
EME?
As a result of this analysis we identify optimal strategies and give policy recommen-
dations for China and Brazil. Our framework can serve as a tool for policymakers and
international organizations to analyze the welfare impact of various policies in differ-
ent scenarios in the short- and long-term and help to shed light on the potential role
that quantitative easing in the US had on the monetary policy transmission mechanism
between the advanced and the emerging economies. By constructing our framework
we provide a methodology that can be used to assess the welfare effects of other pol-
icy actions other than those discussed here on the trading partners and domestically.
According to Obstfeld (2011) an institution such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) can provide advice to emerging economies and advise on taking actions which
are optimal not only from an individual point of view but also from a global perspec-
tive. We believe that our framework can serve policymakers and institutions such as
2For details see Appendix 2.8.2.
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the IMF in evaluating the potential benefits from coordination, an important topic
on the international policy agenda. We show that China and Brazil would not ben-
efit from policy coordination. Our results reveal a novel finding; the unconventional
monetary policy of the US can have an impact on the monetary policy transmission
mechanism in the emerging economies. We find that the effects of the expansionary
monetary policy in the US on emerging economies in the period before the financial
crisis is beggar-thy-neighbour, while it improves their welfare in the period after QE.
We find that the policy recommendations for EME vary depending on the forecasting
horizon. Our framework shows that, potentially due to existing asymmetries between
Brazil and China, the effect of consumption and output, and therefore welfare, differs
substantially between these economies, especially in the period before QE. After QE,
we observe convergence in the consumption and output responses in China and Brazil.
Our analysis reveals that the effect of expansionary monetary policy in the US is much
smaller domestically than in the emerging economies.
This Chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2 we introduce the econometric
methodology; in Section 2.4 we explain how we relate the theory to the empirical
approach and data; in Section 2.5 we present the data; in Section 2.6 we present the
results; and in Section 2.7 we conclude.
2.2 Methodology - Cointegrated Global Vector Au-
toregressive Model
In this section we present the approach we take to obtain the components used in the
construction of individual countries’ payoffs. In the modelling process we are using the
Smith and Galesi (2011) GVAR Toolbox.
2.2.1 Variables choice
The choice of variables is motivated by the theoretical structure of the Corsetti et al.
(2000) model, in which the change in the utility after a monetary shock can be analysed
by looking at changes in consumption and output, and the parameters of the model, such
as within-country substitutability θ > 1, and discounting factor β ∈ (0, 1). Therefore
we choose consumption Cit, output Yit, and money supply Mit, where i denotes the
number of countries in the model.3 Since, we want to analyse the effect of monetary
3Among existing studies who used these variables in VARs are Cochrane (1994, 1998).
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shocks originating in various countries on the welfare of the country itself and its trading
partners, we are including both home and foreign variables into our model. In order
to express the data in US dollars, the data also contains the exchange rates of Brazil
and China relative to the US dollar. Since the data is expressed in real terms using
the deflator there is no need for inclusion of prices as one of the variables. Variables
construction is presented in Section 2.4.1 Variables.
The vector of country-specific home variables is denoted by Xt:
Xt =
 CitYit
Mit

Vector of country-specific foreign variables, which is constructed using trade weights,
is denoted by XFt :
XFt =
 C
F
it
Y Fit
MFit

whereXFit =
∑N
j=0wijXjt, with non-negative trade weights wij, such that
∑N
j=0 wij =
1, and wii = 0 for all i. For the construction of trade weights we use bilateral trade
data, and treat world as consisting of only i countries. For details see Section 2.5.
We can illustrate the construction of home and foreign variables in a three country
example, considering the countries of interest, namely the US, China (CH) and Brazil
(BR).
Let Xt:
Xt =

xUSt
XCHt
XBRt

=

CUSt
YUSt
MUSt
CCHt
YCHt
MCHt
CBRt
YBRt
MBRt

The foreign variables are constructed for the three country case in the following
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way:
XFCHt = wCH,BRXBRt + wCH,USXUSt
XFBRt = wBR,CHXCHt + wBR,USXUSt
XFUSt = wUS,BRXBRt + wUS,CHXCHt
where wCH,BR is the share of trade with Brazil in China’s total trade.
2.2.2 Constructing individual country models
Unit root test
We proceed to investigate the properties of the variables, in particular if these are
stationary or follow a unit-root process. We use two tests: augmented Dickey-Fuller test
(ADF) and weighted symmetric (WS) estimation of ADF. WS test statistic is considered
to perform better than the standard ADF test measured by a smaller mean square error,
because it exploits the time reversibility of stationary autoregressive process (Park and
Fuller, 1995). Lag order in the tests can be selected using Akaike information criterion
(AIC) or the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC).
In Table 2.1 we report the results from the ADF and WS tests for home variables
in the full sample4. Since the WS test performs better we use it to conclude about
the order of integration of the variables. First we look at the values of the test for
the variables in levels. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit root in case of
all variables consumption, output and money supply in all countries. Yet the first
difference of these variables, except for output in China, where the null hypothesis of
unit root cannot be rejected (although only marginally), is stationary.
Since the data is non-stationary, but difference stationary (See Table 2.1) to avoid
spurious regression we can either work with the model with differences, or we can test if
the linear combination of these variables is stationary (for formal test see Table 2.3). If
the linear combination of variables is stationary we say that variables are cointegrated
and can use the model in levels to investigate the long-run relationships between the
variables.
4The results for foreign variables as well as other sample are available upon request.
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Table 2.1: Unit Root Tests for the Domestic Variables at the 5% Significance Level for
1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1, C-V - critical value, ADF - augmented Dickey-Fuller test, WS -
weighted symmetric test
ADF WS
Variables C-V USA China Brazil C-V USA China Brazil
Y (with trend) -3.45 -1.48 -1.67 -1.73 -3.24 -0.78 -2.67 -1.64
Y (no trend) -2.89 -2.75 0.07 -1.84 -2.55 0.95 0.08 -1.57
DY -2.89 -3.51 -1.78 -6.07 -2.55 -3.69 -2.00 -6.25
DDY -2.89 -7.75 -35.75 -9.32 -2.55 -7.92 -35.39 -9.61
C (with trend) -3.45 -1.54 -1.69 -1.69 -3.24 -0.94 -1.94 -1.68
C (no trend) -2.89 -2.79 1.88 -1.88 -2.55 0.88 0.34 -1.62
DC -2.89 -4.10 -2.55 -6.35 -2.55 -4.30 -2.55 -6.49
DDC -2.89 -8.74 -25.15 -7.91 -2.55 -8.88 -25.69 -8.02
M (with trend) -3.45 -0.41 -1.40 -2.52 -3.24 0.28 -1.74 -1.62
M (no trend) -2.89 2.73 -1.27 -2.55 -2.55 1.18 1.33 1.56
DM -2.89 -2.80 -5.72 -3.29 -2.55 -2.88 -5.92 -3.61
DDM -2.89 -7.62 -9.89 -9.30 -2.55 -7.84 -10.18 -9.17
Lag order
Consider a VARX(pi, qi) model where pi is the lag length of domestic and qi of foreign
variables.
Xit = ai0+ai0t+Φi1Xi,t−1+...+Φi2Xi,t−pi+Λi0X
F
it +Λi1X
F
i,t−1+...+Λi2X
F
i,t−qi+εit (2.1)
We select the lag order of the variables in VARX by using the highest value provided
by the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
In Table 2.2 we report the AIC and BSC Criteria for Selecting the Order of the
VARX Models in the pre-crisis and the full sample.
We decide to use AIC criterium to select the lag length for the endogenous variables
in Brazil and China in all samples. Since the AIC criterium is maximized for both USA
and China for two lags we decide to choose this lag length. To remain consistent in the
comparison between countries we decide to select the same lag length in Brazil in all
samples.
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Table 2.2: AIC and BSC Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VARX Models
1994 Q4 - 2007 Q2 1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1
p q AIC SBC logLik AIC SBC logLik
USA 1 1 681.9 650.7 714.9 1015.0 976.6 1048.0
2 1 684.0 644.2 726.0 1021.2 972.3 1063.2
China 1 1 461.0 429.8 494.0 698.6 660.1 731.6
2 1 469.7 430.0 511.7 705.1 656.2 747.1
Brazil 1 1 351.2 320.0 384.2 523.5 485.0 556.5
2 1 347.1 307.4 389.1 520.0 471.1 562.0
Individual country models
Once we have selected the variables and their order we are ready to estimate individ-
ual country Vector Autoregressive Models with foreign variables treated as exogenous
(VARX)(see equation (2.1)).
We can use the Granger representation theorem that states (cp. Verbeek (2008),
p.332), that if a set of variables is cointegrated there exists a valid error correction
representation of the data. In that case we can express the model in the following error
correction form:
∆Xit = ci0 − Πi[Zi,t−1 − γi(t− 1)] + Λi0∆XFi,t + ΓiZi,t−1 + εit (2.2)
where:
• Πi = αiβ
′
i
• Zit = (x
′
it, x
F ′
it )
′
is a ki × ri matrix of rank ri,
• αi is ki × ri loading matrix of rank ri,
• βi is (ki + kFi )× ri matrix of cointegrating vectors of rank ri.
We can see from equation (2.2) that country specific models allow for cointegration
between home and foreign, as well as within home variables. The rank of the matrix
Πi, which we denote by ri = rank(Πi) ≤ ki informs about the number of cointegrat-
ing relationships and is determined using the error-correction forms of the individual
country equations.
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Table 2.3: Cointegration Results for Trace Statistic at the 5% Significance Level in
sample (1) 1994 Q4 - 2007 Q2 and (2) 1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1
Trace statistic
Country Null hypothesis Alternative Critical value (1) (2)
USA r = 0 r = 1 64.54 72.18 68.85
r ≤ 1 r = 2 41.03 33.96 28.21
r ≤ 2 r = 3 20.98 9.17 9.86
China r = 0 r = 1 64.54 94.36 77.47
r ≤ 1 r = 2 41.03 34.85 33.92
r ≤ 2 r = 3 20.98 13.84 10.70
Brazil r = 0 r = 1 64.54 92.90 62.91
r ≤ 1 r = 2 41.03 31.97 37.79
r ≤ 2 r = 3 20.98 9.25 17.43
The VARX models are expressed in error correction form and estimated separately
for each country to obtain the number of cointegrating relations ri, the speed of adjust-
ment coefficients αi, and the cointegrating vectors βi (See Table 2.7: VECMX Estima-
tion: Cointegrating Vectors). The remaining parameters of the VARX models are then
estimated using ordinary least squares regressions, conditional on the estimate of βi
from equation 2.3 containing the vector error correction terms ECMi,t−1 corresponding
to the ri cointegrating relations of the i
th country model (cp. Smith and Galesi (2011)
p.87-88):
∆Xit = ci0 + δiECMi,t−1 + Λi0∆XFi,t + ΓiZi,t−1 + εit (2.3)
The corresponding cointegrated VARX models are then estimated.
To test for cointegration we use trace statistic to test hypothesis about the rank of
Πi, as proposed by Johansen (1988).
In Table 2.35 we report the Cointegration Results for Trace Statistic at the 5%
Significance Level which in small samples has better power properties than the maximal
eigenvalue statistic.
The trace statistic indicates one cointegrating vector in each country in the pre-crisis
sample, and one cointegrating vector in the US and China in the full sample. To remain
consistent in the comparison of all the samples that we use in the study (the number
5The results for the remaining samples are available upon request.
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of cointegrating vectors suggested by the trace statistic in 5 out of 8 samples is one in
each country) we decide to analyze the data choosing one cointegrating vector in each
country in each sample.
Weak exogeneity
In each model we treat home variables as endogenous, and foreign variables as weakly
exogenous. By weak exogeneity we mean that there is no long-run feedback from
domestic to foreign variables. In such case foreign variables are said to be ‘long-run
forcing’ for domestic variables. The implication of weak exogeneity is that the error
correction terms do not enter in the marginal model of foreign variables. We test for
weak exogeneity using a test of joint significance (F-test) of the coefficient on the error
correction terms in the marginal model of the form:
∆XFit,l = ail +
ri∑
j=1
ζij,l ˆECM ij,t +
si∑
k=1
φ
′
ik,l∆Xi,t−k +
ni∑
m=1
ψ
′
im,l∆X˜
F
i,t−m + ηit,l (2.4)
and the joint null hypothesis is H0 : ζij,l = 0, where:
• ˆECM ij,t, j = 1, 2, ..., ri are the estimated error correction terms corresponding to
ri cointegrating relations,
• si - is the lag order of the lag changes for the home variables,
• ni - is the lag order of the lag changes for the foreign variables,.
In Table 2.4 we report the results from the F-Test for weak exogeneity. In case of
the pre-crisis sample we cannot reject the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity in case
of all foreign variables but foreign consumption in China, and we conclude that these
variables are weakly exogenous. The foreign variables in case of the full sample are all
weakly exogenous.
2.2.3 GVAR - dynamic analysis
GVAR Solution
Once we have specified and estimated individual country models we proceed to solve
the GVAR model for the world as a whole making use of the trade weight matrix, an
87
Table 2.4: Test for Weak Exogeneity at the 5% Significance Level (For the sample 1994
Q4 - 2007 Q2 the critical value is 4.11, and for 1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1 it is 3.99)
Foreign variables
Country Y F CF MF Y F CF MF
1994 Q4 - 2007 Q2 1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1
USA 1.04 0.38 2.43 0.02 0.22 0.02
China 0.33 0.60 1.35 0.22 0.07 0.38
Brazil 2.91 6.65 0.76 0.02 0.28 1.21
information which we use to construct the (ki + k
F
i )× k link matrix Wi, where ki is the
number of home, and kFi is the number of foreign variables, and k =
∑N
i=1 ki. Wi is
such that Zt = (X
′
it, X
F ′
it )
′
= WiXit. Individual country models are stacked and solved
simultaneously.
In the case of our three-country model with three variables, the link matrix for each
country is of dimension 6× 9:
WUS =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ωUS,CH 0 0 ωUS,BR 0 0
0 0 0 0 ωUS,CH 0 0 ωUS,BR 0
0 0 0 0 0 ωUS,CH 0 0 ωUS,BR

WCH =

0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
ωCH,US 0 0 0 0 0 ωCH,BR 0 0
0 ωCH,US 0 0 0 0 0 ωCH,BR 0
0 0 ωCH,US 0 0 0 0 0 ωCH,BR

and
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WBR =

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
ωBR,US 0 0 ωBR,CH 0 0 0 0 0
0 ωBR,US 0 0 ωBR,CH 0 0 0 0
0 0 ωBR,US 0 0 ωBR,CH 0 0 0

We can rewrite equation (2.1) in the following way:
Ai0Zit = ai0 + ai1t+
p∑
l=1
AilZit−l + εit (2.5)
where p = maxi(pi, qi), Ai0 = (Iki ,−∆i0), and Ail = (Φil,∆il) for l = 1, ..., p;
which can be rewritten using the weight matrix as:
Ai0WiXit = ai0 + ai1t+
p∑
l=1
AilWiXit−l + εit (2.6)
These individual country models are then stacked to obtain:
G0Xit = ai0 + ai1t+
p∑
l=1
GlXit−l + εt (2.7)
where
G0 =

A10W1
A20W2
...
AN0WN

and
Gl =

A1lW1
A2lW2
...
ANlWN

and since G0 is a non-singular matrix of weights and parameters, we can multiply
equation (2.7) by G−10 from the left to obtain:
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Xt = bi0 + bi1t+
p∑
l=1
FlXt−l + vt (2.8)
where:
• bi0 = G−10 ai0
• bi1 = G−10 ai1
• Fl = G−10 Gl
• vit = G−10 εt
• Xt is the vector of endogenous variables (where in solving the model all variables
are treated as endogenous).
Equation (2.8) is then solved recursively.
The program reports the eigenvalues of the GVAR model and corresponding moduli.
The eigenvalues are computed for the companion coefficient matrix F for the model
given by equation (2.8) in a matrix form:
Xt
Xt−1
...
...
Xt−l+1

=

F1 F2 · · · 0 0
Ik 0 · · · 0 0
0 Ik · · · 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · Ik 0


Xt−1
Xt−2
...
...
Xt−l

+

vt
0
...
...
0

which are denoted by λeig = a ± bi and are computed from the equation involving
the following determinant: |Ikpλeig − F | = 0.
Persistence profiles
If the cointegrating vector is valid the time profile of an effect of a system or variable-
specific shock will go to zero as the time goes to infinity. We obtain the persistence
profiles in the following way. We can express a GVAR model written by equation (2.8)
as a moving average representation:
Xt = dt +
∞∑
s=0
Asvt−s = vt + A1vt−1 + A2vt−2 + ... (2.9)
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with a deterministic component dt and
As = F1As−1 + F1As−1 + ...+ F1As−1 (2.10)
with s = 1, 2, ... and A0 = Im, As = 0, for s < 0.
To look at the persistence profile of country-specific cointegrating vectors we express
equation 2.9 using Zi = WiXit as:
Zit = Widt + vA0vt +
∞∑
s=1
WiAsvt−s (2.11)
Then the persistence profiles PP of β
′
jiZit with respect to shock vi are given by:
PP (β
′
jiZit; vt, n)
β
′
jiWiAnΣvA
′
nW
′
iβji
β
′
jiWiA0ΣvA
′
0W
′
iβji
(2.12)
where Σv is the covariance matrix of vt, and n is the time horizon.
We present the persistence profiles of the pre-crisis and full sample on Figure 2.2.6
We conclude that the effect of a system-wide shock dies out quickly in all samples and
therefore the cointegrating vectors are valid.
Generalized impulse responses
In our model we investigate the effect of shocks to money supply on individual-country
variables consistent with four scenarios:
1. a one standard error positive money supply shock (exogenous expansionary mon-
etary) in the US, a strategy we call APP APP,
2. a one standard error positive money supply shock in the US and China, a strategy
we call PEG APP,
3. a one standard error positive money supply shock in the US and Brazil, a strategy
we call APP PEG,
4. a one standard error positive money supply shock in the US, China and Brazil, a
strategy we call PEG PEG.
Notice that cases (2),(3), and (4) are analysed as a linear combination of shocks.
The generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) are in general defined as:
6Persistence profiles of the remaining samples are very similar and available upon request
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GIFR(Xt; εilt, n) = E(Xt+n|εilt = √σii,ll,Ωt−1)− E(Xt+n|Ωt−1) (2.13)
where
√
σii,ll is the diagonal of the variance covariance matrix of Σu, and Ωt−1 is
the information set at time t− 1.
Since the shocks across countries may be positively correlated we are looking at the
general and not orthogonal impulse (OIR) responses. As opposed to orthogonal impulse
responses the ordering of the variables in the generalized impulse responses does not
matter. We discuss the GIRFs specific to our model in more detail in Section 2.6.2.
2.2.4 Forecasting
Because GVAR performs well in forecasts we use the forecasted values of consumption
and output in each country in the construction of the payoffs. Using the GVAR Toolbox
we obtain point forecasts which are computed recursively for a model given by equation
(2.8):
µh = bˆ0 + bˆ1(T + l) +
p∑
l=1
Fˆlµl−T + vt (2.14)
where the initial values are: µ0 = XT and µ−1 = XT−1.
2.3 Econometric approach and the economic appli-
cation
The econometric analysis of the impact of shocks to individual country money supply
and the effect of joint shocks on the country and its trading partners’ consumption
and output serves as a first stepping stone in a direction of developing an empirical
apparatus designed for welfare evaluation of joint monetary policies in interdependent
economies. This analysis aims to extract information from the data by constructing
individual country vector autoregressive models. Given the data is non-stationary and
the variables are cointegrated (the linear combination of variables is stationary and there
exist and long-run relationship between them) we estimate the vector error correction
models with foreign variables (VECMX) for each country to extract information about
the number of cointegrating relations, ri, the speed of adjustment of the variables to
the long-run equilibrium, αi, and the cointegrating vectors, βi. Having determined the
cointegrating vectors we can then estimate the parameters of the individual country
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models with foreign variables (VARX). Then, in order to analyze the impact of the
monetary expansion in one country on the variables in another country we construct a
Global Vector Autoregressive Model (GVAR) in which we stack the individual country
models (VARX). In order to obtain a GVAR in home variables X
′
i we need to ’remove’
the foreign variables by using an identity Zi = (X
′
i , X
F ′
i )
′ = WiXit which collects all
home variables and the weights used to construct the foreign variables (for more details
see section ’GVAR Solution’). The GVAR can be then used to assess the impact of
the monetary expansion (shock) on individual country variables in one country using
the Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs), and in case of simultaneous
monetary expansion in more than one country, using a linear combination of shocks.
This counterfactual analysis allows to see how the variables behave immediately in
response the shock as well as determine the time path of the variables by looking at
the forecasted variables obtained from the GVAR. The GIRFs together with forecasted
values of the variables in each country are considered to be the key components in
assessing the welfare impact of (joint) monetary expansion in interdependent economies.
It is important to mention that the econometric results themselves are a contribution
and that the presented building blocks extracted from the econometric analysis and
intended for a welfare evaluation constitute only a first attempt in the direction of a
more detailed welfare analysis using an empirical approach. Further work needs to be
done to develop and improve this approach.
2.4 Bridge between the theory and the data
In this section we explain the theoretical approach to payoffs derivation taken in Chapter
1 and based on the Corsetti et al. (2000) model. Then we suggest an alternative
approach to construct the payoffs using data. Before we do that we introduce the
treatment of the variables in the theoretical approach and explain the difficulties we
encounter in trying to relate the empirical approach to the theory.
In the context of the Corsetti et al. (2000) model we analyze the effect of a monetary
shock in the Center on welfare in the Periphery countries considering the following
sequence of events:
1. The economy is in initial equilibrium at time t = 0 at which all exogenous variables
are constant. We call it the initial steady-state.
2. There is an exogenous permanent monetary shock in the Center, at time t = 1.
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We call it the short-run.
3. Simultaneous decision about money supply by policymakers takes place in country
A and B at time t = 1. Because prices are fixed in the short-run after the shock
variables other than prices will adjust. The adjustment takes one period only and
the economy jumps to the new steady state level in time t ≥ 2.
4. The economy reaches a new equilibrium at time t ≥ 2. We call it the long-run.
In Corsetti et.al. (2000) the model is linearized around the symmetric steady-state.
Corresponding to the time when the events occur we apply the following notation for
the variables:
1. In time t = 0 the level variables are denoted with subscript ”0”, for example, the
initial level of money in country i is denoted as M i0. We denote the steady-state
values by an upper bar M¯ i, and because the system is initially in a steady-state
we can write the initial steady-state value of money supply in country i as M¯ i0.
2. In time t = 1 the level variables are denoted with subscript ”1”, for example, the
level of money in country i at the time of the shock is denoted as M i1. To study the
linear system we use the following log-linear approximation of variables around the
symmetric steady-state, for example in case of money supply in general: mi ≡
dM it
M i0
≈ M it−M¯ i0
M¯ i0
denotes the deviation of money supply in country i at time t
from its initial steady-state level. Whenever the time subscript is omitted in the
approximation we refer to a short-run in a variable without bar, and the long
variable with bar.
3. In time t ≥ 2 the level variables are denoted with subscript ”2” until infinity.
Because the adjustment takes place one period only, at time 2 and beyond the
variables are at their new steady-state level, which we denote with bar: M¯ i2.
We denote the new steady-state values by an upper bar M¯ i, and express them
as deviations from the initial steady-state in time t = 0 in the following way:
m¯i ≡ dM¯ it
M¯ i0
≈ M it−M¯ i0
M¯ i0
.
Using this notation we define the monetary shock at time t in the Center (US) as:
MUSt − M¯US0 > 0 (2.15)
in levels, and as:
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mUS ≡ dM
US
t
M¯ i0
≈ M
US
t − M¯US0
M¯US0
> 0 (2.16)
for t = 1, and:
m¯US ≡ dM¯
US
t
M¯US0
≈ M¯
US
t − M¯US0
M¯US0
> 0 (2.17)
for t ≥ 2, in log-linear approximation. In fact because the change in money supply
in the Corsetti et.al. model is permanent we can write that: mUS = m¯US.
The Corsetti et al. (2000) model assumes that countries in the Periphery, in our case
Brazil (BR) and China (CH), have a fixed exchange rate relative to the Center (US). As
a consequence in order to manipulate the exchange rate countries undertake adjustments
in money supply. It can be seen from the relative equations for the exchange rates in
terms of money supply changes and underlying parameters:
eP =
1
ρ
1− β + ρ(1 + β)
1 + β + ρ(1− β)
(
m¯P − m¯US) (2.18)
eCH − eBR = 1
ψ
1− β + ψ(1 + β)
1 + β + ψ(1− β)
(
m¯CH − m¯BR) (2.19)
where P - Periphery, ei ≈ Ei−Ei0
Ei0
is the deviation of an exchange rate after the shock
from its initial equilibrium, m¯i ≈ M i−M i0
Mi0
is the deviation of money supply after the
shock from its initial equilibrium, ψ > 0 is the substitutability between goods produced
within Periphery, ρ > 0 is the substitutability between goods from the Periphery and
the Center, β ∈ (1, 0) is the discount factor, and i = P,CH,BR,US.
Expressions (2.18) and (2.19) are derived using the following definitions of individual
variables and their approximations:
xW = γPx
P + (1− γP )xC (2.20)
and
xP = γAx
A + (1− γA)xB (2.21)
where W = World, P = Periphery, C = US, A = China, and B = Brazil,
γA ∈ [0, 1] is the share of country A in the Periphery’s populations, (1 − γA) = γB is
the share of country B in Periphery’s population, and γP ∈ [0, 1] is the share of country
A and B together in the world’s populations.
95
Equations (2.18) and (2.19) serve as a reference for the strategies in our game
between policymakers who have as a goal to maximize the utility of a representative
household in their countries. It can be seen from equation (2.18) that in order to
maintain fixed exchange relative to the Center the size of adjustment in the money
supply in the Periphery has to be the same as the change in money supply in the
Center, so that eP = 0.
The actions of the policymaker in country i = A,B result in either of these two
outcomes:
1. Fixed exchange rate vis-a-vis the Center, i.e. ei = 0, call it PEG, which is
achieved by increasing the money supply by the same amount as the Center, i.e
m¯i = m¯C ; or
2. Currency appreciation in country i, i.e. ei < 0 , call it APP, which is achieved
by not changing the level of money supply i.e. m¯i = 0.
In our game in which countries are not cooperating and act only in self-interest, we
look at the following four situations:
1. APP APP - money supply increases in the USA only m¯US > 0, and China and
Brazil remain passive. As a result of maintaining the money supply at unchanged
level relative to symmetric equilibrium, namely m¯CH = 0, m¯BR = 0, the exchange
rate in the Periphery appreciates. We can show that using equations (2.18) and
(2.21)7:
m¯P = γCHm¯
CH + (1− γCH)m¯BR = 0
⇒ eP = 1
ρ
1− β + ρ(1 + β)
1 + β + ρ(1− β)
(
0− m¯US) < 0
2. PEG APP - money supply increases in the USA and China by the same amount,
i.e. m¯CH = m¯US > 0, and Brazil keeps the money supply at unchanged level
m¯BR = 0, which results in currency appreciation of Brazil’s exchange rate relative
to the US: eBR < 0, while Chinese exchange remains the same eCH = 0, which we
can show using equations (2.19) and (2.21):
7It is worth to mention that appreciation of currency in country i is also possible when the country
adjusts its money supply by a small amount, however not larger than the size of change in the money
supply in the Center.
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eCH = 0
0− eBR = 1
ψ
1− β + ψ(1 + β)
1 + β + ψ(1− β)
(
m¯US − 0)
⇒ eBR = − 1
ψ
1− β + ψ(1 + β)
1 + β + ψ(1− β)m¯
US < 0
⇒ eP = γCHeCH + (1− γCH)eBR = (1− γCH)eBR < 0
3. APP PEG - money supply increases in the USA and Brazil by the same amount,
i.e. m¯BR = m¯US > 0, and China keeps the money supply at unchanged level
m¯CH = 0, which results in currency appreciation of China’s exchange rate relative
to the US: eCH < 0, while Brazil’s exchange remains the same eBR = 0, which we
can show using equations (2.19) and (2.21):
eBR = 0
eCH − 0 = 1
ψ
1− β + ψ(1 + β)
1 + β + ψ(1− β)
(
0− m¯US)
⇒ eCH = − 1
ψ
1− β + ψ(1 + β)
1 + β + ψ(1− β)m¯
US < 0
⇒ eP = γCHeCH + (1− γCH)eBR = γCHeCH < 0
4. PEG PEG - money supply increases in the USA, and both China and Brazil
increase money supply by the same amount, i.e. m¯CH = m¯BR = m¯US > 0, which
results in unchanged level of exchange rate in the Periphery (China and Brazil)
relative to the Center (US):
m¯P = γCHm¯
CH + (1− γCH)m¯BR = m¯BR = m¯CH = m¯US
⇒ eP = 1
ρ
1− β + ρ(1 + β)
1 + β + ρ(1− β)
(
m¯US − m¯US) = 0
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and
eCH = eBR
2.4.1 Theoretical derivation of payoffs
By comparing the payoffs from available strategies we find Nash equilibria, and give
policy recommendations based on realized changes in utilities from available actions.
The payoffs express the changes in the utility of a representative agent after the shock,
and reflect changes in short- and long-term consumption and output.
We repeat for convenience the way the payoffs are derived in Chapter 1 in this
section. The payoffs are derived using the building blocks of the Corsetti et al. (2000)
model. Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) we focus only on the real components of
the following utility function U it of a representative household in country i:
U it =
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
lnCit+s + χln
(
M it+s
P it+s
)
− κ
2
[Y it+s]
2
]
(2.22)
where κ and χ are positive constants and β is the discount rate between 0 and 1,
assuming that the parameter χ→ 0 we denote the real component as, denoting it with
the superscript UR,it
8 :
UR,it =
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
lnCit+s −
κ
2
[Y it+s]
2
]
(2.23)
where, Cit is consumption of a representative agent in country i, Y
i
t is output of a
representative household in country i, which enters negatively in the utility function
because it generates disutility from work effort.
Since the new steady-state is reached after one period (prices are fixed for one period
only) we can rewrite (2.23) as the sum of the short-term effect (denoted by C and Y )
together with the discounted sum of long-term effects (denoted by C¯ and Y¯ ):
UR,it =
[
lnCi − κ
2
[Y i]2
]
+
β
1− β
[
lnC¯i − κ
2
[Y¯ i]2
]
(2.24)
We will proceed using a log-linear approximation of a variable X, where X = {C, Y }
in the utility function around its (initial) steady state X0:
8Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) (p.662) assume that the disutility from work effort l is −φl,
and the production function is given by y = Alα, where A denotes productivity, and α > 0. Assuming
that α = 0.5 we get κ = 2φA2 , which helps to interpret how κ changes with productivity. If productivity
increases κ falls.
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X = elogX ≈ elogX0 + elogX0(logX − logX0) (2.25)
X ≈ X0 +X0(logX − logX0) (2.26)
X −X0
X0
≈ (logX − logX0) ≡ x (2.27)
Consider the utility function and its value at the (initial) steady state (where we
omit indexes for simplicity):
URt =
[
logC − κ
2
Y 2
]
+
β
1− β
[
logC¯ − κ
2
Y¯ 2
]
(2.28)
UR0 =
[
logC0 − κ
2
Y 20
]
+
β
1− β
[
logC¯0 − κ
2
Y¯0
2
]
(2.29)
and subtracting equation (2.29) from (2.28) yields:
uj ≈ URt − UR0 = c−
κ
2
(Y 2 − Y 20 ) +
β
1− β
[
c¯− κ
2
(Y¯ 2 − Y 20 )
]
(2.30)
Now we can log-linearize the nonlinear terms around their initial steady state value:
Y 2 = e2logX ≈ Y 20 + 2Y 20 (logY − logY0) (2.31)
Y 2 − Y 20 ≈ 2Y 20 (logY − logY0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡y
(2.32)
Based on that equation (2.30) can be rewritten as:
uj ≈ URt − UR0 ≈ c− κY 20 y +
β
1− β
[
c¯− κY 20 y¯
]
(2.33)
Then we substitute the value of the initial steady state:
Y0 =
√
θ − 1
θκ
and thus
Y 20 =
θ − 1
θκ
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we can express the approximation around the symmetric, flexible-price equilibrium:
uj = cj − κθ − 1
θκ
yj +
β
1− β
[
c¯j − κθ − 1
θκ
y¯j
]
= cj − θ − 1
θ
yj +
β
1− β
[
c¯j − θ − 1
θ
y¯j
]
(2.34)
The net present value is the sum of short term value and the discounted sum of the
long term value, so:
xnpv = x+
β
1− β x¯ (2.35)
and the changes in the utility of a representative agent relative to symmetric equi-
librium, following a monetary shock, will represent player’s payoff of the form:
uj = cjnpv −
θ − 1
θ
yjnpv (2.36)
Policymakers in each country use money supply as their policy variables. Since both
consumption and output change after the monetary shock, these can be expressed in
terms of money supply. This is the approach we took in Chapter 1 where we derived
the following expressions for utilities depending on the strategy chosen by each country
in the Periphery:
uAPEG,PEG =
1
θ
m¯C (2.37)
uBPEG,PEG =
1
θ
m¯C (2.38)
uAAPP,APP =
1
θ
(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)m¯C (2.39)
uBAPP,APP =
1
θ
(γP − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)m¯C (2.40)
uAPEG,APP =
1
θ
[1− Π(ρ) + γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ) + γP (Π(ρ)− 1))]m¯C (2.41)
uBPEG,APP =
1
θ
[1 + γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ) + γP (Π(ρ)− 1))]m¯C (2.42)
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uAAPP,PEG =
1
θ
[1+Π(ψ)−γAΠ(ψ)+(1−γA)Π(ρ)+γP (γA−1+Π(ρ)−γAΠ(ρ))]m¯C (2.43)
uBAPP,PEG = −
1
θ
[Π(ρ)− 1 + γA(Π(ψ)− Π(ρ)) + γP (γA − 1)(Π(ρ)− 1)]m¯C (2.44)
where Π(x) =
(
x−θ
x
) (
1+x
1+β+x(1−β)
)
, and x = ρ, ψ.
The payoffs can be summarized in the Payoff matrix in Table 2.5. Countries compare
their payoffs in two different strategies APP and PEG given the choice of strategy of
the other country. In Nash equilibrium no country has an incentive to deviate from
the chosen strategy as they would get a lower payoff from such action.
Table 2.5: Payoff matrix
uBPEG,PEG u
B
PEG,APP
uAPEG,PEG u
A
PEG,APP
uBAPP,PEG u
B
APP,APP
uAAPP,PEG u
A
APP,APP
PEG APP
PEG
APP
Country B
C
ou
n
tr
y
A
2.4.2 Payoffs construction using data and the GVAR
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the welfare implications of monetary expansion
in the Center in different strategies and compare the payoffs derived from a theoreti-
cal model in Chapter 1 with payoffs constructed using data and econometric method.
Although we try to stay as close as possible to the model in Chapter 1 we encounter var-
ious complications in trying to map the payoffs derived in Chapter 1 to payoffs derived
in this chapter. It is important to point out the main differences, which we consider to
be a necessary compromise in order to make progress at this stage. These should be
kept in mind while comparing the empirical with the theoretical results.
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• In Chapter 1 the payoffs are expressed in terms of the policy variable, namely
money supply and the underlying parameters of the Corsetti et al. (2000) model.
Since the consumption and output data, which are the variables in the utility
function measuring the welfare of agents in each economy are observable we use
them in this chapter instead to avoid calibration of all parameters but one (θ)
which is necessary to quantify the welfare changes in Chapter 1.
• In Chapter 1 we assume that the net-asset positions are zero in all countries in
the symmetric equilibrium, an assumption which we relax for the purpose of the
empirical analysis (in order to keep the model as simple as possible we do not
include current account as a variable in the VAR).
• In the model in Chapter 1 the variables in levels in the theoretical model do not
grow, while the data shows a clear time trend in the variables. We take logs of
the variables so the growth over the forecasted horizon is not too large.
• While the money supply adjustment in the Periphery countries necessary to main-
tain the exchange rate at unchange level vis-a-vis the Center is obtained by match-
ing the size of the monetary shock in the Center in Chapter 1, the strategy PEG
is modelled as one standard deviation change in money supply in each country
in the empirical model. This may not correspond to the same size of change in
money supply of each country. We solve this problem by normalizing the size of
the shock by the inverse of the standard deviation. However, it is important to
keep in mind that such monetary adjustment, although true in the theoretical
model, may not correspond to the true exchange adjustment in reality.
• While the shock in the model in Chapter 1 is permanent, the shock in the empirical
approach is transitory (one-off). However, due to the non-stationarity of the
variables the shocks may have permanent effect.
• In Chapter 1 we assume one-period price rigidity, while in this Chapter we do
not make any assumptions about the type of nominal rigidities prevailing in the
economies of interest.
We suggest three alternative approaches to the construction of the welfare measure
using data from the econometric analysis:
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1. An approach in which we need to calibrate the within-country substitutability
parameter θ, and allow to substitute for a symmetric steady-state value of output
in each period. In this approach we make use of the forecasted values of consump-
tion and output, as well as the generalized impulse response functions of these
variables.
2. An approach in which we need to calibrate the parameter in the disutility from
work effort κ. In this approach there is no need to make use of the symmet-
ric equilibrium values of consumption and output, as the forecasted values of
consumption and output, together with the impulse response functions used to
compute the welfare changes.
3. An approach in which we use the log-linearized version of the utility function,
as derived in Chapter 1. We need to calibrate the within-country substitutabil-
ity parameter θ and make use of the generalized impulse response functions for
consumption and output.
Below we present the way in which welfare changes can be evaluated using data and
results from the GVAR estimation, as well as the predictions in terms of short- and
long-run Nash equilibria in each of the aforementioned methods.
First approach to welfare evaluation using data and GVAR
We proceed with the derivation of the payoffs using the first approach.
In order to derive payoffs we use the approach explained in Section 2.4.1 and adjust
it using an information from the data, such as the forecasted values of consumption
Cit+s and output Y
i
t+s in each period after the shock, as well as the effect of the shock
on these variables as represented by the GIRFs (GIRF (Cit) and GIRF (Y
i
t )).
Let us repeat equation (2.23) for convenience:
UR,it =
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
lnCit+s −
κ
2
[Y it+s]
2
]
The total differential of equation (2.23), which shows the total change in the real
component of the utility of an individual i is then:
dUR,it =
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
1
Cit+s(x)
dCit+s − κY it+s(x)dY it+s
]
(2.45)
we can the multiply and divide each period by Y it+s(x) to obtain:
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dUR,it =
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
1
Cit+s
dCit+s − κ
[
Y it+s
]2 dY it+s
Y it+s
]
(2.46)
We then follow Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and substitute for Y its equilibrium
steady state-value9:
Y =
√
θ − 1
θκ
⇒ Y 2 = Y¯ 2 = θ − 1
θκ
we obtain:
dUR,it =
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
1
Cit+s
dCit+s − κ
θ − 1
θκ
dY it+s
Y it+s
]
=
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
dCit+s(x)
Cit+s
− θ − 1
θ
dY it+s
Y it+s
]
(2.47)
We then use expression (2.47) to derive the approximate change in the utility of a
representative agent in country i in different strategies, as described in Section 2.4. In
each strategy we divide the terms in equation (2.47) by the change in the money supply
in the US (dMUSt ) in case of the strategy APP APP, in China and the US (dM
US,CH
t ) in
case of the strategy PEG APP, in Brazil and the US (dMUS,BRt ) in case of the strategy
APP PEG, and in all three countries (dMUS,CH,BRt ) in case of the strategy PEG PEG.
We illustrate this procedure of payoff construction in the strategy APP APP first:
uiAPP,APP ≈
dUR,it
dMUSt
=
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
dCit+s
dMUSt
1
Cit+s
− θ − 1
θ
dY it+s
dMUSt
1
Y it+s
]
(2.48)
In this case we do not need to define short- and long-term10 as in Corsetti et al.
(2000), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Chapter 1, instead we sum each period, and
9We are aware that this is a vary strong assumption, which postulates the same equilibrium value
of output in every period - even in the periods after the shock and even with the positive trend in
output present in the data. Despite these limitations, we consider it a crucial step in order to progress
at this stage of the analysis and given the small size of the shocks and changes in the logarithm of the
output in Brazil and China over time (for example 10.24 in 2014 Q2 and 10.81 in 2026 Q3 in China)
we consider our results to be approximations.
10An alternative approach to derive payoffs by constructing short- and long-term from the data is
explained in Appendix. Although qualitatively this approach yields similar policy recommendations
in terms of Nash equilibria, the results are not quantitatively equivalent.
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make use of the GIRFs11 and the forecasted values of consumption and output:
dCit+s
dMUSt
= GIRF (Cit ; εMUSt , s) = E(C
i
t+s|εMUSt =
√
σUS,Ωt−1)− E(Cit+s|Ωt−1) (2.49)
and
dY it+s
dMUSt
= GIRF (Y it ; εMUSt , s) = E(Y
i
t+s|εMUSt =
√
σUS,Ωt−1)− E(Y it+s|Ωt−1) (2.50)
so the adjusted payoff (over the horizon of the forecast S) becomes:
uiAPP,APP ≈
dUR,it
dMUSt
=
S∑
s=0
βs
[
GIRF (Cit ; εMUSt , s)
1
Cit+s
− θ − 1
θ
GIRF (Y it ; εMUSt , s)
1
Y it+s
]
(2.51)
The remaining payoffs can be constructed in the same way and are given by the
following formulas:
- in case of PEG APP:
uiPEG,APP ≈
dUR,it
dMUS,CHt
=
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
dCit+s
dMUS,CHt
1
Cit+s
− θ − 1
θ
dY it+s
dMUS,CHt
1
Y it+s
]
(2.52)
where for X = C, Y
dX it+s
dMUS,CHt
= GIRF (X it ; εMUSt = εMCHt , s) (2.53)
- in case of APP PEG:
uiAPP,PEG ≈
dUR,it
dMUS,BRt
=
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
dCit+s
dMUS,BRt
1
Cit+s
− θ − 1
θ
dY it+s
dMUS,BRt
1
Y it+s
]
(2.54)
where for X = C, Y
11Later in Section 2.6.2 we make a remark on the way we construct weighted GIRFs in order to
analyze an impact of monetary shocks of the same size in each country.
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dX it+s
dMUS,BRt
= GIRF (X it ; εMUSt = εMBRt , s) (2.55)
- and finally in case of PEG PEG:
uiPEG,PEG ≈
dUR,it
dMUS,CH,BRt
=
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
dCit+s
dMUS,CH,BRt
1
Cit+s
− θ − 1
θ
dY it+s
dMUS,CH,BRt
1
Y it+s
]
(2.56)
where for X = C, Y
dX it+s
dMUS,CH,BRt
= GIRF (X it ; εMUSt = εMCHt = εMBRt , s) (2.57)
Second approach to welfare evaluation using data and GVAR
We proceed with the derivation of the payoffs using the second approach.
To derive the welfare change of agent in economy i we start by totally differentiating
the agent’s utility function:
dUR,it =
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
1
Cit+s
dCit+s − κY it+sdY it+s
]
(2.58)
In the strategy APP APP, only the US changes money supply and Brazil and
China keep it unchanged. In that case the change in the utility in country i, where
i = {China,Brazil} can be defined as:
dUR,iAPP,APP,t
dMUSt
=
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
1
Cit+s
dCit+s
dMUSt
− κY it+s
dY it+s
dMUSt
]
(2.59)
The change in a variable (consumption and output) after monetary shock in the US(
dXit+s
dMUS
)
at time t+ s, where X = {C, Y } can be defined using the generalised impulse
response functions (GIFRS) in the following way:
dCit+s
dMUSt
= GIRF (Cit ; εMUSt , s) = E(C
i
t+s|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Cit+s|Ωt−1) (2.60)
dY it+s
dMUSt
= GIRF (Y it ; εMUSt , s) = E(Y
i
t+s|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Cit+s|Ωt−1) (2.61)
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where εMUSt =
√
σ is the size of the shock to money supply in the US, i.e. one
standard deviation, Ωt−1 is the available information up to the period before the shock
occurs; and so the change in the utility at time t+ s can be expressed as:
dU iAPP,APP,t+s
dMUSt
=
1
Cit+s
[
E(Cit+s|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Cit+s|Ωt−1)
]
− κY it+s
[
E(Y it+s|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Y it+s|Ωt−1)
]
(2.62)
From here we proceed to obtain the expression for the sum of short- and long-term
changes, which we can treat as an approximation of the net present value expression
given by equation (2.34). The main difference is that the long horizon in Chapter 1 is
defined over an infinite time, while here we define the long run over the horizon of the
forecast.
Short and long run are defined in the following way:
• Short - immediate effect.
• Long - remaining quarters up to period 50 of the forecast.
Assuming that in time 0 the system is in equilibrium, and that the shock happens
in time t, the short run change in the utility can be then given by the following formula:
uiAPP,APP,Short =
[
1
Cit
dCit
dMUSt
− κY it
dY it
dMUSt
]
(2.63)
where t = 1, and the long-run:
uiAPP,APP,Long =
50∑
s=2
βs
[
1
Cit+s
dCit+s
dMUSt
− κY it+s
dY it+s
dMUSt
]
(2.64)
which we add to obtain the payoff of country i, which already takes the discount
factor into account, and corresponds to the utility constructed using the sum of net
present value of changes in consumption and output in Chapter 1:
uiAPP,APP = u
i
APP,APP,Short + u
i
APP,APP,Long (2.65)
In the strategy PEG PEG, after the expansionary monetary shock in the US, both
China and Brazil adjust their money supply correspondingly. In that case the change
in the utility in country i, where i = {China,Brazil} can be defined as:
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dUR,iPEG,PEG,t
dMUS+CH+BRt
=
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
1
Cit+s
{
∂Cit+s
∂MUSt
+
∂Cit+s
∂MCHt
+
∂Cit+s
∂MBRt
}]
−
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
κY it+s
{
∂Y it+s
∂MUSt
+
∂Y it+s
∂MCHt
+
∂Y it+s
∂MBRt
}]
(2.66)
The change in the utility depends on the linear combination of changes in consump-
tion and output after monetary shock in each country
(
∂Xit+s
∂MUS
)
+
(
∂Xit+s
∂MCH
)
+
(
∂Xit+s
∂MBR
)
,
where X = {C, Y } can be defined using the generalised impulse response functions
(GIRFS) in the following way, at time t+ s:{
∂Cit+s
∂MUSt
+
∂Cit+s
∂MCHt
+
∂Cit+s
∂MBRt
}
= GIRF (Cit ; εMUSt = εMCHt = εMBRt , s)
= ϕUSE(C
i
t+s|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Cit+s|Ωt−1)
+ϕCHE(C
i
t+s|εMCHt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Cit+s|Ωt−1)
+ ϕBRE(C
i
t+s|εMBRt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Cit+s|Ωt−1) (2.67)
where ϕi i = {US,BR,CH} is a proportionality factor, and{
∂Y it+s
∂MUSt
+
∂Y it+s
∂MCHt
+
∂Y it+s
∂MBRt
}
= GIRF (Y it ; εMUSt = εMCHt = εMBRt , s)
= ϕUSE(Y
i
t+s|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Y it+s|Ωt−1)
+ϕCHE(Y
i
t+s|εMCHt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Y it+s|Ωt−1)
+ ϕBRE(Y
i
t+s|εMBRt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Y it+s|Ωt−1) (2.68)
and so the change in the utility at time t+ s can be expressed as:
dU it+s
dMUS+CH+BRt
=
1
Cit+s
GIRF (Cit ; εMUSt = εMCHt = εMBRt , s)
− κY it+sGIRF (Y it ; εMUSt = εMCHt = εMBRt , s) (2.69)
108
Assuming that in time 0 the system is in equilibrium, and that the shock happens
in time t, the short run change in the utility can be then given by the following formula:
uiPEG,PEG,Short =
[
dU it+s
dMUS+CH+BRt
]
(2.70)
where t = 1, and the long-run:
uiPEG,PEG,Long =
50∑
s=2
βs
[
dU it+s
dMUS+CH+BRt
]
(2.71)
which we add to obtain the payoff of country i, to obtain a counterpart of the payoff
constructed using the sum of net present value of changes in consumption and output
in Chapter 1:
uiPEG,PEG = u
i
PEG,PEG,Short + u
i
PEG,PEG,Long (2.72)
In the strategy PEG APP, after the expansionary monetary shock in the US,
China increases its money supply while Brazil maintains it at the pre-shock level. In
that case the change in the utility in country i, where i = {China,Brazil} can be
defined as:
dUR,iPEG,APP,t
dMUS+CHt
=
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
1
Cit+s
{
∂Cit+s
∂MUSt
+
∂Cit+s
∂MCHt
}]
−
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
κY it+s
{
∂Y it+s
∂MUSt
+
∂Y it+s
∂MCHt
}]
(2.73)
The change in the utility depends on the linear combination of changes in con-
sumption and output after monetary shock in each country
(
∂Xit+s
∂MUS
)
+
(
∂Xit+s
∂MCH
)
, where
X = {C, Y } can be defined using the generalised impulse response functions (GIRFs)
in the following way, at time t+ s:{
∂Cit+s
∂MUSt
+
∂Cit+s
∂MCHt
}
= GIRF (Cit ; εMUSt = εMCHt , s)
= ϕUSE(C
i
t+s|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Cit+s|Ωt−1)
+ ϕCHE(C
i
t+s|εMCHt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Cit+s|Ωt−1) (2.74)
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and {
∂Y it+s
∂MUSt
+
∂Y it+s
∂MCHt
}
= GIRF (Y it ; εMUSt = εMCHt , s)
= ϕUSE(Y
i
t+s|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Y it+s|Ωt−1)
+ ϕCHE(Y
i
t+s|εMCHt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Y it+s|Ωt−1) (2.75)
and so the change in the utility at time t+ s can be expressed as:
dU it+s
dMUS+CHt
=
1
Cit+s
GIRF (Cit ; εMUSt = εMCHt , s)
− κY it+sGIRF (Y it ; εMUSt = εMCHt , s) (2.76)
Assuming that in time 0 the system is in equilibrium, and that the shock happens
in time t, the short run change in the utility can be then given by the following formula:
uiPEG,APP,Short =
[
dU it+s
dMUS+CHt
]
(2.77)
where t = 1, and the long-run:
uiPEG,APP,Long =
50∑
s=2
βs
[
dU it+s
dMUS+CHt
]
(2.78)
which we add to obtain the payoff of country i, to obtain a counterpart of the payoff
constructed using the sum of net present value of changes in consumption and output
in Chapter 1:
uiPEG,APP = u
i
PEG,APP,Short + u
i
PEG,APP,Long (2.79)
In the strategy APP PEG, after the expansionary monetary shock in the US,
Brazil adjusts its money supply while China maintains it at the pre-shock level. In that
case the change in the utility in country i, where i = {China,Brazil} can be defined
as:
dUR,iAPP,PEG,t
dMUS+BRt
=
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
1
Cit+s
{
∂Cit+s
∂MUSt
+
∂Cit+s
∂MBRt
}]
110
−
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
κY it+s
{
∂Y it+s
∂MUSt
+
∂Y it+s
∂MBRt
}]
(2.80)
The change in the utility depends on the linear combination of changes in con-
sumption and output after monetary shock in each country
(
∂Xit+s
∂MUS
)
+
(
∂Xit+s
∂MBR
)
, where
X = {C, Y } can be defined using the generalised impulse response functions (GIRFS)
in the following way, at time t+ s:{
∂Cit+s
∂MUSt
+
∂Cit+s
∂MBRt
}
= GIRF (Cit ; εMUSt = εMBRt , s)
= ϕUSE(C
i
t+s|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Cit+s|Ωt−1)
+ ϕBRE(C
i
t+s|εMBRt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Cit+s|Ωt−1) (2.81)
and {
∂Y it+s
∂MUSt
+
∂Y it+s
∂MBRt
}
= GIRF (Yt; εMUSt = εMBRt , s)
= ϕUSE(Y
i
t+s|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Y it+s|Ωt−1)
+ ϕBRE(Y
i
t+s|εMBRt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Y it+s|Ωt−1) (2.82)
and so the change in the utility at time t+ s can be expressed as:
dU it+s
dMUS+BRt
=
1
Cit+s
GIRF (Cit ; εMUSt = εMBRt , s)
− κY it+sGIRF (Y it ; εMUSt = εMBRt , s) (2.83)
Assuming that in time 0 the system is in equilibrium, and that the shock happens
in time t, the short run change in the utility can be then given by the following formula:
uiAPP,PEG,Short =
[
dU it+s
dMUS+BRt
]
(2.84)
where t = 1, and the long-run:
uiAPP,PEG,Long =
50∑
s=2
βs
[
dU it+s
dMUS+BRt
]
(2.85)
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which we add to obtain the payoff of country i, to obtain a counterpart of the payoff
constructed using the sum of net present value of changes in consumption and output
in Chapter 1:
uiAPP,PEG = u
i
APP,PEG,Short + u
i
APP,PEG,Long (2.86)
Third approach to welfare evaluation using data and GVAR
We proceed with the derivation of the payoffs using the third approach.
To derive the welfare change of agent in economy i we start by recalling the expres-
sion for change in the utility of a representative agent derived before:
ui = ci − θ − 1
θ
yi +
β
1− β
[
c¯i − θ − 1
θ
y¯i
]
Consider strategy APP APP first. We define the change in consumption in the
short-run as the immediate effect of a monetary shock on consumption, i.e t = 1:
ciAPP,APP = GIRF (C
i
t ; εMUSt )
=
[
E(Cit |εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Cit |Ωt−1)
]
(2.87)
and long-term (between s and S, which in our case is between period 2 and 50):
c¯iAPP,APP =
1
S − s
S∑
s=5
GIRF (Cit ; εMUSt , s)
=
1
S − s
S∑
s=2
[
E(Cis+S|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Cit+s|Ωt−1)
]
(2.88)
the change in output in the short-run is given by:
yiAPP,APP = GIRF (Y
i
t ; εmUSt , s)
=
[
E(Y it+s|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Y it+s|Ωt−1)
]
(2.89)
and the change in the long-term output (between s = 2 and S = 50):
y¯iAPP,APP =
1
S − s
S∑
s=2
GIRF (Y it ; εMUSt , s)
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=
1
S − s
S∑
s=5
[
E(Y is+S|εMUSt =
√
σ,Ωt−1)− E(Y it+s|Ωt−1)
]
(2.90)
Then the payoff of a representative agent in country i is defines similar to the net
present value equation:
uiAPP,APP = c
i
APP,APP −
θ − 1
θ
yiAPP,APP +
β
1− β
[
c¯iAPP,APP −
θ − 1
θ
y¯iAPP,APP
]
(2.91)
The payoffs in the remaining strategies are defined in a similar manner, using the
impulse reposes after monetary expansion in more than one country (linear combination
of shocks).
2.5 Data
In this section we describe the data and the sources we have chosen for the analysis
and explain the transformations we have done.
2.5.1 Variables
The choice of variables for the GVAR is motivated by the theoretical model by Corsetti
et al. (2000). Since our motivation is to compare changes in welfare in emerging
economies resulting after monetary expansion in an industrial economy we select the
variables which are used in construction of the payoffs, such as consumption (CONSit)
and output (GDPit), as well as money supply (M1it), which is the policy instrument
in each economy (where i = country, t = time).
We obtain the nominal variables in home currency CONSit, GDPit, and M1it from
the data sources. As a source of the data we use national statistics via DataStream
and Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). For Brazil we use Brazilian ipeadata
macroeconomic database provided by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipea)
and available online. We use quarterly data. If the variables are not seasonally adjusted,
we do the adjustment using EViews using the adjustment method of moving average
(Ratio to moving average - Multiplicative). Since variables come from different sources
we make necessary adjustments to express the variables in common units (millions
or billions). To facilitate the comparison as well as be able to analyze the impact of
monetary shocks of the same size in all countries we use we use an exchange rate (EXit)
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Figure 2.1: Consumption and output in US, Brazil and China, Natural logarithm of
the level, US dollars (2005)
and express the variables in the same currency, namely the US dollar. In order to look
at real variables we deflate the consumption and output with the use of GDP deflators
(country specific Dit). If necessary we re-base the GDP deflators to a common base
year, for example ”2005=100”. We use natural logarithms of each variable.
Each variable is transformed into a real seasonally adjusted variable according to
the following formula:
Cit = ln(cit) =
CONSit
Dit
× EXit
Yit = ln(yit) =
GDPit
Dit
× EXit
Mit = ln(mit) = M1it × EXit
The summary statistics for the full sample 1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1 are available in the
Appendix 2.8.4 in Table 2.11. We provide the plots of consumption and output in each
country on Figure 2.1.
In order to analyse the effect of joint shocks in more than one country we are
constructing regions, which are aggregating the country variables making use of the
PPP GDP data from the World Development Indicators Data Set of the World Bank.
2.5.2 Trade weights
In order to construct the global model we make use of the trade weights. In construction
of weight matrices (as well as regional aggregation procedure) we follow Dees et al.
(2007). We construct trade weights by using the data on imports and exports from the
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Table 2.6: Trade weights 2009
USA Brazil China Sum
USA - 0.11 0.89 1
Brazil 0.50 - 0.50 1
China 0.88 0.12 - 1
OECD STAN Bilateral Trade database by Industry (grand total) and End-use category
(Total trade in goods), assuming that the world consists of the number of countries that
we include in our model. In case of our three-country model these are USA, Brazil and
China. We sum imports and exports of each country and compute what are the shares
of individual countries trading partners in their total trade. We are using trade weights
for year 2009.
Trade wights are used to construct foreign variables as well as to solve the global
VAR. To construct trade weights for United States, Brazil and China we collect data
on bilateral exports and imports in thousand USD, in this particular case for 2009. We
sum the value of bilateral export and import and treat the world as if it was composed
of only those three countries. This allows us to compute the share of trade coming from
each trade partner in total trade of a country, values which are presented in Table 2.6.
Notice that each column adds up to one. So for example, only 11% of total US trade
comes from Brazil, while 0.89% of its trade comes from China. Half of the total trade
of Brazil comes from China, while the other half from the US, and 88% of total trade
in China comes from the US, while only 0.12% of its trade comes from Brazil.
2.5.3 Regional aggregation
In the construction of regions we use PPP GDP which is a measure of gross domestic
product using purchasing power parity rates. We use data from the World Bank.
We then use these weights together with country specific variables to construct
regional variables using the following formula:
XREGIONt = Σ
Ni
l ω
0
ilXilt (2.92)
where XREGIONt is the regional variable in a region, ω
0
il is a weight used in aggre-
gation (here PPP GDP), and Xilt is a country-specific variable (country l in region i),
i is the number of countries in the region.
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In particular, in order to analyse linear combination of money shocks, we construct
the following regions:
• REGION1 consisting of two countries in the strategy PEG APP, namely US and
China, and the regional variable becomes:
MREGION1t = PPP,GDP (USt)MUSt + PPP,GDP (CHt)MCHt (2.93)
• REGION2 consisting of two countries in the strategy PEG APP, namely US and
Brazil, and the regional variable becomes:
MREGION2t = PPP,GDP (USt)MUSt + PPP,GDP (BRt)MBRt (2.94)
• REGION3 consisting of three countries in the strategy PEG PEG, namely US,
China and Brazil, and the regional variable becomes:
MREGION3t =
PPP,GDP (USt)MUSt + PPP,GDP (CHt)MCHt + PPP,GDP (BRt)MBRt
(2.95)
Similarity as in the case of constructing trade weights one can use values of PPP
GDP from a particular year, or the average over few years. We have decided to chose
the latter, yet we have checked and the size of the weights do not vary significantly over
time.
2.6 Results
In this section we present the results from the GVAR for selected samples. We show
emerging countries’ payoffs, which we construct using the results from the GVAR and
the resulting Nash equilibria. The way we approached the estimation procedure allows
us to analyse the evolution of the Nash equilibria over time. The findings are presented
within the relevant subsections.
2.6.1 Cointegrating Vectors and Persistence Profiles
We estimate 8 samples in annual intervals of the final period over the period beginning
in 1994 Q4 until 2007 Q2 through 2014 Q1. In this section we present the estimation
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Table 2.7: VECMX Estimation: Cointegrating Vectors - t-values in brackets
1994 Q4 - 2007 Q2 1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1
USA China Brazil USA China Brazil
Y 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
- - - - - -
C -0.92 -1.87 -1.07 -1.13 -1.57 -1.05
(5.67) (5.88) (41.41) (6.63) (4.84) (14.67)
M 0.13 -0.53 0.06 0.06 -0.19 -0.02
(-1.46) (2.11) (-1.64) (-1.29) (1.02) (0.13)
Y ∗ -0.16 2.17 1.48 -0.10 -3.47 0.77
(2.74) (-2.02) (-3.07) (1.57) (2.27) (-0.61)
C∗ 0.15 -2.70 -0.91 0.00 4.88 0.20
(-1.48) (2.15) (1.97) (-0.02) (-2.35) (-0.27)
M∗ -0.04 -1.28 -0.94 0.13 0.62 0.33
(0.83) (5.10) (3.39) (-2.26) (-2.21) (-1.01)
trend 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(-0.47) (-2.91) (-0.44) (0.51) (0.28) (1.18)
results from regressions using the full sample, i.e. 1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1, and the pre-crisis
sample, i.e. 1994 Q4 - 2007 Q2. The estimation for the periods between these interval
are available upon request.
We decide to impose the same normalization in all samples in order to facilitate the
comparison. Table 2.7 summarizes the estimated coefficients together with the t-values
in brackets for the full sample and the pre-crisis sample. In all samples we normalize the
domestic output in each country. Under this normalization we expect the coefficient on
consumption to be negative and close to one, implying one to one relationship between
consumption and output.
The coefficient on consumption in China is -1.56 and in Brazil -1.05, in the full
sample, and -1.87 in China and -1.07 in Brazil in the pre-crisis sample. The coefficients
are of expected sign and size, and statistically significantly different from zero, and
except from China imply one to one relationship between consumption and output.
Since we are interested in the effect of changes in foreign money supply as well as
domestic money supply we want to look at the estimated coefficients on M∗ and M in
both samples. The coefficients on foreign money supply M∗ in China and Brazil in the
pre-crisis sample are statistically significantly different from zero (at 0.05 significance
level) and negative, implying an increase in output, after monetary expansion abroad.
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The estimated coefficient on domestic money supply M in both China and Brazil and
in both samples are less significant and much smaller. In the full sample, the estimated
coefficients on the foreign money supply have the opposite sign relative to the pre-crisis
sample, and are less significant. We expect these differences in estimated coefficients
to generate different welfare consequences of strategic interactions in the pre-crisis and
full samples.
We present the persistence profiles of the cointegrating vectors in each country for
the pre-crisis and full sample in Figure 2.2.12 These persistence profiles indicate that
the system comes back to an equilibrium after the shock in both emerging economies
very quickly. The adjustment takes place between 8 quarters for the samples ending in
the pre-crisis period, through 2009 Q2 and then reduces to 4-5 quarters in the samples
finishing after 2010 Q2.
2.6.2 Generalized Impulse Response Functions
The Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) inform us about the effect of
a one standard deviation shock on individual variables over time. Together with the
forecasted values of consumption and output the GIRFs are the main variables we use
in construction of the payoffs in the non-cooperative game between emerging economies.
Since in Chapter 1 strategy PEG corresponds to an increase in money supply in an
emerging economy of the same size as in the US we need to make sure that the size of the
shock to money supply in each country is the same. Since GVAR is constructed from
individual country models, the size of the the one standard deviation of the residual in
money equation may in general not be the same. In order to measure an impact of a
monetary shock of the same size in each country we weight the GIRFs for consumption
and output by the size of the shock. We use GIFRs from regional shocks, that is the
linear combination of shocks originating in different economies, and normalize them by
the weights constructed from the standard deviation of the residuals σi in the money
equations. We define the weight for country i by the inverse of the standard deviation
in each country: 1
σi
.
Let the weights in our three-country model be 1
σUS
, 1
σCH
, and 1
σBR
, and the GIRF of
a variable X, where X = C, Y in country i at time t after s quarters, in this case a linear
combination of shocks in all three countries (that is the regional shock) be denoted by
ˆGIRF (X it ; εM it , εMCHt , εMBRt , s). Then the weighted GIRF of variable X which reflects
12The persistence profile in the remaining samples are very similar and available upon request.
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Figure 2.2: Persistence profiles of the cointegrating vectors in the pre-crisis and full
sample
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the shock of the same size in each country, in the case of strategy PEG PEG, is given
by the following formula:
GIRF (X it,PEG,PEG) = GIRF (X
i
t ; εMUSt , εMCHt , εMBRt , s)
=
1
σUS
ˆGIRF (X it ; εMUSt , εMCHt , εMBRt , s)
+
1
σCH
ˆGIRF (X it ; εMUSt , εMCHt , εMBRt , s)
+
1
σBR
ˆGIRF (X it ; εMUSt , εMCHt , εMBRt , s) (2.96)
In a similar way we construct the GIRFs in the remaining strategies:
- in case of PEG APP:
GIRF (X it,PEG,APP ) = GIRF (X
i
t ; εMUSt , εMCHt , s)
=
1
σUS
ˆGIRF (X it ; εMUSt , εMCHt , s) +
1
σCH
ˆGIRF (X it ; εMUSt , εMCHt , s) (2.97)
- in case of APP PEG:
GIRF (X it,APP,PEG) = GIRF (X
i
t ; εMUSt , εMBRt , s)
=
1
σUS
ˆGIRF (X it ; εMUSt , εMBRt , s) +
1
σBR
ˆGIRF (X it ; εMUSt , εMBRt , s) (2.98)
- and in case of APP APP:
GIRF (X it,APP,APP ) = GIRF (X
i
t ; εMUSt , s) =
1
σUS
ˆGIRF (X it ; εMUSt , s) (2.99)
For example in the case of a full sample the standard deviations of the residuals in
the money equations are: σUS = 5%, σCH = 1%, and σBR = 2.7%, so the weighted
GIRFof a variable X ,for country i in time t in the strategy PEG PEG is given by:
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GIRF (X it,PEG,PEG) =
1
0.005
ˆGIRF (X it,PEG,PEG)
+
1
0.01
ˆGIRF (X it,PEG,PEG) +
1
0.027
ˆGIRF (X it,PEG,PEG)
and the constructed GIRF shows an effect of 1% change in money supply in each
country on the variable X such as consumption and output in country i.
In Chapter 1 we analyze the effect of monetary expansion in different strategies
on consumption and output. However, the effects in Chapter 1 are presented not as
absolute changes in the variables, but as relative changes, i.e. relative to the other
emerging economy. This is due to the algebraic complexity that arises as soon as we
extend the model beyond two countries. Such approach makes it difficult to formulate
predictions as for the direction of change in the individual variables. This complication
does not arise as far as the data analysis using GVAR methodology is concerned, and
we can use this approach to analyse the responses in the components of the utility of
each country in different strategies.
On Figures 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 we present the weighted GIRFs reflecting the change
in output and consumption in both China and Brazil in different samples (multiplied
by 100)13.
The response of consumption and output in China depends strongly on the strategy
of Brazil, and less so on China’s own strategy in all sample periods. On the other hand,
the change in Brazil’s consumption and output depends more on its own strategy and
less on the strategy of China. This responses are rather counterintuitive given the trade
linkages between those countries.
By performing the analysis over various sample periods in time we can see how the
pattern of changes in response of consumption and output in China and Brazil evolves,
see Figures 2.3 - 2.6.
In the period before the financial crisis of 2007-08, the US monetary expansion affects
negatively both output and consumption in Brazil. This effect remains in the sample
period finishing in 2008 Q2. In the sample period finishing in 2009 Q2 the effect on the
long-term consumption and output becomes positive in the strategy PEG APP, while
the immediate effect is still negative. No matter when the shock in the US occurs14, and
no matter what Brazil is doing, its output after the US monetary expansion falls in the
short-term in all analysed sample periods. Short-run negative effect on consumption can
13Remaining samples GIRFs are available upon request
14by construction the shock happens at the end of each sample period
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Figure 2.3: GIRFs of consumption (C) and output (Y) 1994 Q4 - 2007 Q2
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Figure 2.4: GIRFs of consumption (C) and output (Y) 1994 Q4 - 2010 Q2
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Figure 2.5: GIRFs of consumption (C) and output (Y) 1994 Q4 - 2012 Q2
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Figure 2.6: GIRFs of consumption (C) and output (Y) 1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1
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be observed in the sample periods until 2011 Q2 and becomes positive in all analysed
samples thereafter. Beginning in the sample period in 2011 Q2 the effect of monetary
expansion in the US on consumption and output turns positive in the long-run in the
strategy PEG APP and APP APP and in all strategies after the sample period finishing
in 2013 Q2.
The decrease in Brazilian output in the samples until around 2010 is consistent
with the traditional monetary policy transmission mechanism that predicts a relatively
lower output in the short- and in the long-run in the country with no monetary shock
(which in our model is equivalent to allowing its currency to appreciate), if the so
called Marshall-Lerner-Robinson (MLR) condition15 does not hold. The fact that the
same output response is present in all strategies in Brazil, and that the GIRFs of
both consumption and output are similar in different strategies within the same sample
(except for the period of 2009 Q2 - 2011 Q2) could possibly be attributed to the steady
appreciation of real that took place in Brazil since 2003 (Mourougane, 2011), except
for the period around 2008-2010, which persists in the data.
In the period before the financial crisis of 2007-08 and up to approximately 2008 Q2
the effect of a monetary expansion in the US is negative for Chinese consumption, both
in the short- and in the long-run in all strategies. This is in contrast to the response
of output in China which increases in all strategies in both short- and long-run in all
analysed sample periods. The initially negative effect on consumption in China becomes
positive over time, especially in the long-run in all sample periods finishing after 2010
Q2.
Relatively higher output and relatively lower consumption in China in all strategies
might reflect the fact that during the period until 2009 China was pegging (which is
reflected in the data). According to the standard monetary transmission mechanism, if
the MLR condition does not hold, in a country where monetary expansion takes place
(which in our model is equivalent to maintaining fixed exchange rate) the consumption
is relatively lower and the output relatively higher. This effect may prevail over a longer
time horizon, even after China abandoned peg since we estimate the model recursively
15The MLR condition informs about the effect of a change in relative prices after monetary shock
on the trade balance. If the sum of import and export elasticities is greater than one (when this
is the case we say that the MLR condition holds, and that it does not if the sum is smaller than
one), the currency devaluation (caused by monetary expansion) will improve the trade balance of that
country where the shock has originated. As long as the between-country elasticity of substitution is
different from one, consumption smoothing will take place via adjustment in the current account. This
condition is relevant for the theory predictions of consumption and output responses after a monetary
expansion.
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(the information in the data from the previous periods influences the results).
The reaction of output in EME is similar to Chen et al. (2012) in terms of their
shape of impulse responses of the GDP growth in China and Brazil. Although our
analysis relates the effect of QE on EME only indirectly, our findings are very similar
to Chen et al. (2012) who attempt to assess the direct impact of the first rounds of
the quantitative easing on advanced and emerging economies by analysing the effect of
reduction in the US term spread on such variables as money growth, GDP, inflation,
stock prices, etc. Unfortunately there analysis does not look at the effect of such policy
on consumption nor welfare.
Finding 1. The effect of the US monetary expansion on consumption in China and
Brazil, and on output in Brazil is significantly different in the periods before the financial
crisis of 2007-08 and the first round of QE, and after those events. The initially negative
short- and long-run effect on consumption in China turns positive after 2010 Q2 and
the initially negative effect on output and consumption in Brazil turns positive after
2012 Q2 in the long-run.
The different response of consumption and output in the period before and after the
first round of QE potentially reveals a change in the monetary transmission mechanism
over time. This change might be associated with the increase in global linkages and
globalization, or with the effect of the unconventional monetary policy in the US on
the transmission mechanism. Considering the theory in Chapter 1, this variation could
possibly be caused by a change in the underlying parameters of the model such as
the substitutability between goods, which in turn are related to the so called MLR
condition.
The inspection of the Figures 2.3 - 2.6 reveals another finding:
Finding 2. The long-run response of output in China and Brazil after the US monetary
expansion converges over time after the policy of QE in the US.
The convergence of output and long-run consumption effects in China and Brazil
over time could possibly be explained by the fact that after 2009 China became the ma-
jor trading partner of Brazil, while the role of the US decreased over time (Mourougane,
2011).
The reaction of consumption and output to the US monetary expansion in the
emerging economies plays a crucial role in the evaluation of welfare changes expressed
using the constructed payoffs. We describe how these changes drive the evolution of
payoffs over time in Section 2.6.3 where we show that the change in the response of
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consumption and output in China and Brazil corresponds to the period in which the
Nash equilibrium changes, that is the period until 2010 Q2 and 2011 Q2 (see Finding
4).
2.6.3 Payoffs
Using the computed forecasts for output and consumption, together with weighted
GIFRs we construct the payoffs in the way described in Section 2.4.2. The results
presented here are discussed using the first of three suggested approaches. The results
from the remaining two approaches are presented in the Appendix 2.8.1.
The payoff matrices that contain the payoffs from different samples are the normal-
form representations of the non-cooperative game between China and Brazil, and are
presented on Figure 2.7. On Panel A we present the short-term payoffs, representing
the immediate change in the utility after the shock in each emerging economy for the
three samples: pre-crisis sample, i.e. 1994 Q2 - 2007 Q2, the sample until 2011 Q2
and the full sample, i.e. 1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1 for the elasticity of substitution parameter
θ = 6. This is the most used value of θ in the macroeconomics literature (for example
Gali and Monacelli (2005)). On Panel B we present the long-run effects in form of
cumulative payoffs over the period of 50 quarters for the corresponding samples as in
the short-term for the same elasticity of substitution parameter θ = 6. Nash equilibria
are in bold. We have identified a pattern in the way Nash equilibria evolve over time
and present it in Table 2.8. Because the resulting Nash equilibria are the same in
’adjacent’ samples16, we decided to present the short- and long-run results only for the
representative samples. The remaining payoff matrices are available upon request.
Table 2.8 presents the summary of the results obtained from the payoff matrices in
all samples over time for the elasticity of substitution parameter θ = 6. However, since
in Chapter 1 the within-country elasticity of substitution θ is assumed to be greater
than 1 we perform robustness checks to see if the Nash equilibria vary with the values
of this elasticity parameter between 1 and 6. We conclude that the results are quite
robust in terms of the chosen values of the elasticity of substitution parameter θ.
As far as the immediate adjustment of consumption and output in each sample is
concerned, the short-run policy recommendation for China is to peg and for Brazil to
allow its currency to appreciation. PEG APP is the short-run Nash equilibrium in
all samples, with one exception of the sample ending in 2010 Q2. Similar policy has
16For example the long-run Nash equilibrium is the same in samples finishing in 2007 Q2 and 2008
Q2.
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Figure 2.7: Short and long-run Nash equilibria in selected samples
been observed after the the first round of the quantitative easing in the US and may
explain that it was optimal for China, from the short-run point of view, to maintain
fixed exchange rate relatively to the US.
Finding 3. The policy recommendations for the emerging economies after monetary
expansion in the US vary depending on the forecasting horizon. In the short-run it is
optimal to peg for China, and for Brazil to allow its currency to appreciate. In the
long-run the policy recommendations are history-dependent (see Finding 4).
Although in the short-run PEG APP results in more beneficial welfare effect for
Brazil and China, it is not a long-run Nash equilibrium in all samples. Based on
the computed payoffs, it is optimal for China to allow its currency to appreciate in the
periods just before, during the period of the financial crisis, and during the first round of
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Table 2.8: Nash equilibria (NE) over time in the estimated samples in the context of
the US policy of quantitative easing (QE)
Nash equilibria
Sample period Economic event Short-run Long-run
1994 Q4 - 2007 Q2 Pre-crisis period PEG APP APP PEG
1994 Q4 - 2008 Q2 Financial crisis, QE I begins PEG APP APP PEG
1994 Q4 - 2009 Q2 QE I PEG APP APP PEG
1994 Q4 - 2010 Q2 QE I ends APP PEG PEG PEG
1994 Q4 - 2011 Q2 QE II PEG APP PEG PEG
1994 Q4 - 2012 Q2 Between QE II and QE III PEG APP PEG APP
1994 Q4 - 2013 Q2 QE III PEG APP PEG APP
1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1 Exit from the QE PEG APP PEG APP
quantitative easing (until between 2009 Q2 and 2010 Q217), while it is optimal for Brazil
to increase money supply over that period from the long-run perspective. Between the
period around 2010 Q2 and 2011 Q2 welfare of both China and Brazil increases relative
to the pre-shock level in all strategies, and the resulting Nash equilibrium changes to
PEG PEG, in cases of high elasticity of substitution (e.g. 6). This is the only period
in which the payoffs are sensitive to the choice of values of the elasticity of substitution
θ. For low values of θ the Nash equilibrium is then PEG APP, which is the same as
the optimal strategy from the short-run perspective. The increase in the utilities can
possibly be explained by the fact that the economy was in a recovery period after the
crisis. Alternatively, we could attribute this change in payoffs to the way the monetary
transmission mechanism has been altered over time by the US policy of quantitative
easing. One can see this effect in the way consumption and output respond differently
to monetary expansion in the US over time on the GIRFs Figures (e.g. Fig 2.3 - 2.6).
Finding 4. The policy recommendations for the emerging economies vary depending
on when the monetary expansion in the US is applied (i.e. is history-dependent). Our
framework suggests that in the period finishing in 2009 Q2, i.e. had the monetary
expansion in the US taken place in 2009 Q2, it would have benn optimal for China
to allow its currency to appreciate and for Brazil to peg. In the period approximately
between 2010 Q2 - 2011 Q2 it would have been optimal for both emerging economies to
increase their money supply and keep their exchange rate vis-a-vis the US fixed, while
17In order to identify an exact moment of the policy change it would be helpful to perform recursive
estimation using quarterly intervals instead of annual ones.
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after 2011 Q2 it would have been optimal for China to keep the exchange rate fixed
while for Brazil to allow its currency to appreciate. We attribute this time variation to
potential changes in the monetary transmission mechanism over time, possibly due to
the effect of the unconventional monetary policy of quantitative easing in the US.
It is interesting to point out that despite the fact that no matter what Brazil is doing,
that is in every strategy, its consumption and output decrease in the samples finishing
in 2009 Q2, while its payoff is positive and larger than the one of China. At the same
time in the aforementioned period the model predicts that Chinese consumption will
decrease and output will increase. But because the output enters the utility function
with a negative sign, and more output means more disutility from work effort, Chinese
payoffs are initially negative. The way the payoffs are constructed should be kept in
mind while analyzing the results and interpreting the policy recommendations. We
summarize this important remark below (Remark 12).
Remark 12. By construction, a payoff of country i is positive if the increase in con-
sumption is larger than the increase in output (weighted by θ−1
θ
where the weight is
decreasing in θ), or if the decrease in output (weighted) is larger than the decrease in
consumption.
The payoff matrices are snapshot representations of welfare changes over particular
time horizon. Although the long-term changes in the utility computed as cumulative
payoffs may be positive, the welfare effect in the emerging economies may vary over
time, and even be negative in the short-run. To illustrate that, we plot the per-period
changes in the utility over time in China and Brazil in various samples on Figures 2.8,
2.9, 2.10, and 2.1118. For example, the initially negative welfare effect in Brazil in the
strategy PEG PEG in sample 1994 Q2 - 2010 Q2 (see Figure 2.9) turns positive over
time, and this strategy is in fact the Nash equilibrium.
This framework has been designed to analyze how the welfare of emerging economies
is affected after the monetary expansion in the US, nevertheless our approach allows to
show the impact of such policy of the US on itself in all analysed strategies. The payoffs,
representing welfare change in the US are presented relative to Chinese and Brazilian
payoffs on Figures 2.8 - 2.11. These figures illustrate that a monetary expansion in the
US has much stronger welfare effect in both China and Brazil than domestically. The
welfare effect of monetary expansion in the US (even when the monetary expansion
18Remaining samples are available upon request.
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Figure 2.8: Payoffs for the sample 1994 Q4 - 2007 Q2 with θ = 6 - Nash equilibrium
APP PEG
takes place simultaneously in the emerging economies) is close to zero in the US in all
strategies. We summarize this observation below.
Finding 5. Welfare in the emerging economies which are trading partners of the US
reacts more to the expansionary monetary policy of the US than the welfare of the US
itself.
Although both Chen et al. (2012) and Bernanke (2013) do not explicitly analyze the
welfare effect of the QE on EME, their simulations suggest that there are spillovers from
the US policy to EME. These spillovers however, may not be very negative and may
vary between economies. Indeed the Figures 2.8 - 2.11 show that the welfare impact
of expansionary monetary policy in the US varies initially between Brazil and China
and becomes more positive after QE in all countries, including the US over time. This
brings us to another finding:
Finding 6. Initially in the sample periods finishing in 2007 Q2 and 2008 Q2 the policy
of the US is beggar-thy-neighbour for EME in most cases regardless of the strategy
employed by the EMEs. This result is consistent with Obstfeld’s (2011) predictions that
the emerging economies lose no matter what they do. The payoffs turn positive for
Brazil and China in the sample finishing in 2010 Q2 in all strategies but APP APP.
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Figure 2.9: Payoffs for the sample 1994 Q4 - 2010 Q2 with θ = 6 - Nash equilibrium
PEG PEG
This result is in contrast to Obstfeld (2011), who suggested that EME’s loss can be
reduced if both countries allow their currencies to appreciate. With the sample finishing
in 2011 Q2 the policy of the US becomes enrich-the-neighbour in all strategies, which
is consistent with Chapter 1 for particular combination of the size and substitutability
parameters (see Proposition 2).
Our Finding 6 sheds light on the existing debate between policymakers about the
effect of the monetary policy expansion in the US after the crisis (Bernanke (2013),
Rousseff (2012)). Our analysis suggests that after the first round of QE such policy
had a positive long-term welfare effect on China and Brazil.
2.6.4 Policy implications
In this Section we relate our findings and resulting Nash equilibria to the economic
developments in the world economy, and summarize potential policy recommendations
for China and Brazil.
The resulting short-run Nash equilibrium is PEG APP in all analyzed samples except
for the one ending in 2010 Q2. In fact after the crisis this is exactly the policy followed
by China and Brazil. China maintained fixed exchange relative to the US until 2010.
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Figure 2.10: Payoffs for the sample 1994 Q4 - 2012 Q2 with θ = 6 - Nash equilibrium
PEG APP
Brazil has allowed real to appreciate continuously since 2003 (Mourougane, 2011). Since
the policy followed by China and Brazil is a Nash equilibrium only in the short-run,
this might suggest that the policymakers in those countries might be shortsighted.
Our framework suggests that in the long-run in the period before the QE, both
economies would be better off in the long-run by pursuing the opposite strategy, namely
APP PEG. We believe that this policy suggestion at that moment would help to improve
welfare in China and Brazil. At that time inflation in China was high and growing (food
inflation in 2007 was 12.3% and in 2008 14.3% in 2008, OECD) and further monetary
expansion would only contribute to even greater increase in prices. Brazil by allowing
its currency to appreciate worsened its competitiveness and monetary expansion could
potentially help to increase exports. In practice Brazil appreciation did not continue
over the period of 2008-2010, which is consistent with our policy recommendations for
Brazil. Our framework however suggest that Brazil should stop allowing its currency
to appreciate a year earlier and a year after than it actually did that.
In the period of policy change (i.e. in the samples finishing in 2010 Q2 and 2011
Q2) both countries would be recommended to increase their money supplies. Although
PEG PEG strategy is a Nash equilibrium, the presented payoff matrix shows that the
alternative strategy PEG APP do not differ significantly in terms of changes in welfare.
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Figure 2.11: Payoffs for the full sample with θ = 6 - Nash equilibrium PEG APP
The policy recommendation changes significantly in the period after the QE and
the long-term Nash equilibrium becomes the same as the short-term one.
The different pre-QE and post-QE long-run welfare effects as well as the convergence
in the consumption and output responses in China and Brazil might as well be influenced
by changing expectations over time, these in turn could be related to the policy of
the QE in the US. At this stage we cannot be sure that this is a direct evidence of
the US policy of the quantitative easing but it would be interesting to investigate
this connection in more detail. Another explanation might be that since there are
significant differences between these economies, such as different ongoing policies, stage
of development, trade linkages and exchange rate regimes, and consumption and output
responses to crisis (see Figure 2.1) it is plausible to expect differences in welfare effects
between them over time.
Our results are not consistent with the theory which predicts quantitatively the
same payoffs for both emerging economies in the strategy PEG PEG and APP APP.
We can possibly explain this departure from the theoretical predictions by differences
between the Brazilian and Chinese economies which are not captured in the theoretical
model, yet are observed in the data. Similarly to the findings in Chapter 1 we identify
no need for policy coordination in the results form the empirical analysis for Brazil and
China. We do not observe so called Prisoner’s Dilemma in the data, perhaps due to
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the same reason as in Chapter 1, i.e. large asymmetries between Brazil and China.
Our Finding 5, which says that the effects of expansionary monetary policy in the
US has stronger welfare effect on EME than domestically is important to be considered
by the policymakers in the US in their future policy decisions.
The Nash equilibria on Figure 2.7 convey an interesting information related to
Pareto optimality. Outcomes of strategic interactions between players in a non-cooperative
game are considered to be Pareto optimal, if there is no combination of strategies yield-
ing a higher payoff for both countries, than the resulting Nash equilibrium. If however,
strategies that allow to improve upon existing Nash equilibrium exist, coordinating
countries towards those strategies would result in gains from coordination. In Chap-
ter 1 we have shown sufficient conditions for such cases, which are called Prisoner’s
Dilemmas.
Finding 7. According to our framework, short- and long-run Nash equilibria for China
and Brazil after monetary expansion in the US are Pareto optimal. Therefore, there is
no need for these EME to coordinate on alternative policies.
This result is consistent with Chapter 1, in which we explain that in the presence
of large country-size asymmetries between EME there are no gains from coordination,
and in contrast to the suggestions of the IMF (Lagarde (2014)).
It is important to point out that the fact that China and Brazil adopted various
policy tools during the period of the analysis has not been explicitly dealt with in the
current approach. The change in the exchange rate regime in China could potentially be
isolated by undertaking counterfactual analysis allowing to evaluate how the economy
would behave in the absence of the regime switch. The approach of modeling regime
changes suggested by Hamilton (1989) could be useful. For example, the fact that China
abandoned the fixed exchange rate relative to the US dollar in 2009 could potentially
be controlled for by forecasting the variables in the model and applying the monetary
shocks to the hypothetical data assuming the exchange rate remained fixed. We are
aware that our approach could be improved in this sense, and allowing to extract the
effect of the actual policy component on the analyzed variables could lead to different
welfare evaluation than in the current approach.
To assess the effect of other than exchange rate and monetary policy tools, such
as capital controls and reserve accumulation would require a model including more
variables. It might therefore be worth to be considered in the future research.
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2.7 Conclusions
We propose a novel framework to analyse welfare consequences of monetary expansion
in the US on China and Brazil. We find that the effect of the expansionary monetary
policy on welfare of EME is time-dependent and varies with the policy horizon used for
evaluation of the effects of such policy (Finding 3 and Finding 4). The Nash equilibria
are different in the samples before the financial crisis of 2007-08, and in the period
before the QE than the Nash-equilibria in the post-crisis samples. We identify optimal
strategies which can be used as policy recommendations for EME. In particular, we find
that before QE China could have increased its welfare by easing the inflationary pres-
sures via currency appreciation, and Brazil could have gained from monetary expansion
which could have improved its competitiveness and increased its exports. In the period
after QE our policy recommendations are the same in the long- and in the short-run,
and suggest monetary expansion in China and currency appreciation in Brazil. We
shed light on the ongoing debate about the effects of the expansionary monetary policy
of the US on its trading partners. We find that the welfare effect of such policy is
initially negative for Brazil and China, which is consistent with the analysis in Obstfeld
(2011). However, over time, in particular after the first round of QE, the welfare effect
on EME becomes positive, as asserted by Bernanke (2013), or Powell (2013) (Finding
6). This time-varying welfare effect is a consequence of the change in the response
in consumption in China and Brazil in the periods before the QE and after, and the
change in the response in output in Brazil in those periods (Finding 1). Although the
reaction of output to monetary expansion in the US initially differs significantly be-
tween Brazil and China (decrease in of output in Brazil vs. an increase in output in
China), we observe convergence in those responses over time, especially after the policy
of QE (Finding 2). Among possible explanations of this change over time might be
the effect that QE potentially has on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
internationally. We find that the welfare effect of expansionary monetary policy in the
US is much weaker in the US than in Brazil and China. In fact, it is close to zero in the
US and over time becomes more positive in all countries, including the US (Finding 5).
We find, possibly due to the asymmetries between Brazil and China, that there is no
need for policy coordination and the so called Prisoner’s Dilemma do not arise in any
of the analysed samples and analysed horizons, which is consistent with the findings in
Chapter 1 (Finding 7).
We believe that our framework can serve as a tool for international organizations to
identify welfare-superior strategies of the EME and to highlight the welfare improvement
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coming from coordination of policymakers in EME towards such policies.
By addressing the existing gap in the literature pointed out in the introduction, we
hope to have provided a stepping stone for future research investigating the welfare
effects of self-oriented policies on individual economies and their trading partners. We
believe that the introduced framework could be improved or amended in several ways.
Including more countries could enrich the analysis and draw more realistic conclusions
for the global economy. Among other improvements one might perform the analysis
on stationary data, consider different specifications, and apply time-varying weights, to
name just a few. In order to analyze the change over time in a more accurate way one
could consider quarterly recursion instead of the annual one applied here. An additional
extension could be to include the US as an active player to identify the so called Nash-
Nash equilibria of a global game. This would allow us to investigate if the US can
benefit from ‘bribing’ the emerging economies using transfer payments to change their
policy actions for the benefit of the US. Addressing these issues is part of our future
research agenda.
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Table 2.9: Nash equilibria (NE) over time in the estimated samples in the context of
the US policy of quantitative easing (QE) - Alternative 2
Nash equilibria
Sample period Economic event Short-run Long-run
1994 Q4 - 2007 Q2 Pre-crisis period APP PEG APP PEG
1994 Q4 - 2008 Q2 Financial crisis, QE I begins APP APP APP PEG
1994 Q4 - 2009 Q2 QE I no NE APP APP
1994 Q4 - 2010 Q2 QE I ends PEG PEG APP PEG
1994 Q4 - 2011 Q2 QE II PEG PEG APP PEG
1994 Q4 - 2012 Q2 Between QE II and QE III PEG PEG APP PEG
1994 Q4 - 2013 Q2 QE III PEG PEG APP PEG
1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1 Exit from the QE APP APP APP PEG
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Nash equilibria in alternative methods
Table 2.9 presents the predicted short- and long-run equilibria arising using second
method.
Results are sensitive to the choice of the the parameter in the disutility from work
effort κ in the sense that it (κ) acts as a scaling factor but the Nash equilibria stay the
same.
Table 2.10 presents the predicted short- and long-run equilibria arising using third
method.
The results from Alternative 1 are qualitatively and quantitatively different in most
cases from the Alternative 1 presented in the main body of the Chapter.
The results from Alternative 3 are qualitatively similar (same Nash equilibria in
most periods) but quantitatively different from the Alternative 1 presented in the main
body of the Chapter.
2.8.2 Related theory and predictions
Predictions from the theory based on the Corsetti et al. (2000) model
In Chapter 1 we show that depending on the relative values of the substitutability
parameters, size asymmetry between the countries, and their actions the change in
welfare after monetary expansion in the Center the change in welfare varies.
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Table 2.10: Nash equilibria (NE) over time in the estimated samples in the context of
the US policy of quantitative easing (QE) - Alternative 3
Nash equilibria
Sample period Economic event Short-run Long-run
1994 Q4 - 2007 Q2 Pre-crisis period PEG APP APP PEG
1994 Q4 - 2008 Q2 Financial crisis, QE I begins PEG APP APP PEG
1994 Q4 - 2009 Q2 QE I PEG APP APP PEG
1994 Q4 - 2010 Q2 QE I ends PEG APP PEG PEG
1994 Q4 - 2011 Q2 QE II PEG APP PEG PEG
1994 Q4 - 2012 Q2 Between QE II and QE III PEG APP PEG PEG
1994 Q4 - 2013 Q2 QE III PEG APP PEG APP
1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1 Exit from the QE PEG APP PEG APP
In case all of the three countries increase money supply (by the same amount, which
is equivalent with maintaining the exchange rate vis-a-vis the center at unchanged level),
a strategy that we call PEG PEG, the change in individual’s country welfare will always
be positive.
The results of such policy can however be negative and bring about deterioration
of welfare in emerging economies (EME). This can happen for example in the strategy
APP APP in case the substitutability between goods produced between the countries
in the Periphery and the Center (ρ) is larger that the within country substitutability
(θ).
The exact conditions informing about then the expansionary policy if an advanced
economy is positive and when negative in terms of welfare of the emerging economies
are presented in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 and we repeat them for convenience
in Appendix 2.8.3.
In case of PEG APP the negative change in welfare of emerging economies can
occur:
• when the Periphery countries are large as a whole - for the smaller country if
the elasticity of substitution between the goods produced in the Periphery (ψ)
is larger than the within country substitutability (θ), and when the following
condition hold Π(ψ) < γA
γA−1 ,
• when the Periphery countries are small as a whole - in case the substitutability
of goods produced between the countries in the Periphery and the Center (ρ) [for
the larger country] or the elasticity of substitution between the goods produced
140
in the Periphery (ψ)[for the smaller country] is larger that the within country
substitutability (θ).
Negative change in the utility of EME in case of APP PEG occurs in similar cases to
PEG APP (see PEG APP with mirror image results for one of the Periphery countries).
In general the following two scenarios could result from policy interactions in EME.
We are interested if similar result can be obtained using the GVAR analysis.
1. Scenario 1: All payoffs positive, when the following condition on the relative
elasticity of substitution parameters is satisfied: θ ≥ ψ ≥ ρ.
2. Scenario 2: Positive payoffs in PEG PEG, negative in APP APP, and negative
in PEG APP and APP PEG for the country that pegs, if either θ ≤ ψ or θ ≤ ρ
(sufficiently smaller).
Figure 2.12: Potential scenarios Chapter 1
Obstfeld’s (2011) predictions
In this section on Figure 2.13 we present the payoff matrix suggested by Obstfeld (2011),
where α > 0.1 is the share of intra-EME trade and −0.9 is the cost of inflation.
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Figure 2.13: Payoff matrix suggested by Obstfeld (2011)
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2.8.3 Propositions - Welfare changes
Proposition 1. (Beggar-thy-neighbour) Monetary expansion in the Center is beggar-
thy-neighbour for the Periphery countries in the following cases:
• for both Periphery countries in case of APP, APP, if ρ > β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
, i.e. ρ
sufficiently larger than θ,
• for country A, if the Periphery is large, i.e. γP → 1, and:
– APP,PEG, if ψ >
β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
, i.e. ψ sufficiently larger than θ, and
country A is very small, i.e. γA → 0,
– PEG,APP, if Π(ψ) < γA
γA−1 ,
• for country B, if the Periphery is large, i.e. γP → 1, and:
– APP,PEG, if Π(ψ) < γA−1
γA
,
– PEG,APP, if ψ >
β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
, i.e. ψ sufficiently larger than θ,
• for country A, if the Periphery is small, i.e. γP → 0, and:
– APP,PEG, if country A is very small, i.e. γA → 0, and ψ > β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
,
i.e. ψ sufficiently larger than θ, or if country A is very large, i.e. γA → 1,
and ρ >
β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
, i.e. ρ sufficiently larger than θ,
– PEG,APP, if country A is very small, i.e. γA → 0, and Π(ψ)− Π(ρ) < −1,
• for country B, if the Periphery is small, i.e. γP → 0, and:
– APP,PEG, if country A is very large, i.e. γA → 1, and Π(ψ)− Π(ρ) < −1,
– PEG,APP, if country A is very large, i.e. γA → 1, and ψ > β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
,
i.e. ψ sufficiently larger than θ, or if country A is very small, i.e. γA → 0,
and ρ >
β+θ+
√
β2+6βθ+θ2
2β
, i.e. ρ sufficiently larger than θ.
where γA and γB are country A and B population shares in the population of the
Periphery, γP is the population’s share of the Periphery in the world economy, β is
the discount factor, θ is the within-country elasticity of substitution between types of
goods produced domestically, ψ is the elasticity of substitution between the types of
goods produced in the Periphery countries, ρ is the elasticity of substitution between
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Table 2.11: Summary statistics in the full sample 1994 Q4 - 2014 Q1
Mean Median Max Min Std. dev. Mean Median Max Min Std. dev.
Home output Foreign output
USA 11.1 11.1 11.2 11.0 0.1 9.7 9.6 10.2 9.4 0.2
China 9.7 9.7 10.2 9.3 0.3 10.9 10.9 11.0 10.8 0.0
Brazil 9.5 9.5 9.8 9.1 0.2 10.4 10.4 10.7 10.1 0.2
Home consumption Foreign consumption
USA 10.9 10.9 11.0 10.8 0.1 9.4 9.3 9.8 9.1 0.2
China 9.4 9.3 9.8 9.0 0.2 10.7 10.7 10.8 10.6 0.1
Brazil 9.3 9.3 9.6 8.9 0.2 10.1 10.1 10.4 9.9 0.1
Home money supply Foreign money supply
USA 12.1 12.1 12.4 12.0 0.1 12.7 12.7 13.3 12.1 0.4
China 12.9 13.0 13.5 12.3 0.4 12.0 12.0 12.3 11.8 0.1
Brazil 11.0 11.0 11.5 10.2 0.4 12.5 12.5 13.0 12.2 0.2
the types of goods produced in the Center and the Periphery, and Π(ρ) and Π(ψ) are
defined as Π(x) =
(
x−θ
x
) (
1+x
1+β+x(1−β)
)
, where x = ρ, ψ.
Proposition 2. (Enrich-thy-neighbour) Monetary expansion in the Center is
always enrich-thy-neighbour for all countries in the Periphery in case of PEG PEG.
This is independent of country size and elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods. It can be enrich-thy-neighbour for the Periphery countries in other
strategies, if the conditions in Proposition 1 do not hold.
2.8.4 Summary statistics
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Chapter 3
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in
Tariff Games in an N-Country
Trade Model
Ma lgorzata M. Mitka joint with Professor Subir Chattopadhyay
3.1 Introduction
Despite many initiatives to facilitate free trade, such as the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade in 1994, tariffs remain widely used in many countries. Customs
duties on merchandise imports, called tariffs, change both the relative price and volume
of trade between economies, as well as generate revenue for the importing country. It
is well recognized that a country imposing tariffs can benefit from such protectionist
measures even in case of retaliation, that is when trading partners impose tariffs in
return. When countries engage in retaliatory practice we call such a situation a tariff
war. However, retaliation may result in lower welfare relative to a situation in which
not all countries impose tariffs. It is therefore crucial to understand when retaliation
is beneficial and how should the optimal tariffs be set. We are motivated by recent
interactions between advanced and emerging economies, such as Brazil adopting tariffs
on goods from China and the United States (see Colitt (2011)), and United States
imposing tariffs on Chinese steel products, solar panels and other goods (see Evans
(2014)), and would like to understand how the differences between such economies
drive the outcomes of tariff wars.
There is a clear tendency in the way tariffs are set depending on the origin of the
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imported goods. Data on tariffs and bilateral imports from the ”World Tariff Profiles
2013” (UNCTAD, 2013) shows that the share of duty-free imports in both emerging and
advanced economies for a trading partner, which is an emerging economy, is significantly
lower than for the trading partners with advanced economies. For example 3.9% of
Brazil’s tariff lines for imports of agricultural products from China is duty free, while
it’s 74.7% with the United States. Similarity in India: 6.2% of Indian tariff lines for
imports of agricultural products are duty free for imports from China, but 69.1% for
imports from the US. When we look at the tariff pattern in advanced economies, we
can see again that the emerging economies have the least share in duty-free tariff lines,
for example 6.4% in case of agricultural products from China, but 92.3% in case of
agricultural products from Canada.
Another regularity in the way tariffs are set concerns the type of products, such as
agricultural and non-agricultural goods. The value of the duty-free imports from the
emerging economies is low for agricultural and very high for the non-agricultural goods
(for example Brazil’s value of duty-free imports of agricultural goods from China is
worth 0.0%, while it is worth 90% in case of non-agricultural goods). It is also lower
for advanced economies for agricultural than for non-agricultural goods coming from
emerging economies (for example US’s value of duty-free imports of agricultural goods
from China is 0.8% and 35.9% of non-agricultural goods).
Although these are bilateral statistics, countries trade with more than one country,
and it is well recognized that the tariffs are chosen depending on the decisions of the
trading partners and countries who are considered to be competitors on third markets.
Most of the literature on tariff wars uses two-country models (for example Kennan and
Riezman (1988), Syropoulos (2002), Wong (2004)), making it impossible to analyze
interactions between countries competing on a third market. Motivated by the scarcity
of appropriate models which could be used for a formal analysis of tariff wars we ex-
tend the standard two-county two-good model to many countries, and because we want
to investigate tariff patterns depending on the characteristics of an economy, in par-
ticular the inherent asymmetries between them, we allow for asymmetries in country
preferences. Although our goal is to understand how asymmetries drive the outcomes
of tariff wars in a multi-country environment, before we address this issue we need
to investigate when the existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed. Therefore our
primary focus in this chapter is to establish whether extending the two-country two-
good model prevailing in the literature to a multi-country one generates consequences
in terms of characterisation of equilibria. We want to establish if such equilibria always
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exist. Even though a relatively large body of literature investigating trade with tariffs
exists, it is difficult to identify a general existence result in such models and answer
our questions of interest. Some of the early papers are silent about the existence and
analyse the problem only graphically (Johnson, 1953-54). These are followed by papers
which provide solutions for optimal tariffs (Kennan and Riezman, 1988).
More recently Wong (2004) addresses the existence problem and specifies conditions
in which the equilibrium exists, and providing examples of non-existence. Huang et al.
(2013) investigate the existence of multiple equilibria using numerical methods. We
provide more details concerning related literature in Section 3.2.
We consider a multi-country two-good model1 with tariffs and provide conditions
on the primitives of the model that guarantee existence of a pure strategy interior Nash
equilibrium in a tariff game. We show that no-trade equilibria in such a game do not
exist, and provide an example in which there is no Nash equilibrium no matter what
tariff rate the country chooses.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: In Section 3.2 we provide a discussion
of related literature; in Section 3.3 we present the model and results; in Section 3.4 we
conclude.
3.2 Related literature
Since the paper of Johnson (1953-54), who showed that even with retaliation a country
can benefit by imposing a tariff on imports, there has been a large body of research
investigating the conditions under which a country can win a tariff war and achieve
a higher welfare from imposing tariff relative to the free trade equilibrium. Johnson
(1953-54) argues that winning a tariff war depends on the elasticity of import demand.
Using a graphical example in a two-country two-good case, he shows that it is the
country with the higher elasticity of import demand that wins the tariff war, but only
if the other country’s elasticity of import demand is very low. Intuitively a country
wins a tariff war when the improvement in its terms of trade offsets the decrease in the
trade volume.
Subsequently, Gorman (1958) imposed more formal structure on the analysis of
tariff games with retaliation, but investigated only cases in which offer curves, that is
the quantity of one good that a country exports for each quantity of the good that it
1We believe that a two-good model can be a good representation of the world if we consider these
two goods to be agricultural and non-agricultural goods, in relation to the aforementioned aggregate
statistics from the ”World Tariff Profiles”.
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imports (also called the reciprocal demand curve), have constant elasticity of import
demands and therefore optimal tariffs are independent of the tariffs imposed by other
countries.
If, however, tariffs depend on each other, then one can construct reaction functions,
that is best responses to tariff decisions of other country (or counties in the case of
more than two-country models). The reaction functions depend on the primitives of
the model and are informative about the existence and number of equilibria. In a
two-country model, for example, the number of intersections of the reaction functions
(when continuous) determines the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria. If there are
discontinuities in the reaction functions this may lead to non-existence of an equilibrium
(see Wong (2004) discussed below).
Among authors who consider best responses dependent on the tariff choice of the
relevant trading partner is Kuga (1973). Using a multi-country and multi-good model
with factors of production he proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium, but only in
mixed strategies. He does not consider the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium. To prove the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium Kuga restricts the strategy
set (set of possible tariffs) to be finite, and assumes cardinal utility functions.
A further contribution is Kennan and Riezman (1988), in which the authors show
that, in equilibrium, optimal tariffs can be expressed in terms of countries’ endowments.
They use a two-country two-good endowment economy with symmetric Cobb-Douglas
preferences. They provide a condition in terms of endowments, determining who wins
a tariff war. Although they did not prove it, in their simple structure Nash equilibria
always exist and countries reaction functions are well defined. After relaxing the sym-
metry of preferences (see Kennan and Riezman (1984)), the problem of finding Nash
equilibria becomes more complicated.
Several extensions of the two-country two-good model have been done, mostly with
the purpose of showing that trade agreements such as customs unions can improve
trading partners’ welfare. The welfare improvement is a result of choosing a common
tariff on good of which both countries forming the customs union are importers, because
this common tariff is lower relative to Nash equilibrium tariff, see for example Kennan
and Riezman (1990). These papers make an explicit assumption on the trade pattern
and assume the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Their numerical examples usually
impose symmetry of endowments and preferences in order to simplify the analysis.
More recent papers, such as Syropoulos (2002), using a two-country two-good model
with production, provides conditions on existence of a Nash equilibrium and shows how
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a country size matters for a tariff war looking at the limiting cases. Syropolous analysis
relies on the characteristics of the price elasticities of demand and their elasticities.
Wong (2004) addresses the existence problem in a more rigorous way and provides
conditions in terms of the elasticity of ”the elasticity of import” that guarantee the
convexity of the offer curves. He provides conditions for homothetic and quasi-linear
preferences that satisfy those conditions and that guarantee the existence of an equi-
librium. He showed that non-convexity of offer curves can generate discontinuities2 in
the reaction functions, and lead to non-existence of Nash equilibria. He illustrates his
finding with an analytical example, which we reproduce here (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Non-existence of trading Nash
equilibrium, Wong (2004), p. 380
Figure 3.1 illustrates Wong’s (2004)
non-existence result in a two-country two-
good economy. The picture shows the en-
dowment point ω, the home F , and for-
eign F ∗ offer curves, and home I and
foreign I∗ indifference curves. The best
response correspondences are represented
using dotted lines. The area enclosed
by the foreign offer curve F ∗ is non-
convex for some tariff rates. Home coun-
try maximises utility subject to the for-
eign’s country offer curve, and because
of this non-convexity there are more than
one tangency points of the home indiffer-
ence curve with the foreign offer curve.
Both points xb and xc solve the maximiza-
tion problem faced by home country un-
der the constraint specified by the foreign
offer curve F ∗. This multiplicity of so-
lutions leads to the discontinuity in the
best response correspondence of the home
country. Therefore there is no trading Nash equilibrium in such economy. Wong’s coun-
terexample indicates that the key ingredient in the general existence result in Otani
(1980) is the assumption (Assumption 11b, p. 649) which assures the required convex-
2This problem has already been recognized by Johnson (1953-54), who however did not analyse it
further.
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ity, although Otani justifies it with the subjective conjecture of the government (about
the vector of parameters characterizing the class of preferences, without specifying them
explicitly).
Among existing papers there have also been several numerical approaches to the
tariff games. One of them is by Hamilton and Whalley (1983) in which they calculate
optimal tariffs in a two-country two-good model using various functional forms in an
exchange model as well as model with production. They find that optimal tariffs vary
with import price elasticities. They recognize the computational difficulties that arise
as soon as a model is extended beyond two countries and two goods.
In a paper by Abrego et al. (2006) the authors consider a three-county three-good
pure exchange economy with constant elasticity of substitution preferences, and analyze
how trade patterns may change depending on the equilibrium concept. Their computa-
tional evidence shows that pattern of trade is more likely to change in economies with
three or more countries and three or more goods with asymmetric preferences. They
find that when comparing free trade and customs union the possibility of reversing the
trade flows happens in 35% of cases, while in case of customs unions and Nash equilibria
the pattern changes in 40% of cases.
Among more recent ones is Huang et al. (2013) who compute multiple Nash equi-
libria in a model with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences. In contrast
to the prevailing view, that what matters in the tariff war are the elasticities of import
demand, the authors find that these are the elasticities of substitution that matter.
They show that even in a two-country two-good economy with CES preferences when
the substitution elasticities are low it is possible for multiple competitive and Nash
equilibria to arise.
Our approach is slightly different in that we do not relay on the elasticity assump-
tions and look at the first and second derivatives of the objective function. We consider
an N-country two-good Cobb-Douglas model with country specific preferences and arbi-
trary endowments. This allows us to look at the interactions between asymmetric coun-
tries. We provide conditions on the primitives of the model that ensure the existence
of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium without restricting the trade pattern. Moreover,
we show that Nash equilibria with prohibitive tariffs cannot arise.
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3.3 The Model
Consider a world with two goods and a set I = {1, 2, · · · , I} of countries. The goods
are traded in international markets at prices p1 > 0 and p2 > 0. The government in
each country sets a tariff on the second good;3 the gross tariff rate is denoted τi for
i ∈ I. We impose the restriction that the gross tariff rate is always positive, τi > 0.
Trade is free if τi = 1 in every country. The tariff τi induces a vector of domestic prices
(p1, τip2) in country i. The tariff generates revenue if τi > 1 and country i is an importer
of good 2 or if τi < 1 and country i is an exporter of good 2. The proceeds from the
tariff are redistributed to consumers in country i in the form of a lump-sum.4
The representative consumer in each country has an endowment, denoted ωi ∈
R2+/{0} for i ∈ I, and behaves competitively when faced with the vector of domestic
prices (p1, τip2) in country i. The quantities of each good demanded by the consumer
in country i are denoted xi1 and xi2. The income available to the consumer is denoted
wi and
wi = p1ωi1 + τip2ωi2 + (τi − 1)p2(xi2 − ωi2) (3.1)
and the budget constraint faced by the consumer is
p1xi1 + τip2xi2 ≤ wi (3.2)
We shall assume that the consumer in country i has a utility function ui of the
Cobb-Douglas form, so ui(xi1, xi2) = xi1
αixi2
1−αi , with parameter αi ∈ (0, 1).
We also make the nondegeneracy assumptions:
∑
i ωi1 > 0 and
∑
i ωi2 > 0.
In Section 3.3.7 we solve the demand problem faced by the consumer in country i
and show that:
xi1(p1, p2, τi) =
αiτi
αiτi + (1− αi)
p1ωi1 + p2ωi2
p1
(3.3)
and
3In Section 3.3.7 we consider the more general framework in which each government can set a tariff
rate on each good, and we show that the ratio of the tariff rates on the two goods determines demand,
international prices, etc., so that the specification adopted is without loss of generality.
4We do not impose the condition “τi > 1 if and only if country i is a net importer of good 2”. In
doing so, we follow much of the literature, e.g. Otani (1980) and Kennan and Riezman (1988); Wong
(2004) does impose the restriction.
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xi2(p1, p2, τi) =
1− αi
αiτi + (1− αi)
p1ωi1 + p2ωi2
p2
(3.4)
Since demand is homogeneous of degree zero in international prices, we may nor-
malize international prices and set p1 = 1, and solve for the Walrasian equilibrium price
vector. This is done in Section 3.3.7 where we show that
p∗2(~τ) =
∑
i[1− A(αi, τi)]ωi1∑
iA(αi, τi)ωi2
(3.5)
where ~τ = (τ1, τ2, · · · , τI) ∈ RI++ and A(αi, τi) := αiτiαiτi+(1−αi) .
Utility at the Walrasian equilibrium can now be calculated. vi : R
I
++ → R denotes
the indirect utility function that is induced for country i. We shall specify suitable
values τ and τ , where ∞ > τ > τ > 0, and restrict the tariff rate set by country i to
satisfy τ ≥ τi ≥ τ . We are now in a position to analyse a game in strategic form where
the strategies are tariff rates chosen by each government and the payoff functions are
(v1(~τ), · · · , vI(~τ)).
3.3.1 Properties of the payoff functions in the tariff game
Given a vector of tariff rates, the utility achieved by each country at the market clearing
international relative price is given by the following equation:
vi(~τ) = (xi1 (p
∗
2 (~τ)))
αi(xi2(p
∗
2(~τ))
1−αi (3.6)
We turn to a study of the function vi. Lemma 5 below provides an explicit form
for vi and its first derivative. This shows that vi is well defined and continuously
differentiable.
Lemma 5. The utility function vi is:
(i) well defined:
vi(~τ) = (A(αi, τi))
αi(1− A(αi, τi))1−αi
[
ωi1(p
∗
2 (~τ))
αi−1 + (p∗2 (~τ))
αiωi2
]
(3.7)
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(ii) and continuously differentiable
∂vi(~τ)
∂τi
= vi(~τ) · ∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi) · {M(αi, τi) +N(αi, ~τ)} (3.8)
where: M(αi, τi) =
αi−A(αi,τi)
1−A(αi,τi)
1
A(αi,τi)
and N(αi, ~τ) =
(1−αi)ωi1∑
j [1−A(αj ,τj)]ωj1 −
αi·ωi2∑
j A(αj ,τj)ωj2
.
Next, we provide conditions that ensure that at a low enough value of the tariff rate
set by country i, the payoff function is increasing in τi, and that the payoff function is
decreasing in τi at a high enough value of the tariff rate. These boundary tariff rates
are denoted τ and τ and specify the strategy set of each country. That is the content of
Lemma 6 and it ensures that for every profile of actions τ−i := ((τj)j 6=i), there is at least
one value τ˜i ∈ (τ , τ) such that the equation ∂vi∂τi (τ˜i, τ−i) = 0 is satisfied. τ and τ do more
than just restrict the strategy set to be compact; they are consistent bounds since they
ensure that any solution to the first order condition is interior. The alternative would
be a strategy set where a maximizer exists but is on the boundary, and the derivative
of the objective function at the maximizer is not zero. Such a bound would be artificial
in that changing it would change the solution and hence the putative Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 6. (i) If ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1 for all i ∈ I then there exists τ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∂vi
∂τi
(τ , τ−i) > 0 for τ−i ∈ [τ ,∞)I−1.
(ii) If ωi1∑
j ωj1
< 1 for all i ∈ I then there exists τ > 1 such that ∂vi
∂τi
(τ , τ−i) < 0 for
τ−i ∈ (0, τ ]I−1.
In Lemma 7 we provide a means to exactly evaluate the sign of ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
.
Define the function sign : R → {−1, 0, 1} by sign(x) = −1 if x < 0, sign(x) = 0 if
x = 0, and sign(x) = 1 if x > 0.
Lemma 7. The sign of the second derivative at which the first order condition is sat-
isfied, i.e. sign
{
∂2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
}
is given by the following expression:
sign
{
−2αiτiωi2 − [1− 2αi(1− τi)]
[∑
j 6=i
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]}
. (3.9)
Finally, in Lemma 8 we show two properties: that ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
6= 0, so any
solution to the first order condition is robust rather than this being a generic property,
and that if vi is increasing at τ , a sufficient condition for which is provided in Lemma
6 (i), then ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
is always negative.
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Lemma 8. (i) ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
6= 0.
(ii) If αi ≤ 1/2 or if ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1 then ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
< 0.
The proofs of Lemma 5-8 are available in the Appendix 3.5.
3.3.2 Equilibrium
Our objective is to investigate the conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in the tariff game. Lemma 5 in Section 3.3.1 established that the function vi
is well defined and continuously differentiable; however, vi typically fails to be concave.
In Proposition 7 in Section 3.3.3 we provide a set of conditions on the graph of i’s
payoff function that ensure the existence of an interior Nash equilibrium in a general
setting with one dimensional strategy sets. The remaining properties of the function
vi established in Section 3.3.1 lead to Proposition 8 in Section 3.3.4 which identifies
conditions on the primitives of the model that ensure that the graph of vi is such
that Proposition 7 applies. In Section 3.3.5 we provide an example to show that the
conditions in Proposition 8 are tight. Finally, in Section 3.3.6 we show that under very
mild conditions, in any interior Nash equilibrium there is trade.
3.3.3 An existence result
Consider the following game. The set of players is I = {1, 2, · · · , I} with generic
element i. S is the strategy set of each player. The choice made by player i is denoted
si. Payoffs are given by the functions pii : S
I → R. Let s−i := ((sj)j 6=i) denote a profile
of actions for all but agent i, and write payoffs as pii(si, s−i). We have5
Proposition 7. Assume that S := [s, s] ⊂ R, and that, for every i ∈ I, the function pii
is twice continuously differentiable on (t, t)I where [s, s] ⊂ (t, t). Suppose that for each
i ∈ I and every profile s−i the following conditions hold:
(i) ∂pii
∂si
(s, s−i) > 0 and ∂pii∂si (s, s−i) < 0,
(ii) if s˜i is such that
∂pii
∂si
(s˜i, s−i) = 0 then ∂∂si
(
∂pii
∂si
(s˜i, s−i)
)
< 0.
Then there exists (s∗1, · · · , s∗I) ∈ SI , with s∗i ∈ (s, s) for each i ∈ I, such that for each
i ∈ I si ∈ S ⇒ pii(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ pii(si, s∗−i).
5We state and prove this intuitive result since we were unable to find a suitable reference.
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We provide the proof of Proposition 7 below.6
The result says that when the strategy space is an interval, and player i’s payoff
function is (i) increasing in i’s choice at the left boundary and decreasing in i’s choice
at the right boundary and (ii) has a negative second derivative at every point at which
the first derivative is zero, the game has an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Clearly, there is a unique solution to the first order condition; the key point in the proof
is to show that, therefore, the payoff function pii is quasiconcave in si.
Proof of Proposition 7. Fix a profile s−i and consider the problem of identifying sˆi :=
argmaxsi∈S pii(si, s−i). Since S is a compact set and pii is a continuous function of si,
such a value sˆi must exist.
Note that ∂pii
∂si
(si, s−i) is a continuously differentiable function of si. Since S = [s, s],
by condition (i), continuity, and the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is a value
s˜i ∈ (s, s) at which ∂pii∂si (s˜i, s−i) = 0, i.e. the function has a zero in the interior of the
set S. By condition (ii), and continuity of the second derivative, it can have only one
zero; furthermore, since ∂
∂si
(
∂pii
∂si
(s˜i, s−i)
)
< 0, the sufficient condition for s˜i to be a
local maximum is met.
By condition (i), sˆi /∈ {s, s}, i.e. the solution to the maximization problem cannot
be at either boundary point. But then sˆi = s˜i since the necessary condition for an
interior point to be a maximizer is satisfied only at s˜i.
We have shown that given a profile s−i, i’s best response always exists, is an interior
point, and is a single value. But then, as we now show, the function pii must be quasi-
concave in si. If not then for some profile s−i and some p, the upper set is not convex,
i.e. there are values s1i , s
2
i , and s
3
i in the set S such that s
1
i < s
2
i < s
3
i and pii(s
1
i , s−i) ≥ p,
pii(s
3
i , s−i) ≥ p but pii(s2i , s−i) < p. Since pii is continuously differentiable, there would
exist s4i ∈ (s1i , s3i ) such that ∂pii∂si (s4i , s−i) = 0 and ∂∂si
(
∂pii
∂si
(s4i , s−i)
)
> 0, where the latter
follows from the fact that pii(s
1
i , s−i) ≥ p, pii(s3i , s−i) ≥ p but pii(s2i , s−i) < p. But that
contradicts condition (ii) in the statement of the proposition.
Since the set S is compact and convex, and for each i the payoff functions are qua-
siconcave in si for a given profile s−i, the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
follows (see, for example, Theorem 3 in Debreu (1982)). Interiority has already been
established and is maintained since S is compact and pii is continuous so pii is uniformly
continuous.
6Furthermore, since S is compact and pii is continuous, all Nash equilibria are interior, s
∗
i ∈ (s, s).
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3.3.4 Pure strategy equilibria in the tariff game
We are now in a position to apply Proposition 7 to show that interior pure strategy
Nash equilibria exist in the tariff game played by countries whose fundamentals satisfy
the conditions specified in Proposition 8. The conditions restrict the distribution of
endowments by ruling out extreme cases in which a single country’s endowment of a
good is equal to the world’s endowment of that good. The example in Section 3.3.5
illustrates that the conditions cannot be relaxed.
Proposition 8. Assume that for all i ∈ I (i) ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1 and (ii) ωi1∑
j ωj1
< 1. The
tariff game of such an economy has an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 8 follows immediately by applying Proposition 7 and Lemma
5-8 and is omitted.
3.3.5 An example
In this example we show what happens when the conditions on the primitives of the
model specified in Proposition 8 do not hold.
Example 1. Consider a two country world. Let country 2’s endowment of the second
good be 0, ω22 = 0, in particular ω2 /∈ R2++. For given tariff rates the Walrasian
equilibrium is always well-defined. Yet, the tariff game does not have an interior Nash
equilibrium. To see this, use Lemma 5 (ii) to obtain the sign of ∂v1
∂τ1
(~τ) by evaluating
the expression within braces:
α1 − A(α1, τ1)
1− A(α1, τ1)
1
A(α1, τ1)
+
(1− α1)ω11∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− α1 · ω12∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
=
α1 − A(α1, τ1)
1− A(α1, τ1)
1
A(α1, τ1)
+
(1− α1)ω11∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− α1
A(α1, τ1)
=
α1 − 1
1− A(α1, τ1) +
(1− α1)ω11∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
= (1− α1)
{
ω11∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− 1
1− A(α1, τ1)
}
= (1− α1)
ω11
∑
j[1− A(α1, τ1)]− ([1− A(α1, τ1)]ω11 + [1− A(α2, τ2)]ω21)∑
j [1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1[1− A(α1, τ1)]
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Figure 3.2: First derivative of country i in Example 1
(1− α1) −[1− A(α2, τ2)]ω21
[1− A(α1, τ1)]
∑
j [1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
< 0
since ω21 > 0 necessarily as ω22 = 0 and ωi ∈ R2+/ {0}. This shows that regardless
of the vector of tariffs chosen, country’s 1’s first order condition can never have an
interior solution.
It is important to mention that he example does not restrict ω1 or preferences. We
present the graph of the first order condition of country i on the following Figure 3.2.
3.3.6 On Nash equilibria that eliminate trade
In this subsection we show that if initial endowments are such that in the absence of
tariffs there is trade, i.e. the endowment is not a Pareto optimal allocation, and no
country’s endowment of the first good is equal to the world’s endowment of the first
good, then in any interior Nash equilibrium of the tariff game there is trade. This result
appears to contradict statements in the literature that suggest that a tariff regime with
prohibitive rates that eliminate trade is always a Nash equilibrium.7
Proposition 9. Assume that the vector of endowments is not a Pareto optimal alloca-
tion and that ωi1∑
j ωj1
< 1 for all i ∈ I. Then at every interior Nash equilibrium there is
trade.
7Dixit (1987) appears to be the first to make the claim; it is repeated and used in Syropoulos (2002).
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The proof of Proposition 9 can be found after the proofs of Lemma 5 - 8.
3.3.7 Model equivalence
We start with the optimization problem faced by the representative consumer in country
i. She faces international prices p1 > 0 and p2 > 0, and the government in country i
sets gross tariff rates τi1 > 0 and τi2 > 0 on the net trade in each good (as we show
below, the more general specification with a tariff on each good does not provide greater
flexibility than a tariff on a single good). Tariff revenues are redistributed in the form
of a lump-sum and so income in country i, denoted wi, is given by
wi = τi1p1ωi1 + τi2p2ωi2 + (τi1 − 1)p1(xi1 − ωi1) + (τi2 − 1)p2(xi2 − ωi2) (3.10)
Evidently,
wi = (τi1 − 1)p1xi1 + (τi2 − 1)p2xi2 + p1ωi1 + p2ωi2 (3.11)
The optimization problem faced by i taking p1, p2, τi1, and τi2 as given is
max xi1
αixi2
1−αi (3.12)
subject to
τi1p1xi1 + τi2p2xi2 ≤ wi (3.13)
The constraint holds with equality, and the first order necessary and sufficient conditions
for xi to solve the problem are that there is a λi > 0 such that
αixi1
(αi−1)xi21−αi = τi1p1λi (3.14)
(1− αi)xi1αixi2(−αi) = τi2p2λi (3.15)
τi1p1xi1 + τi2p2xi2 = wi (3.16)
Simplifying
αixi1
(αi−1)xi21−αi
τi1p1
= λi =
(1− αi)xi1αixi2(−αi)
τi2p2
(3.17)
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⇐⇒ xi2 = (1− αi)τi1p1
αiτi2p2
xi1 (3.18)
Demand xi1(p1, p2, τi1, τi2) can now be calculated as that value that satisfies
p1xi1 + p2
(1− αi) p1
αi (τi2/τi1) p2
xi1 = p1ωi1 + p2ωi2 (3.19)
⇐⇒ p1
{
αi (τi2/τi1) + (1− αi)
αi(τi2/τi1)
}
xi1 = p1ωi1 + p2ωi2 (3.20)
⇒ xi1 =
{
αi(τi2/τi1)
αi (τi2/τi1) + (1− αi)
}
[p1ωi1 + p2ωi2]
p1
(3.21)
World markets will clear at prices (p∗1, p
∗
2) if and only if
∑
i xi1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) =
∑
i ωi1
⇐⇒
∑
i
{
αi(τi2/τi1)
αi (τi2/τi1) + (1− αi)
}
[p∗1ωi1 + p
∗
2ωi2]
p∗1
=
∑
i
ωi1 (3.22)
Clearly, we can normalize prices and set p1 = 1. Also, the tariff rates set by each
country affect prices only through the ratios of the tariffs on the two goods. Therefore,
we may work with the variables τi = τi2/τi1. Let ~τ = (τ1, τ2, · · · , τI). For αi ∈ (0, 1)
and τi > 0, set A(αi, τi) :=
αiτi
αiτi+(1−αi) . A(αi, τi) ∈ (0, 1). We have
p∗2(~τ) ·
∑
i
A(αi, τi)ωi2 =
∑
i
[1− A(αi, τi)]ωi1 (3.23)
⇐⇒ p∗2(~τ) =
∑
i[1− A(αi, τi)]ωi1∑
iA(αi, τi)ωi2
(3.24)
We have obtained the market clearing international relative price as a function of
the tariff rates set by each of the countries and the parameters specifying economic
fundamentals ((αi, ωi)i∈I). Also, consumption of good 1 in country i at equilibrium
prices is xi1 (p
∗
2 (~τ)) = A(αi, τi)[ωi1 + p
∗
2 (~τ)ωi2].
3.4 Conclusions
Motivated by economic developments in the world trade as well as lack of theoretical
existence results concerning strategic interactions between countries in a multi-country
world we extend a two-country two-good model to facilitate such analysis. We provide
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conditions on the primitives of the model that ensure the existence of a pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium and showed that Nash equilibria with prohibitive tariffs cannot
arise. We consider these two important results as a good starting point for conducting
further analysis that would investigate the role of asymmetries between countries on
the outcome of tariff wars. Preliminary steps have been taken by looking at numer-
ical examples. In the future we would like to undertake a quantitative evaluation of
the results in the light of the stylized facts mentioned in the introduction. However,
given the complex nature of the problem in the presence of asymmetries in models with
more than two countries, we are convinced that an analytical approach would help to
establish more clear cut results. We leave this for future research.
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3.5 Appendix: Proofs
In what follows, we will find it easier to work with the reciprocal of the price p∗2(~τ). So
define the function f by
f(~τ) =
∑
iA(αi, τi)ωi2∑
i[1− A(αi, τi)]ωi1
. (3.25)
Lemma E1 is our first supplementary result; it provides the evaluation of two partial
derivatives that will be used later.
Lemma E1. The functions A and f are differentiable on their domains and
∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi) =
αi(1− αi)
[αiτi + (1− αi)]2 > 0
∂f
∂τi
(~τ) =
∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi)∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
{f(~τ)ωi1 + ωi2} .
Proof. We compute each of the expressions.
∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi) =
∂
∂τi
[
αiτi
αiτi + (1− αi)
]
=
αi[αiτi + (1− αi)]− αiτiαi
[αiτi + (1− αi)]2 =
αi(1− αi)
[αiτi + (1− αi)]2 > 0.
∂f
∂τi
(~τ) =
∂
∂τi
[ ∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
]
=
∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi)ωi2
{∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
}
−
{∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
}
∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi)(−1)ωi1[∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
]2
=
∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi)
[
ωi2
{∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
}
+
{∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
}
ωi1
]
[∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
]2
=
∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi)∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
{f(~τ)ωi1 + ωi2} .
We can now proceed to prove Lemma 5 which we repeat below for convenience:
Lemma. (5) The utility function vi is:
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(i) well defined:
vi(~τ) = (A(αi, τi))
αi(1− A(αi, τi))1−αi
[
ωi1(p
∗
2 (~τ))
αi−1 + (p∗2 (~τ))
αiωi2
]
(ii) and continuously differentiable:
∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = vi(~τ)·∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi)·
{
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
1
A(αi, τi)
+
(1− αi)ωi1∑
j [1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
}
Proof.
(i) vi(~τ) = (xi1(p
∗
2(~τ)))
αi(xi2(p
∗
2(~τ)))
1−αi
which, upon using the first order condition, becomes
vi(~τ) = (xi1(p
∗
2(~τ)))
αi
(
(1− αi)
αiτip∗2(~τ)
xi1(p
∗
2(~τ))
)1−αi
= (xi1(p
∗
2(~τ)))
(
(1− αi)
αiτip∗2(~τ)
)1−αi
= A(αi, τi) [ωi1 + p
∗
2(~τ)ωi2]
(
(1− αi)
αiτi
)1−αi( 1
p∗2(~τ)
)1−αi
,
where we incorporate the explicit form of the demand function xi1(p
∗
2(~τ)). By rewriting
the expression (1−αi)
αiτi
in terms of A(αi, τi), we obtain
vi(~τ) = A(αi, τi)
[
ωi1
(
1
p∗2(~τ)
)1−αi
+
(
1
p∗2(~τ)
)−αi
ωi2
](
1
A(αi, τi)
− 1
)1−αi
= (A(αi, τi))
αi(1− A(αi, τi))1−αi
[
ωi1(p
∗
2 (~τ))
αi−1 + (p∗2 (~τ))
αiωi2
]
.
(ii) Recall that f(~τ) = 1
p∗2(~τ)
so that (i) may be rewritten as
vi(~τ) = (A(αi, τi))
αi(1− A(αi, τi))1−αi
[
ωi1(f(~τ))
1−αi + (f(~τ))−αiωi2
]
.
We proceed to differentiate the function.
∂vi(~τ)
∂τi
=
{
αi(A(αi, τi))
αi−1∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi)(1− A(αi, τi))1−αi
+(A(αi, τi))
αi(1− αi)(1− A(αi, τi))−αi(−1)∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi)
}
·{(f(~τ))1−αiωi1 + (f(~τ))−αiωi2}
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+(A(αi, τi))
αi(1− A(αi, τi))1−αi
{
(1− αi)(f(~τ))−αi ∂f
∂τi
(~τ)ωi1 + (−αi)(f(~τ))−αi−1 ∂f
∂τi
(~τ)ωi2
}
.
We group the terms in the first two lines in the expression above to obtain the first two
lines below; we also substitute for ∂f
∂τi
(~τ) from Lemma E1 and collect some common
terms in the last line above to obtain the third and fourth lines below. We have
∂vi(~τ)
∂τi
=
{
(A(αi, τi))
αi(1− A(αi, τi))1−αi(f(~τ))−αi
}
· [αi (1− A(αi, τi))− (1− αi)A(αi, τi)]
A(αi, τi)[1− A(αi, τi)]
∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi) · {(f(~τ))ωi1 + ωi2}
+
{
(A(αi, τi))
αi(1− A(αi, τi))1−αi(f(~τ))−αi
}
·
∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi)∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
{f(~τ)ωi1 + ωi2} ·
{
(1− αi)ωi1 + (−αi)(f(~τ))−1ωi2
}
.
We collect terms and use the expression for vi(~τ) obtained in (i) to simplify the expres-
sion to
∂vi(~τ)
∂τi
= vi(~τ)·∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi)·
{
αi − A(αi, τi)
A(αi, τi)[1− A(αi, τi)] +
(1− αi)ωi1 + (−αi)(f(~τ))−1ωi2∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
}
= vi(~τ)·∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi)·
{
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
1
A(αi, τi)
+
(1− αi)ωi1∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
}
,
where we incorporate the explicit form of the function f(~τ).
The next supplementary result distills the key implication obtained so far.
Lemma E2. sign
{
∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)
}
= sign
{
αi−A(αi,τi)
1−A(αi,τi)
1
A(αi,τi)
+ (1−αi)ωi1∑
j [1−A(αj ,τj)]ωj1 −
αi·ωi2∑
j A(αj ,τj)ωj2
}
Proof. Since A(αi, τi) ∈ (0, 1) and ωi ∈ R2+/{0}, from Lemma 5 (i) we have vi(~τ) > 0.
Also, by Lemma E1, ∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi) > 0. The result follows directly from Lemma 5 (ii).
For notational ease, we define
M(αi, τi) :=
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
1
A(αi, τi)
; Ni(~τ) :=
(1− αi)ωi1∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
.
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Remark 13. Evidently, ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) has the same sign as M(αi, τi) +Ni(~τ).
Our next supplementary result provides an evaluation of M(αi, τi).
Lemma E3.
M(αi, τi) =
(1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
.
Proof. Since
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi) =
αi − αiτiαiτi+(1−αi)
1− αiτi
αiτi+(1−αi)
=
(αi − 1)αiτi + αi(1− αi)
(1− αi) = αi(1− τi)
we have
M(αi, τi) =
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi) ·
1
A(αi, τi)
=
αi(1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
αiτi
=
(1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
.
We turn to the proof of Lemma 6 which establishes conditions under which there is
an interior solution to the first order condition ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0. We repeat Lemma 6 below
for convenience:
Lemma. (6) (i) If ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1 for all i ∈ I then there exists τ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∂vi
∂τi
(τ , τ−i) > 0 for τ−i ∈ [τ ,∞)I−1; (ii) if ωi1∑
j ωj1
< 1 for all i ∈ I then there exists τ > 1
such that ∂vi
∂τi
(τ , τ−i) < 0 for τ−i ∈ (0, τ ]I−1.
Proof. By Lemma E2 and E3, the sign of ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) is determined by the sign of the
expression
(1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
+
(1− αi) · ωi1∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
.
In (i) below, we ignore the positive second term and show that even so the sum of
the remaining terms is positive for τ sufficiently small. In (ii) we ignore the last term,
which is negative, and show that for τ sufficiently large the sum of the remaining terms
is, nonetheless, negative.
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(i) By hypothesis ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1 for all i ∈ I; so there must exist τ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∀ i ∈ I ωi2∑
j ωj2
< (1− τ) ⇐⇒ αi
A(αi, τ)
ωi2∑
j ωj2
< (1− τ)αiτ + (1− αi)
τ
.
But then, since A(αj, τj) is increasing in τj, for τj ≥ τ we must have
0 < (1− τ)αiτ + (1− αi)
τ
− αi · ωi2∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 + A(αi, τ)ωi2
.
That verifies the sign of the expression.
(ii) By hypothesis ωi1∑
j ωj1
< 1 for all i ∈ I; so there must exist a τ > 0 sufficiently
large such that
∀ i ∈ I ωi2∑
j ωj2
<
(
1− 1
τ
)
⇐⇒ 1− αi
[1− A(αi, τ)]
ωi2∑
j ωj2
<
(
1− 1
τ
)
[αiτ+(1−αi)].
But then, since A(αj, τj) is increasing in τj, for τj ≤ τ we must have
(1− τ)[αiτ + (1− αi)]
τ
+
(1− αi) · ωi1∑
j 6=i[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1 + [1− A(αi, τ)]ωi1
< 0.
That verifies the sign of the expression.
We now prove six supplementary results that prepare the groundwork for the proof
of Lemma 7. The first one, Lemma E4, provides an evaluation of ∂M
∂τi
(αi, τi).
Lemma E4.
∂M
∂τi
(αi, τi) = −αi − 1− αi
(τi)2
.
Proof.
∂M
∂τi
(αi, τi) =
∂
∂τi
{
(1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
}
=
τi {−[αiτi + (1− αi)] + (1− τi)αi} − (1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
(τi)2
=
−αi(τi)2 − (1− αi)τi + τi(1− τi)αi − (1− τi)αiτi − (1− τi)(1− αi)
(τi)2
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= −αi − 1− αi
(τi)2
.
In Lemma E5 we provide an evaluation of ∂Ni
∂τk
(~τ).
Lemma E5.
∂Ni
∂τk
(~τ) =
αk(1−αk)
[αkτk+(1−αk)]2[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2 {(1− αi) (f(~τ))2 · ωk1ωi1 + αi · ωi2 · ωk2} .
Proof.
∂Ni
∂τk
(~τ) =
∂
∂τi
{
(1− αi)ωi1∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
}
=
(−1)(1− αi)ωi1[− ∂A∂τk (αk, τk)ωk1][∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
]2 − (−1)αi · ωi2[ ∂A∂τk (αk, τk)ωk2][∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2
=
∂A
∂τk
(αk, τk)
 (1− αi)ωi1ωk1[∑
j [1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
]2 + αi · ωi2ωk2[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2
 ,
=
αk(1−αk)
[αkτk+(1−αk)]2[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2 {(1− αi) (f(~τ))2 · ωk1ωi1 + αi · ωi2 · ωk2} ,
where we use the expression for ∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi) obtained in Lemma E1 and the explicit form
of the function f(~τ).
Our objective is to pin down the sign of ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ) at ~τ at which ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0. The
next two supplementary results provide evaluations that are very useful in reaching our
objective.
Lemma E6. ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 if and only if
(1− αi) · (f(~τ) · ωi1)2 = − (αi)
2
1− αi · (ωi2)
2 + 2αi · f(~τ) · ωi1 · ωi2
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+
1
1− αi
[
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
]2 
[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
A(αi, τi)
2 .
Proof. From Lemma E2 we know that
∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 ⇐⇒ αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
1
A(αi, τi)
+
(1− αi)ωi1∑
j [1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
= 0.
Move the first term in the latter expression to the right, multiply each term by
[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
,
then use the definition of the function f(~τ) and rearrange the expression to obtain
(1− αi) · f(~τ) · ωi1 − αi · ωi2 = −αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
A(αi, τi)
⇐⇒ (1− αi)2 · (f(~τ) · ωi1)2 + (αi)2 · (ωi2)2 − 2(1− αi)αi · f(~τ) · ωi1 · ωi2
=
[
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
]2 
[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
A(αi, τi)
2
and the result follows.
Lemma E7. ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 if and only if
(1− 2αi)(ωi2)2 + 2(1− αi) · f(~τ) · ωi1 · ωi2
= (ωi2)
2 − 2ωi2
{
(1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
}[∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
.
Proof. From Lemma E2 we know that
∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 ⇐⇒ αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
1
A(αi, τi)
+
(1− αi)ωi1∑
j [1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
= 0.
Move the first term in the latter expression to the right, multiply each term by
[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
,
and use the definition of the function f(~τ) to obtain
(1− αi) · f(~τ) · ωi1 − αi · ωi2 = −αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
A(αi, τi)
.
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Multiply each term by 2ωi2 and rearrange to obtain
(1−2αi)(ωi2)2+2(1−αi)·f(~τ)·ωi1·ωi2 = (ωi2)2−2ωi2
αi − A(αi, τi)1− A(αi, τi)
[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
A(αi, τi)
 .
Use Lemma E3 in the expression above to get the desired result
(1− 2αi)(ωi2)2 + 2(1− αi) · f(~τ) · ωi1 · ωi2
= (ωi2)
2 − 2ωi2
{
(1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
}[∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
.
Next we use Lemma E6 and E7 in LemmaE5.
Lemma E8. If ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 then
∂Ni
∂τi
(~τ) =
(αi)
2
[αiτi+(1−αi)]2[∑
j A(αj , τj)ωj2
]
 (ωi2)2[∑
j A(αj , τj)ωj2
] − 2ωi2 (1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
+αi
{
(1− τi)
τi
}2
.
Proof. Consider the expression obtained in Lemma E5 when k = i. We have
∂Ni
∂τi
(~τ) =
αi(1−αi)
[αiτi+(1−αi)]2[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2 {(1− αi) (f(~τ) · ωi1)2 + αi · (ωi2)2} .
Use Lemma E6 to substitute for the first term within braces to obtain
∂Ni
∂τi
(~τ) =
αi(1−αi)
[αiτi+(1−αi)]2[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2 {− (αi)21− αi · (ωi2)2 + 2αi · f(~τ) · ωi1 · ωi2
+
1
1− αi
{
(1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
}2 [∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2
+ αi · (ωi2)2

=
αi(1−αi)
[αiτi+(1−αi)]2[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2 {αi(1− 2αi)1− αi · (ωi2)2 + 2αi · f(~τ) · ωi1 · ωi2
}
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+
αi(1− αi)
[αiτi + (1− αi)]2
1
1− αi
{
(1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
}2
=
(αi)
2
[αiτi+(1−αi)]2[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2 {(1− 2αi) · (ωi2)2 + 2(1− αi) · f(~τ) · ωi1 · ωi2}+αi{(1− τi)τi
}2
.
Now use the result in Lemma S.7 E7 to obtain
∂Ni
∂τi
(~τ) =
(αi)
2
[αiτi+(1−αi)]2[∑
j A(αj , τj)ωj2
]
 (ωi2)2[∑
j A(αj , τj)ωj2
] − 2ωi2 (1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
+αi
{
(1− τi)
τi
}2
.
Our penultimate supplementary result is used in Lemma 7 and 8.
Lemma E9. If ~τ is such that ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 then
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 > 0.
Proof. Since A(αj, τj) > 0, ωj2 ≥ 0 and
∑
i∈I ωi2 > 0, we have (i)
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 ≥ 0
and (ii)
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 = 0 if and only if ωj2 = 0 for all j 6= i and ωi2 > 0.
If ωj2 = 0 for all j 6= i and ωi2 > 0 then, using Lemma E2,
sign
{
∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)
}
= sign
{
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
1
A(αi, τi)
+
(1− αi)ωi1∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− αi
A(αi, τi)
}
= sign
{
αi − A(αi, τi)− [1− A(αi, τi)]αi
1− A(αi, τi) · A(αi, τi) +
(1− αi)ωi1∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
}
= sign
{
(1− αi)
{
− 1
1− A(αi, τi) +
ωi1∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
}}
< 0
unless ωj1 = 0 for all j 6= i and ωi1 > 0 in which case the expression takes the value
zero. So if ωj2 = 0 for all j 6= i and ωi2 > 0 and ~τ is such that ∂vi∂τi (~τ) = 0 then,
necessarily, ωj1 = 0 for all j 6= i and ωi1 > 0. But that contradicts our assumption
that for every i ∈ I, ωi ∈ R2+/{0}. We conclude that if ~τ is such that ∂vi∂τi (~τ) = 0 then∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 > 0.
We use Lemma E4, E8 and E9 to prove Lemma 7 which we repeat below for conve-
nience:
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Lemma. (7)
sign
{
∂2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
}
= sign
{
−2αiτiωi2 − [1− 2αi(1− τi)]
[∑
j 6=i
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]}
.
Proof. From Lemma 6 (ii), E2, and the definitions, we have
∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = vi(~τ) · ∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi) · {M(αi, τi) +Ni(~τ)} .
By Remark 13, ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 if and only if M(αi, τi) + Ni(~τ) = 0. Since
∂2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ) can be
written as the sum of three terms, it follows that at any ~τ such that ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 two
of the terms must be zero. Furthermore, as in the proof of Lemma E2, vi(~τ) > 0 and
∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi) > 0; evidently,
sign
{
∂2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
}
= sign
{
∂M
∂τi
(αi, τi)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
+ ∂N
dτi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
}
.
From Lemma E4 and E8, we have
∂M
∂τi
(αi, τi)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
+
∂N
dτi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
= −αi − 1− αi
(τi)2
+
(αi)
2
[αiτi+(1−αi)]2[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
 (ωi2)2[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
] − 2ωi2 (1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
+αi
{
(1− τi)
τi
}2
.
Since
−αi − 1− αi
(τi)2
+ αi
{
(1− τi)
τi
}2
= −1− 2αi + 2αiτi
(τi)2
= −1− 2αi(1− τi)
(τi)2
,
it follows that
sign
{
∂2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
}
= sign {Ki}
where
Ki =
(αi)
2
[αiτi+(1−αi)]2[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
 (ωi2)2[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
] − 2ωi2 (1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
−1− 2αi(1− τi)(τi)2 .
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We have
Ki
[∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2
= (ωi2)
2 (αiτi)
2
[αiτi + (1− αi)]2 −
[∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2
[1− 2αi(1− τi)]
−2ωi2 (1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
(αiτi)
2
[αiτi + (1− αi)]2
[∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
.
Introduce the notation Ai :=
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2, and simplify the expression to
obtain
Ki
[∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2
= (ωi2)
2 (αiτi)
2
[αiτi + (1− αi)]2−2ωi2
(1− τi)(αi)2τi
[αiτi + (1− αi)] [Ai + A(αi, τi)ωi2]
− [Ai + A(αi, τi)ωi2]2 [1− 2αi(1− τi)] .
Now expand the terms within brackets and collect terms to obtain
Ki
[∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2
= − [1− 2αi(1− τi)] [A(αi, τi)ωi2]2+(ωi2)2 (αiτi)
2
[αiτi + (1− αi)]2−2ωi2
(1− τi)(αi)2τi
[αiτi + (1− αi)] [A(αi, τi)ωi2]
− [1− 2αi(1− τi)] [2Ai · A(αi, τi)ωi2]− 2ωi2 (1− τi)(αi)
2τi
[αiτi + (1− αi)] [Ai]
− [1− 2αi(1− τi)] (Ai)2 ,
which, upon recalling the definition of A(αi, τi), may be simplified to
Ki
[∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2
=
(αiτi)
2
[αiτi + (1− αi)]2 {− [1− 2αi(1− τi)] + 1− 2(1− τi)αi} (ωi2)
2
− 2αiτi
[αiτi + (1− αi)] {[1− 2αi(1− τi)] + (1− τi)αi} [Aiωi2]
− [1− 2αi(1− τi)] (Ai)2 .
Evidently, the coefficients in the first term on the right add up to zero and the second
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term can be simplified to obtain
Ki
[∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]2
= −2αiτi [1− αi(1− τi)]
[αiτi + (1− αi)] [Aiωi2]− [1− 2αi(1− τi)] (Ai)
2
= −Ai {2αiτiωi2 + [1− 2αi(1− τi)]Ai} .
By Lemma E9, at ~τ such that ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0,
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 > 0, i.e. Ai > 0, and so,
at such a ~τ ,
sign
{
∂2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
}
= sign
{
−2αiτiωi2 − [1− 2αi(1− τi)]
[∑
j 6=i
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]}
where we recall that Ai :=
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2.
Our last supplementary result is used in Lemma 8 to claim that ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
6=
0.
Lemma E10. The equations
2αiτiωi2 + [1− 2αi(1− τi)]
[∑
j 6=i
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
= 0
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
1
A(αi, τi)
+
(1− αi)ωi1∑
j [1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
= 0
cannot hold simultaneously.
Proof. Set Ai :=
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2, and rewrite the first equation as
−2αiτiωi2−[1− 2αi(1− τi)]Ai = 0 ⇐⇒ αi(1−τi)Ai = αiτiωi2+Ai
2
. (∗)
Now observe that
(1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
τi
[∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
−αiωi2 = αi(1− τi)
A(αi, τi)
[Ai + A(αi, τi)ωi2]−αiωi2,
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where we use the definition of A(αi, τi),
=
αiτiωi2
A(αi, τi)
+
Ai
2A(αi, τi)
+ αi(1− τi)ωi2 − αiωi2,
where we use (∗),
=
αiτiωi2
A(αi, τi)
+
Ai
2A(αi, τi)
− αiτiωi2 = αiτiωi2
[
1
A(αi, τi)
− 1
]
+
Ai
2A(αi, τi)
> 0
if ωi2 > 0; this is because 1 > A(αi, τi) and Ai ≥ 0. Recall Lemma E3 to conclude that
if ωi2 > 0 then
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
1
A(αi, τi)
[∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
− αiωi2 > 0.
Since ωi 6= (0, 0), it is evident that
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
1
A(αi, τi)
[∑
j
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
+(1−αi)ωi1
[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
∑
j [1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
−αiωi2 > 0
and the result follows since, under our maintained assumptions,
[∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
>
0.
Below we provide the proof of Lemma 8 which we repeat below for convenience:
Lemma. (8)
∂2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
6= 0
If αi ≤ 1/2 or if ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1 then ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
< 0.
Proof. Lemma 7, Lemma E2 and Lemma E10 directly imply that ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
6= 0.
If αi ≤ 1/2 then 0 < 1 − 2αi(1 − τi) for all τi > 0, and the required result follows
directly from Lemma 7.
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We turn to the case where αi > 1/2. Let τˆi be the unique value such that
ωi2 =
[2αi(1− τˆi)− 1]
2αiτˆi
·
[∑
j 6=i
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]
.
Observe that
sign
{
−2αiτiωi2 − [1− 2αi (1− τi)]
[∑
j 6=i
A(αj, τj)ωj2
]}
=

1 if τi ∈ (0, τˆi)
0 if τi = τˆi
−1 if τi ∈ (τˆi,+∞) .
Since ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1, By Lemma 6 (i), there exists τ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂vi
∂τi
(τ , τi) > 0
for τ−i ∈ [τ ,∞)I−1. Notice that, since ∂vi∂τi (τ , τ−i) > 0, if ~τ is such that ∂vi∂τi (~τ) = 0 then
τi 6= τ .
We have three cases to consider. (i) If τˆi < τ then the result follows from the obser-
vation above, which assures us that the sign of the expression in brackets is negative,
and Lemma 7. (ii) If τˆi = τ , then, since
∂vi
∂τi
(τ , τ−i) > 0, if ~τ is such that ∂vi∂τi (~τ) = 0
then, necessarily, τi > τ = τˆi, and the argument given in (i) can be used. (iii) Consider
the case where τ < τˆi and let ~τ be such that
∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0. If for such a ~τ we have τi > τˆi
then we can use the argument given in (i). We turn to the case that remains in which
~τ is such that τ < τi ≤ τˆi as we have already shown that τi 6= τ .
So consider first ~τ such that ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 and τi ∈ (τ , τˆi). By the observation above,
which assures us that the sign of the expression in brackets is positive, and Lemma
7, we must have ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
> 0. Since ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) is a continuous function, and
∂vi
∂τi
(τ , τ−i) > 0, the Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there must exist ~˜τ with
τ˜i ∈ (τ , τˆi) with ∂2vi∂τi ∂τi (~˜τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~˜τ)=0
< 0; Here we use the fact that the value τˆi is unique
so by the observation above and Lemma 7, ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
6= 0 . But then, by Lemma
7, the sign of the expression in the observation made earlier must also be negative. But
that contradicts the observation above, since the sign of the expression must be positive
for all τi ∈ (0, τˆi).
The remaining case where ~τ is such that ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 and τi = τˆi is ruled out since
∂2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ)
∣∣∣∣ ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ)=0
6= 0.
Below we provide a proof of Proposition 9, which we repeat below for convenience:
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Proposition. (9) Assume that the vector of endowments is not a Pareto optimal allo-
cation and that ωi1∑
j ωj1
< 1 for all i ∈ I. Then at every interior Nash equilibrium there
is trade.
Proof. Let ~τ be an interior Nash equilibrium profile of tariff rates. It follows ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0
for each i ∈ I. By Lemma E2, for each i ∈ I,
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
1
A(αi, τi)
+
(1− αi)ωi1∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
= 0
⇐⇒ αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
A(αi, τi)
+(1−αi)ωi1−
αi · ωi2
∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
= 0 (∗)
since, under our maintained hypotheses,
∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1 > 0.
Suppose that the interior Nash equilibrium has the additional property that there
is no trade. It follows that at p∗2(~τ), (xi1 (p
∗
2 (~τ)) , xi2 (p
∗
2 (~τ))) = ωi for all i ∈ I. So i’s
first order condition in the domestic market for the two goods, xi2 =
(1−αi)
αiτip∗2(~τ)
xi1, must
hold at (xi1, xi2) = ωi. To summarize, for each i ∈ I, in addition to (∗), the following
must be true:
p∗2(~τ) =
1
τi
(1− αi)/ωi2
αi/ωi1
p∗2(~τ) =
∑
i[1− A(αi, τi)]ωi1∑
iA(αi, τi)ωi2
.
It follows that, for all i ∈ I,
αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
A(αi, τi)
+ (1− αi)ωi1 − αi · ωi2 1
τi
(1− αi)/ωi2
αi/ωi1
= 0
⇐⇒ αi − A(αi, τi)
1− A(αi, τi)
∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
A(αi, τi)
+
(
1− 1
τi
)
(1− αi)ωi1 = 0,
which, upon using Lemma E3, becomes
⇐⇒
(
1− 1
τi
){
−[αiτi + (1− αi)]
∑
j
[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1 + (1− αi)ωi1
}
= 0,
so that at least one of the two expressions within brackets must be zero.
If
(
1− 1
τi
)
= 0 for each i ∈ I, then ~τ = (1, · · · , 1) and from i’s first order condition
in the domestic market for the two goods, at the interior Nash equilibrium under consid-
eration, marginal rates of substitution are equalized across countries. This can happen
only if the endowment distribution is also a Pareto optimal allocation, a situation which
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we have ruled out. It follows that for each i ∈ I
[αiτi + (1− αi)]
∑
j
[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1 = (1− αi)ωi1
⇐⇒
∑
j
[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1 = [1− A(αi, τi)]ωi1,
where we use the fact that αiτi + (1− αi) > 0 together with the definition of A(αi, τi).
These are I equations with 1 − A(αi, τi) > 0 and ωi1 ≥ 0 for each i ∈ I, and ωi1 > 0
for at least two countries. It is evident that the equations cannot hold simultaneously.
We have shown that assuming that there is no trade at the interior Nash equilibrium
results in a contradiction.
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